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The construction industry recognises the hazardous nature of its activities, which can be seen in the 
high toll of accidents its workers suffer compared with other industries - ranging from lost time injuries to 
fatalities. There is also a high incidence of ill-health among construction workers, including fatal diseases 
such as cancer arising from asbestos exposure. However, the industry may not be sufficiently aware of the 
potential for it to be associated with more major or catastrophic events (those involving multiple deaths 
and/or significant damage to property and infrastructure). 
Larger construction organisations have been applying ‘holistic’ risk management techniques to manage
project risk. Low probability but high-consequence issues have often been included in these considerations. 
Most issues addressed have had purely commercial consequences eg sudden loss of a major contract or 
customer. However, some issues do have significant health and safety implications. 
This project has examined these ‘low probability but high-consequence’ safety hazards by looking at: 
n the types of catastrophic event which have occurred or which might occur during construction; 
n the reasons for occurrence when there have been (or could have been) catastrophic events during 
construction, including an examination of the underlying factors; 
n the controls which should contribute to an avoidance of a catastrophic event; and 
n where the UK construction industry could improve. 
This report and the work it describes were funded by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Its contents, 
including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily 
reflect HSE policy. 
HSE Books 
     
 
  
 
         
          
             
         
          
          
       
        
     
 
         
           
        
      
 
     
       
         
         
         
   
 
            
      
            
           
          
     
 
          
  
         
         
       
             
       
 
PREVENTING CATASTROPHIC EVENTS IN CONSTRUCTION
Executive summary
The construction industry recognises the hazardous nature of its activities, which manifests 
itself in the high toll of accidents its workers suffer compared with other industries. These 
range from lost time injuries to fatalities. There is also a high incidence of ill-health among 
construction workers including fatal diseases such as cancer arising from asbestos exposure. 
However, the industry may not be sufficiently aware of the potential for it to be associated 
with more major events (those involving multiple deaths and/or significant damage to property 
and infrastructure). These major or catastrophic events may have wide implications such as 
extensive delay or project failure, significant business impact, loss of money and loss of 
reputation for all concerned.
Health and safety risk management in the industry has traditionally focused upon preventing 
accidents arising from the most significant hazards such as falls from height (the biggest killer 
on site) but more recently there has been a welcome growth in the understanding of latent 
health problems, which can emerge years after exposure.
And increasingly, larger construction organisations have been applying ‘holistic’ risk 
management techniques to manage project risk and low probability but high-consequence
issues will have been included in these considerations. Many of the issues addressed have had 
purely commercial consequences e.g. sudden loss of a major contract or customer. However, 
some have health and safety implications - this project has examined these ‘low probability but 
high-consequence’ safety hazards.
In even more hazardous industries such as the chemical, oil and gas and the nuclear and rail 
industries, major hazard scenarios are required to be examined in depth. These potentially 
catastrophic events are sometimes referred to as ‘Top Events’. It is appreciated that they can 
have a disastrous impact on a company’s reputation and well-being and upon society. The 
process of examining the risk of a catastrophic event requires that a ‘safety case’ is prepared, 
based upon a safety risk assessment.
This project has looked at the risks of ‘Catastrophic Events’ in the UK construction industry as 
follows:
§ The types of catastrophic event which have occurred or which might occur during 
construction 
§ The reasons for occurrence when there have been (or could have been) catastrophic 
events during construction, including an examination of the underlying factors
§ The controls which should contribute to an avoidance of a catastrophic event
§ Where the UK construction industry could improve. 
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To examine these issues the following approach was taken: 
§ Review the literature 
§ Find out what people thought, by consultation and by means of an on-line survey and 
focus group events 
§ Examine a number of ‘case study’ events which were, or could have been, 

catastrophic 

§ Review all the information gathered and suggest where the industry should focus its 
attention to make improvements.
It was clear that there have been Catastrophic Events with major consequences. Their 
importance was recognised by the industry, although it is considered that in their day-to-day 
work few people realised the severity of what might happen if things went seriously wrong. 
Examples of Catastrophic Events are given in the report.
Certain issues emerged which were considered to require attention from the industry: these are 
discussed in detail in the report and are summarised as follows:
Issue 1: The industry should recognise that catastrophic events need further attention
We found that Catastrophic Events are a significant cause for concern and have not received 
the attention they deserve. Accordingly they should be considered in an appropriate manner 
and preventative action should be taken as an inherent part of normal construction activity. 
Issue 2: Corporate risk management systems should be improved
We found that many events had occurred which had significantly impacted at board level upon 
both construction organisations and upon clients. In order to respond to obligations imposed by 
legislation and The Turnbull Report1, companies’ organisational risk management should 
include consideration of how well Catastrophic Event risks are being managed. The use of 
industry-relevant indicators should be explored to support such activity.
Issue 3: Knowledge, skills and experience of safety risk management should be raised
The case studies frequently demonstrated a failure among project personnel at all levels to 
adequately identify the full extent of hazards and address the risks arising; other sources 
demonstrated a considerable degree of uncertainty and a lack of confidence in the industry’s 
knowledge, skills and experience of safety risk management. This suggested that more 
emphasis needed to be given to: 
§ Education of those who will be entering the industry 
§ CPD and on-the-job training 
§ Development of more effective safety risk management systems. 
1 The Turnbull Report, Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (1999) applies to listed companies but is 
good practice for all companies.
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This issue offers the best promise for long-term incremental improvement and involves all 
stakeholders.
Issue 4: Communication and interface management should be improved
The research emphasised the need for effective communication about hazards and particularly 
the importance of effective management of risk at interfaces between and within organisations. 
The report explores areas where improvements can be made.
This issue underpins the improvement of performance in other issue topics and involves all 
stakeholders. 
Issue 5: Competence is key
As expected, the issue of competence (which underpins CDM 20071) was seen to be important. 
In particular the competent fulfilment of the role of Principal Contractor2 on site was identified 
as central to avoiding Catastrophic Events in construction.
The industry should develop proposals for ensuring that inappropriate Principal Contractors 
(or more accurately inappropriate persons) do not become responsible for sites where there are 
risks which could lead to Catastrophic Events; all stakeholders need to be consulted on how 
this might be achieved.
Issue 6: Effective management of temporary works is crucial to success
It was apparent from many case studies that insufficient consideration was being given to the 
management of temporary works in its widest sense. This work must be taken seriously and 
include all temporary works aspects, including issues relating to cranes and scaffolding. 
The potential impact of failures of temporary works needs to be considered carefully to reduce 
the likelihood of a Catastrophic Event occurring and the industry needs to seek to improve 
performance in this vital area. All stakeholders should be consulted on how to achieve this 
improvement.
Issue 7: Independent reviews should be employed
Evidence was found that the effective use of independent review, from an early stage and 
ongoing, would have reduced the risk of a catastrophic event.
Evidence was also found of projects where there was inadequate independent review of what 
was happening on site and there was concern in the industry that levels of effective supervision 
had been stripped away over recent decades.
1 CDM 2007, the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 
2 Noting that on smaller projects where there is no legal requirement for a Principal Contractor, the Main Contractor will assume 
overall responsibility for site safety.
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These issues need to be explored further and encouragement given for clients to seek 
independent authoritative advice.
Issue 8: The industry should learn from experience
Learning from experiences was not found to be well-rooted in the industry. There was lack of 
confidence that: 
§ Learning was shared rapidly  
§ Lessons were incorporated into the education and training process 
§ Information could be easily accessed 
There was however activity which needed to be encouraged and supported: 
§ The work of SCOSS1 and CROSS2 (which needs to be more widely appreciated and 
publicised) 
§ The work of the various industry bodies and groupings3 that provide guidance. Ways 
to improve their effective performance should be investigated and their activities 
should be inclusive of all industry stakeholders. 
Key definitions
We found terms which are in use but which need to be better defined and understood; they are 
explored in the Glossary to this report.
Conclusion
Catastrophic Events in construction are real issues which require proper consideration by all 
stakeholders, led by directors and senior staff. There are opportunities for improvement of 
performance and all stakeholder groups should be involved in agreeing what should be done 
and making the necessary changes.
1SCOSS, the Standing Committee on Structural Safety (see Glossary)
2 CROSS, Confidential Reporting on Structural Safety (see Glossary) 
3 For examples, see 9.1.1 
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PART ONE – Report on the construction industry and Catastrophic Events

1.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Preface
Health and safety in construction 
Health and safety has always been important in the construction industry, which suffers from a 
higher incidence rate of death, injuries and ill-health compared with other sectors.
Over recent decades there has been a concerted and increasingly successful effort to improve 
performance, driven by legislation, industry improvements and societal change. Harming people 
is no longer seen as an inevitable by-product of constructing. Companies and individuals have 
striven to improve performance and they have had some success. However, much remains to be 
done.  
Other dangerous industries 
At the same time, the huge risks which exist in particularly dangerous industries such as chemical 
and nuclear have received particular attention. Regular disasters which have affected large 
numbers of people, such as Bhopal, and major losses such as Piper Alpha have fostered a rigorous 
assessment of risk, using advanced analytical techniques. Despite these advances, catastrophes do 
still occur; BP’s environmental, financial and reputational disaster in the gulf of Mexico being the 
latest (although it is rarely mentioned that there were multiple fatalities at the time of the initial 
explosion). These types of event are known as events with ‘Major Accident Potential’ and also 
sometimes as ‘Top Events’ in the chemical industry – avoiding them is an essential issue for every 
Board involved in such projects.
Catastrophic Events in construction; the brief 
This report examines the risk of Catastrophic Events faced during construction by the construction 
industry and asks the questions, what are Catastrophic Events in construction? (and) what can be 
done to seek to prevent them? The research has sought inputs from people active in the industry 
and examined a large number of actual (case study) events, looking for trends and messages. The 
brief for this work was in no way prescriptive and the researchers were free to pursue their 
enquiries and to draw conclusions, with a view to challenging the industry to address issues which 
appeared to offer the best chance for improvement in performance.
This report in context; messages for the construction industry 
Inevitably, given the size and variety of work undertaken in construction and the very flexible 
systems involved, in conjunction with the complexity of human behaviour and interaction, the 
findings of the research did not evidence simple conclusions. However, from the vast amount of 
information received some important messages did emerge which are worthy of further 
consideration by the industry. The report therefore does not offer panaceas, but points out where 
thought and effort is most needed to reduce the risk of further catastrophic events on our sites.  
It is for the construction industry to respond. 
8 
    
  
 
 
        
          
            
         
           
       
          
          
       
             
          
             
         
  
      
 
 
  
            
         
             
        
             
           
            
          
     
  
 
 
     
         
           
         
          
           
          
           
          
         
  
1.5 Message from the HSE 
Mike Cross, Head of HSE Construction Engineering Specialists
It is vitally important for HSE to have a clear understanding of the hazard 
and risk profiles of the industries we regulate in order to inform how we 
should go about that work most effectively. Construction has always been 
regarded as one of GB's most dangerous industries based on its high 
incidence rates of deaths and injuries. Comprehensive data from RIDDOR 
and elsewhere about these deaths and injuries has allowed a detailed 
analysis of causes and trends in conventional incidents to inform priorities 
and workplans. However, low probability high consequence events are 
much less amenable to this sort of analysis and this project was initiated to 
improve the understanding by HSE and the industry so that effective 
action can be taken. It is a very important first step - my hope is that it 
elicits a positive response from the construction industry to the issues it 
has raised. 
1.6 Messages from the authors of this report 
Alan Gilbertson, CIRIA 
This work has brought me close to many sad events, in which people have 
been killed and injured, including both people in our industry and 
members of the general public. I have also seen how often there has been 
‘a close shave’ where only ‘luck’ decided how severe the consequences 
were. I hope that our industry will take the issues we raise seriously and 
respond in a positive manner; there is always room for improvement and 
we can all make a difference. Recent events in the Gulf of Mexico have 
also reinforced the extent to which commercial issues can be deeply 
affected by an engineering failure.
Joseph Kappia, Loughborough University
My background is in human factors research and the construction industry 
is an example of an industry where human behaviour and interaction is 
central to all aspects of performance. My research on this project into 
performance as it affects safety, and particularly the more extreme events, 
has demonstrated the variability and complexity of the industry and of its 
processes. The behaviour of people lies at the heart of nearly all the 
events we examined as case studies and it is through addressing their 
skills and behaviour and the systems within which they work and interact 
that the industry should be able to forge ahead.
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Lee Bosher, Loughborough University
To the layperson the construction industry may not appear to present the 
types of risks associated with other industries (such as the petrochemical 
industry) or indeed the threats associated with large scale natural hazards 
(such as earthquakes and floods). However, this report highlights that 
high impact, but low probability, events on construction sites need to be 
taken seriously. Rather than reactively dealing with the aftermath of such 
events, a proactive and proportionate approach to risk management is 
advocated. Amongst other matters, this report places the responsibility for 
risk management across many disciplines at organisational, project and 
site levels. 
Alistair Gibb, Loughborough University
In my earlier career in construction I have sadly had a number of personal 
experiences of major incidents which have brought home to me the need 
for this work – ALL risks need to be managed and, whilst there has been a 
helpful emphasis in the last few years on the less obvious hazards such as 
occupational health, we must not allow this to detract from the need to 
consider ‘What is the worst thing that could happen on our project?’
1.7 Messages from the project steering group
In traditional CIRIA fashion, the work has been overseen and guided by a strong industry project 
steering group. Representative members of the steering group have provided these messages:
Vaughan Burnand, Chairman of Constructing Excellence and 
Chairman of the Health and Safety Panel of the Strategic Forum
Our progress in Construction Health and Safety has been good with 
excellent reduction in fatalities and AFRs as we work towards a zero 
harm industry. However we must learn from ours and other industry’s 
experiences because we are all too close to potential catastrophic events. 
The words ‘we were lucky’ is too often applied to near hits, accidents, 
reportables and even fatalities. We need to really understand and 
communicate the root causes of these events rather than breathe sighs of 
relief. This paper makes an excellent start.
Paul Bussey, Associate, Scott Brownrigg; Architect and member of 
DIOHAS  
As an Architect primarily representing the Designers Initiative on Health 
and Safety (DIOHAS), and as a Registered CDM-C, it has been a great 
insight to me, working with the engineering and contracting world
analysing and mitigating Catastrophic Events. The potential for such 
"low likelihood but high consequence events" occurring on most 
Architectural Projects is low, but not insignificant. This research will 
hopefully cast more light on the proportionate consideration of whether 
or not these are "greater than normal" significant risks under the current 
CDM 2007 Regulations or need further legislative clarification. 
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Paul Ebbutt, Principal Client Engineer, Civils – London 
Underground  
Catastrophe in construction does happen and the experience is that there 
will be significant impact on business; the operations, the customers and 
the staff. Clients have a key role in construction projects; they should 
take appropriate professional advice and also take note of comments and 
observations from all levels of the project organisation. This includes 
listening to the bad news as well as the good news. The level of risk and 
responsibility passed onto the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
projects is of concern. Clients must accept responsibility for the risks 
associated with their project ambitions and for the way risks are 
managed in the project. Risk cannot be just passed on down the supply 
chain.
John Carpenter, Consultant, Secretary to SCOSS, Reviewer of this 
report 
Any process which is designed to identify major hazards and then plan 
for their safe management will not only help to avoid catastrophe, but is 
likely to bring overall benefit to the project as a consequence of the 
forethought and associated planning activity. This Report is an important 
step in this direction. 
Laura Hague, Mott MacDonald, representing the Major 
Consultants Health and Safety Forum
Designers have a key role to play in managing risk on construction sites.
By identifying risks early in the design process we can have a significant 
impact in eliminating and minimising the major hazards of construction 
and maintenance. As always, effective communication with other 
stakeholders on the project is essential – as the HSE put it - getting the 
right information, for the right people at the right time. This is our 
challenge and one that the whole industry must rise to. 
Paul Hoyland, Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering Limited 
This report is particularly relevant for an industry such as tunnelling, 
where the consequences of collapse can be so catastrophic. There is no 
doubt that a focus on recognising and addressing all high consequence 
risks is essential, including those risks which are considered to have a 
low probability.
11
      
  
       
          
         
           
             
            
        
  
  
 
     
          
        
         
       
        
          
           
       
          
          
            
         
 
  
 
      
           
         
    
         
            
           
         
 
  
 
    
          
        
        
          
    
 
 
 
 
Gordon Masterton, Jacobs, Chairman of SCOSS and of the CIC’s 
Health and Safety Committee 
Many construction projects carry the risk of a catastrophic event 
occurring. Recognising this risk is its first step in its prevention. This 
report provides essential guidance to all involved in construction and 
applying the guidance will go a long way towards creating an industry 
that is even safer for its workers and the public. We cannot rest until we 
achieve an industry that has zero tolerance to injury and can embark on 
major projects confidently planning for zero injury to workers and 
public.
Alan Powderham, Mott MacDonald, member of SCOSS 
Major hazards in construction are an ever present threat and, while their 
occurrence is relatively rare, we must maintain our awareness and 
vigilance to avoid them. Civil engineering projects typically involve the 
challenges presented by a wide variety of risks. These range across 
programme, commercial and technical aspects and are often inter­
related. However, while it is essential to adopt a holistic approach to 
safety, we must, at the same time, avoid the temptation to adopt too 
generic an approach. We must differentiate between safety risks and 
risks in general. If safety is not adequately maintained, any effort in risk 
management as a whole may be critically compromised. I commend this 
report as a rich source of knowledge and distilled experience as a basis 
for a more informed approach to addressing major hazards in 
construction.
Peter Robertshaw, Osborne, representing the UKCG
The UKCG and I have been delighted to be involved in this project, to 
identify potential means to prevent future saddening losses from low-
probability, high-consequence events.  I consider that this report can 
help the industry to manage the risks associated with such events, as 
only with knowledge can we truly manage and hence reduce the risk to 
our fellow workers. The industry should embrace this report and make it 
something that is read by both our current and future construction 
industry leaders. 
Clive Sherwood, Charteris Insurance, representing the ABI 
The Insurance industry plays a major role in encouraging good risk 
management practices within the Construction industry. Insurers do not 
just deliver claims services, we also promote important prevention 
principles and ensure that Catastrophic events are understood and help to 
reduce risk in the future. 
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Philip Willis, CDM Co-ordinator at Jackson Coles, Chairman of 
DIOHAS  
With thirty years in the construction industry in architectural practice 
and as a CDM Co-ordinator, I was delighted to participate as a member 
of the steering group in view of the obvious contrast with my day to day 
work. Normally working with designers in the identification, elimination 
and control of hazards with the potential to affect people over long 
periods; from the inception of a design to the demolition of the resulting 
structure, on this project we were concerned with incidents capable of 
affecting very much larger numbers of people in a single instant.
1.8 The structure of this report 
This report is designed to present the results of research in a form which is accessible for busy 
people in our industry. It is in the following parts:
§ An executive summary 
§ Part one of the report (sections 1 to 4) which discusses our findings in terms of the issues 
which we identified in Part 2, focused towards identifying key issues which the industry 
needs to address
§ Part two of the report (sections 5 to 10) which provides details of the research undertaken 
and analysis of what was learnt, underpinning the discussion in Part 1 
§ Supporting appendices, including a Glossary discussing commonly-used terms. 
References are generally provided as footnotes but in Section 6: Literature Review they are 
provided at the end of the section.
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2. Catastrophic Events in construction
2.1 CONSTRUCTION – A DANGEROUS INDUSTRY 
Around the world, construction has the reputation of being a dangerous industry and in the UK 
statistical records place it amongst the most dangerous, albeit it has made great improvements in 
the last decade. In 2009–20010 there were 42 fatal accidents giving a rate of 2.2 per 100 000 
workers. This is the third highest rate of fatal injuries, behind only agriculture and extractive 
industries. Most incidents affect only one worker but occasionally two or more may be killed or 
injured by a single event. More rarely still, members of the public have been killed during 
construction work, although thankfully in recent decades this has (research suggests ‘by chance’) 
been a rare occurrence in the UK.
Understanding why the industry is so dangerous has been the focus of research activity in recent 
years. The studies undertaken by Latham1, Egan2 and Wolstenholme3 and the behaviours 
researched by Loughborough University and others (in particular for the Donaghy Report4) suggest 
an industry which has many unique features, including an ever-present need to manage a wide 
variety of risks at all levels of operation and throughout the design and construction process.
The industry is unique compared to other sectors in the way which ever-changing teams of people 
interact to achieve a succession of essentially unique structures on different sites. The industry 
therefore needs to be (and is) highly flexible and responsive - and it has to manage risk in 
constantly-changing and highly varied environments which present many hazards.  
2.2 SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT IN CONSTRUCTION 
In response to the dangers inherent in UK construction, legislation has been passed which 
supplements the basic legal requirement for employers and others to ensure the health and safety of 
employees and others at risk. The key legislation is CDM 2007 (see Glossary), which sets out clear 
responsibilities for duty-holders, complemented by other specific legislation about particular issues 
such as the use of work equipment.  
In response to the legislation, designers and contractors have to identify hazards, eliminate them if 
possible, reduce the level of risk from the remaining hazards and control the residual risks. This can 
be described as ‘safety risk management’ and CDM 2007 explains what actions are required, 
including cooperation and coordination between the duty-holders and the provision of information 
where it is required.  
CDM 2007 also defines the scope of ‘construction’ and it must be recognised that: 
§ Construction activity involves work on a wide range of ‘structures’
§ New-build is only part of the work activity; maintenance, cleaning, refurbishment, 
adaptation and finally demolition are all considered to be construction activities.
1 Latham, M, Constructing The Team, HMSO, 1994
2 Report of the Construction Task Force, Foreword by Sir John Egan, HMSO, 1998 
3 Wolstenholme, A, Never Waste a Good Crisis, Constructing Excellence, 2009 
4 Donaghy, R, One Death is Too Many, TSO, 2009 
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2.3	 CONSTRUCTION HAZARDS 
In order to manage the risk, the hazards themselves must first be recognised. Some generic hazards 
are highlighted by specific regulations (eg working at height, working with asbestos) but many are 
not. Both designers and contractors are required to be able to envisage the dangers presented by the 
hazards which are or might be present and be able to understand them and handle them during the 
safety risk management process.
Some hazards are ubiquitous and they should be easily recognised and dealt with during risk 
assessment. Safe ways of working will have been developed and documented by contractors for 
dealing with generic hazards. However, many hazards will be affected by site conditions and 
project specifics. For example, working on scaffold erection will involve much work which is 
generic, but the specific challenges on a particular site must be taken into consideration before 
planning and organising the work. The identification and consideration of hazards must therefore 
take account of site and project specifics. 
2.4	 CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 
Some of the hazards on a project could have very severe consequences and, for the purposes of this 
report, these will be termed ‘Catastrophic Events’, involving multiple casualties on and/or off-site 
or other gross impacts.
Catastrophic Events are events that are beyond the ordinary or 
routine and are characterised by being of 
low probability but high consequence.
Examples of occurrences which may be Catastrophic Events are:
§ Structural collapse of permanent structure 
§ Collapse of temporary works
§ Collapse of plant or equipment, such as cranes
§ Fire 
§ Tunnel collapse 
§ Disruption of underground services. 
Typically, these events will involve the uncontrolled release of large amounts of stored energy and 
as such will – once they start – be very difficult (or impossible) to control.  
Catastrophic events would be those having the following potential consequences:
§ Potential for multiple deaths and serious injuries in a single incident and/or
§ Serious disruption of infrastructure (eg road, rail ) and/or services (eg power, 
telecoms) 
In addition, such events may well have the following features:
§ Ability to adversely affect organisations commercially, either directly or through loss 
of reputation 
§ Creation of public demand for action, possibly leading to demand for a public 
enquiry and/or changes to relevant legislation. 
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The fact that such events are exceptional in the UK (compared to other countries) is a tribute to the 
levels of skill and care evidenced in UK construction. However, the fact that such events do occur, 
no matter how infrequently, and the fact that the potential for their occurrence is ever-present is 
sufficient reason for them to be considered, particularly when it is borne in mind that most of the 
case studies discussed later in this report were only potentially catastrophic because of chance (ie 
‘luck’) and not because of the success of precautions being taken on those projects.
It might be suggested that attention to catastrophic events might displace attention from more 
ordinary or ‘routine’ hazards and risks. On the contrary, in examining catastrophic event risk, it is 
hoped that other hazards and risks would necessarily be discussed. Moreover, raising safety risk 
management up the commercial agenda should similarly improve the level of attention given to the 
subject as a whole and the levels of knowledge and skill evidenced by those in the industry. 
It might also be suggested that mentioning the commercial consequences of a catastrophic event 
risks confusing safety risks and risks in general; for example, balancing safety risk against cost or 
risk to programme. This is not intended – indeed, in the UK it would not be legal as safety risks 
must be effectively managed, using the 'so far as is reasonably practicable' test.
2.5 THE CONSEQUENCES OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 
When one of these rare events does occur the consequences can be far reaching. Apart from the 
high human cost, the direct financial costs can be enormous. The site might be taken over by the 
police and HSE for days or weeks as evidence is collected. Time and cost will also arise from the 
work necessary to make the site safe again and clear away materials and equipment. However, 
these immediate impacts can easily be dwarfed by the impact of the event upon project completion 
and, in the long-term, damage to reputation leading to loss of future business. 
There can also be wider implications. The public and media are much more exercised by single, 
catastrophic events, than by a steady toll of ‘routine’ incidents, which can lead to an outcry for 
‘something to be done’ including demand for more legislation. 
During consultation it became evident that there is also a post-event human toll, as there is for any 
incident. Pressures upon those involved (both directly and because of a role within a company) are 
invariably enormous and (because of the protracted investigative and legal processes) also lengthy, 
running into many years. Quite apart from the diversion from other duties, emotional impact can 
affect performance.
The potential consequences of catastrophic events may be 
wide-ranging and long-lasting. 
For all of these reasons, directors and senior managers need to understand the immediate and 
underlying causes of catastrophic events and have in place effective strategies that can adequately 
address the potential for them to cause major disruption to their businesses.
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The potential impact of a catastrophic event upon a company
means that directors and senior managers need to consider
the risks they are exposed to and manage accordingly. 
The research undertaken (see Section 7, the on-line survey) suggests that ‘Catastrophic Events’ are 
not being consciously considered on all projects.
Requirements for directors to consider risks which could seriously affect a company’s well-being 
are now established following the Turnbull Report1 quite apart from risk of prosecution under 
Health and Safety Legislation and the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.
Exactly how directors and the senior managers who support them should monitor the state of play 
in their organization requires serious consideration. Over-emphasis on trends in day-to-day issues 
such as lost time injuries and compliance with safety regulations may lead to a misplaced feeling 
that all is well, while potential catastrophic events are not appreciated or the factors which 
influence their likelihood considered. This issue was a factor in the BP’s Texas City disaster in 
1995, where reported safety performance was improving but inadequate safety-critical maintenance 
was not being monitored or reported directly to directors. Recently, work on the subject of 
appropriate performance indicators for the chemical industry has been carried out in the UK2 but so 
far no similar work which is directly relevant to the construction industry appears to have been 
carried out.
We found that many events have occurred which have impacted at 

director level upon both construction companies and upon

client organisations.  

Organisational risk management of companies should respond by 

including consideration of how well the risk of catastrophic events is 

being managed; the use of industry-relevant indicators should be 

explored to support such activity. 

In considering the use of relevant indicators for use by top managers, the issue of incident reporting 
needs to be addressed. It is human nature to under-report incidents, yet they may provide 
organisations (and the wider industry) with warnings which need to be heeded and acted upon. 
2.6	 CONSIDERATION OF POTENTIAL CATASTROPHIC EVENTS DURING 
SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT
Hazardous situations which could potentially cause a catastrophic event need to be identified and 
managed as part of the safety risk management process. The aspect of safety risk management 
which relates to a potential catastrophic event is considering what catastrophic event (or events) 
might occur and then managing the risks involved in a proportionate manner.
1 The Turnbull Report, Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code , 1999 
2 HSG 254, Developing process safety indicators, HSE, 2006 
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It was notable that the on-line survey showed overwhelming support (93%) for the proposition that 
where construction involves a major risk such as risk to lots of people, extra precautions should be 
taken. Therefore, ensuring that potential catastrophic events are identified and dealt with in a 
proportionate manner appears to be sensible. Exactly how the construction industry seeks to ensure 
that this happens then becomes the issue. 
How the issue of catastrophic events is managed in the chemical/oil-and-gas industry (which is 
regulated by COMAH, see Glossary) is briefly discussed in section 2.8 for perspective. It is not 
suggested that parallel processes are required in the construction industry, but the techniques used 
may be helpful and they may be adapted to suit the construction industry.
2.7 LEADERSHIP 
The need for directors and senior managers to engage with ‘Catastrophic Event thinking’ can only 
be helpful to the consideration of wider health and safety issues because of the increased level of 
attention and commitment being shown by leaders to the safety risk management process.  
Leadership is an essential ingredient for change – and changing the way a company works so as to 
avoid a catastrophe is a good investment for leaders.
‘One of the true tests of leadership is the ability to recognise
a problem before it becomes an emergency.’ 
Arnold Glasgow
The HSE website provides advice about leadership1. 
2.8 MAJOR HAZARD INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 
Industries which are defined as “major hazard”, e.g. on-shore chemicals, offshore and nuclear are 
required by legislation to prepare some form of safety case, in which potential catastrophic events 
are identified and their risks reduced on a statistical basis, to an acceptable level.
The detailed statistical techniques used in major hazard industries are very unlikely to be directly 
relevant to the construction industry because:
§ The relevant statistics which would be needed are rarely available as the failures do not 
normally involve issues such as, for example, malfunction of equipment in normal 
operation, for which there may be a statistical chance of malfunction, but do normally 
involve issues such as out-of-process working or the occurrence of unforeseen ground 
conditions 
§ Most catastrophic events in the construction industry involve human factors to a large 
degree, as evidenced by the research undertaken in this project 
It is not therefore appropriate to examine the statistical element of the major hazard risk assessment 
process in detail here but the technique used may certainly be relevant, vis:
§ What ‘Catastrophic Events’ are of concern?
1 See http://www.hse.gov.uk/leadership/principlesleadership.htm
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§ How might they happen? 
§ How can the hazards involved be eliminated or the risk reduced/controlled
When considering a particular potential catastrophic event, fault tree analysis may be employed to 
understand the hazards involved and their risk profile. For example, the event might happen in this 
manner (or this manner etc) and for each scenario: what would instigate this? What would allow it 
to happen? What would ensure it couldn’t happen? – etc until the subject has been ‘unwrapped’ and 
appropriate decisions can be made.  
2.9 THE OBSERVATIONAL METHOD (‘OM’)
The observational method is a well established technique used to manage safety risks, primarily 
during construction. It has been traditionally applied to tunnelling and groundworks but its rigorous 
and comprehensive approach could well serve as a template for addressing the issue of major 
hazards in construction in general. The objectives are to save cost or time while maintaining an 
acceptable level of safety. Its focus on safety and the key interface between design and construction 
has also enabled OM to play a major role in recovering projects that have suffered from a crisis 
during construction. The emphasis on prediction, monitoring, feedback, and teamwork also creates a 
strong opportunity for learning1. 
2.10 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Whilst only a handful of non-UK case study events have been considered in this research, the issue 
is significant around the world. Some countries appear to suffer catastrophes more often, although 
no statistics have been found to support this2. Whilst the reasons for frequency of occurrence may 
be cultural, many of the findings of this research will be of interest and relevance in other 
countries, because of the universal nature of construction. 
2.11 HEALTH ISSUES
This research did not set out to consider health risk. However, in a similar manner to the growing 
industry appreciation that health risk has a major impact and is in fact much greater in total impact 
than accident risk, there may be catastrophic health risk arising from construction which has to be 
considered. Therefore accidental releases of harmful materials which could have a catastrophic 
effect upon people should be taken into account when considering the possibility of catastrophic 
events.  
2.12 CRIMINALITY 
Our examination of case study events did consider whether there had been direct, wilful criminality 
as a causative factor. Arson was identified as the main problem but other causes (including wilful 
damage by discontents, hooligans or terrorists) might need to be considered as potential hazards.
1 Powderham A. J. 2002 The observational method – learning from projects, Proc. Institution of Civil Engineers, Geotechnical 

Engineering 155 Issue 1, January 2002. 

2 The HSE report Tower crane incidents worldwide RR820, 2010, examined recent tower crane incidents worldwide but drew no 

statistical conclusions about variations between countries in overall frequency of occurrence.
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2.13 POST-CONSTRUCTION 
Post-construction events were outside the remit of this research. However, the comment was made 
that many causes of collapse could occur at any time. The need for designs to be robust in use and 
not to suffer disproportionate collapse is dealt with during the design process, in accordance with 
design codes and various regulations, including the Building Regulations. 
Our comments are directed mainly towards incidents which occur because of events during 
construction, when a structure will pass through various states which will not recur later, in use. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that there will be similarities between some events which are ‘during 
construction’ with ‘in-use’ events. A good example would be the collapse of a department store in 
Korea which according to reports1 occurred shortly after construction, killing over 500 people. It 
could equally have occurred during construction, and had many of the hallmarks of a catastrophic 
construction event, which it would have been had it occurred a little earlier. It could easily have 
done so as the failure mechanism was progressive and probably started during construction.
This distinction is not important, as the lessons learnt and the messages identified are largely 
common.
2.14 EXAMPLES OF ‘CATASTROPHIC EVENTS’ IN THE UK SINCE 2000 
The following list shows a sample of recent catastrophic or potentially catastrophic events.
Basingstoke fire*, 2010 
Camberwell fire*, 2010 
Glasgow fire*, 2010 
Dartford telecoms tunnel damage, 2009 
Withington hospital gas explosion, 2009 
Kings Dock Mill Liverpool crane collapse, 2009 
Talbot Road fire* Blackpool, 2009 
Peckham fire*, 2009 
Glasgow fire*, 2009 
Belfast tunnelling incident, 2009 
High Wycombe fire*, 2009 
East London line GW9 bridge ‘drop’, 2008 
Manchester fire*, 2008 
Weston-Super-Mare pier fire, 2008 
Royal Marsden fire, 2008 
Belway Homes, Edinburgh fire, 2008
Teeside scaffolding collapse, 2008
Nottingham MEWP collapse, 2007 
Commercial Rd building collapse, London, 2007 
Turnford tower crane hook failure, 2007
Newcastle fire*, 2007 
Hull piling rig collapse, 2007 
Croydon tower crane collapse, 2007 
Colquitt St Liverpool tower crane collapse, 2007 
Date Street Manchester fire, 2007 
Cutty Sark fire, 2007 
Wirral mobile crane collapse, 2007
* fires in timber-framed construction 
Dean Farrar St. Victoria building collapse, 2007 
Manchester house collapse, 2007 
Warrington mobile crane overturned, 2007 
Sheffield gas main damage by piling, 2006 
Truro scaffolding hit by van, 2006 
Colindale fire*, 2006 
Wembley stadium roof near-failure, 2006 
Battersea tower crane collapse, 2006 
Milton Keynes scaffold collapse, 2006 
Edinburgh scaffold collapse, 2005 
Telstar House London demolition collapse, 2005 
Aberystwyth scaffold collapse, 2005 
Durrington tower crane collapse, 2005 
Gerrards Cross cut-and-cover collapse, 2005 
Albion St Glasgow steel frame collapse, 2005 
Tower Bridge Road building collapse, 2004 
CTRL Lavender Street tunnelling incident, 2003 
CTRL crane collapse, 2002 
Stockton gas main severed, 2002 
Dundee earth bund cofferdam failure, 2001 
Canary Wharf tower crane collapse, 2000 
Glasgow house wall collapse, 2000 
Livingstone cinema wall collapse, 2000 
Cardiff Fanum House scaffolding collapse, 2000 
Edinburgh MEWP collapse, 2000 
Edinburgh partial wall collapse, 2000 
1 Collapse of Sampoong Department Store, The Korea Times, 14 October 2004 
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2.15 IMAGES 
The following selection of images demonstrates the type of event under consideration. They are not 
intended to relate to the case study events reported in Part Two of the report.  
Kings Dock Mill Liverpool crane collapse, Weston-Super-Mare pier fire, 2008
2009 (courtesy Vertikal.net) 
Teeside scaffolding collapse, 2008 Hull piling rig collapse, 2007
(courtesy HSE) (courtesy CNplus) 
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Croydon tower crane collapse, 2007 Commercial Rd collapse, London, 2007
(courtesy Vertikal.net)
Cutty Sark Fire, 2007 Cutty Sark Fire, 2007
 
The Cutty Sark on fire The remains after the fire 

Liverpool crane collapse, 2007 Battersea tower crane collapse, 2006
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Colindale timber-framed fire, 2006 Gerrard’s Cross cut-and-cover collapse, 
(courtesy London Fire Brigade) 2005 (View from inside the remaining 
tunnel) 
Dean Farrarh Street building collapse Dean Farrarh Street building collapse 
(aerial view) (courtesy HSE) (street view) (courtesy HSE) 
Durrington tower crane collapse, 2005
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3. Why do Catastrophic Events happen?
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It was confirmed by the research (see Part Two in this report) that there is no simple answer to 
this question. However, the research provided insights into which issues were more important 
and the key points are presented here.
Underlying many of the issues is the complexity of the construction industry (see Glossary) .  
For those unfamiliar with the concept, Reason’s plates (see 10.2 for more detail) provide a visual 
basis for discussion of complexity:
Project (including design and planning) 
Site (management & supervision) 
Society & Industry 
The concept revolves around the ease with which the plates as a whole can be pierced – the 
fewer ‘holes’ in each plate and the smaller they are – the better, ie the defence against an event 
will be better. An alternative representation would be to have plates for organizations involved 
or individuals involved.
Reason’s Plates’ concept ties in well with a number of case study events where there were 
several players who failed to act, for a variety of reasons. If one of them had acted, events might 
have been different and the catastrophic event avoided.  
3.2 ATTITUDES TO RISK
3.2.1 Perceptions
It is a truism that no-one wants an accident. However, individuals and organizations are 
conditioned by their experiences and what they see going on around them. This has a significant 
effect upon perception of low-likelihood events, as people will not have experienced them first­
hand and may not even have heard about them from others.
The profile of risk tolerance in society often demonstrates a perverse tolerance of risk from 
every-day incidents such as car accidents (frequently seen and heard/read about at local level but 
involving small numbers of people per event) but intolerance of less commonly manifested 
hazards such as train crashes (rarely experienced or read about but potentially involving 
significant numbers of people).
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In society therefore, there is fear of ‘Catastrophic Events’ despite a lack of real knowledge and 
understanding of them.
It has been suggested1 during consultation that some of those who work on sites are ‘risk 
tolerant’; this research suggests that on the contrary, they just do not appreciate the hazards, 
possibly because there is frequently an element of ‘making do’ in site work. In a similar manner, 
directors and senior managers may not appreciate the potential impact of catastrophic events.
This research supports the view that what the industry needs is more awareness, 
information and guidance on the hazards which exist, including the risk of 
Catastrophic Events. 
3.2.2 Elimination of hazards
This research has shown that elimination of hazards is a missing link in many peoples thinking. 
Hazards need to be consciously recognised before they can be eliminated and their risks then 
minimised; this should include ‘Catastrophic Event’ safety risk management.
In balancing risks during ERIC thinking (Eliminate hazards, Reduce risks, Inform others, 
Control residual risks), there will be options which do cost more than others but are safer and 
judgements have to be consciously made as to which to adopt. See also Glossary for more about 
ERIC.  
It had been thought by the researchers that incidents might include a significant proportion which 
arose from issues which were in some way new. However, the case studies which have been 
examined arose almost without exception from factors which might have been predicted, 
particularly if (a) there had been a conscious effort to do so, by competent people, and (b) if 
there had been a degree of review during the whole process of safety risk management. Even 
where risks were very difficult to predict, because for example of variations in ground 
conditions, the difficulty of prediction could itself have been identified as a risk and firmer 
measures put into place.
3.2.3 Safety risk management skills 
We found a lack of confidence, with reports that contractors risk assessments and method 
statements were being prepared by ‘experts’, but not ‘owned’ by site managers and not being 
reviewed and adapted for each site. Respondents seemed to feel that they have not been trained 
adequately (not just in small companies!). This was not measured but there were clear 
deficiencies in many of the case studies and the on-line survey also revealed issues of concern. 
1 ‘But we like risk’ – why workers act dangerously: Construction Research and Innovation Vol. 1, Issue 1, Chartered Institute of 
Building, 2010 
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3.2.4 Safety risk management culture 
Safety risk management can be used formally as a tool to decision-making but it can also 
become embedded as a feature of the culture of an organization or of an industry. It is felt from 
the responses received that the industry is starting to adopt a safety risk management culture, 
particularly in higher-risk sectors such as rail.
3.2.5 Systemic failure and pan-sector issues
A systemic failure event is not related specifically to an event, but is instead related to the 
manner in which an industrial sector, organisation, or project, is managed, organised or 
perceived. For more on systemic failure see Glossary.
The research found evidence of many underlying causes of events which could be described as 
‘systemic’ and there were few events where there was no aspect of systemic failure.
Serious pan-sector systemic issues are evidenced when a number of events which are or might 
have been catastrophic occur in the space of a few years, such as the series of tower crane 
accidents in the UK during the decade 2000-2010. In these types of events, good practice is 
clearly not good enough and extraordinary steps are necessary to make a difference (in this case, 
the development of equipment to reduce reliance on human intervention, regulation, training, 
inspection). 
3.2.6 Particular issues 
Key points from the research which are highlighted in the overall conclusions (see Section 10) 
are as follows:
- Catastrophic events are different and complex 
- Reducing major hazard risks must be addressed at society, project and site levels 
- People, process and product all play their part, both in causing and preventing 
catastrophic events 

- Competent people are the key to success 

- Risk identification, assessment and management is essential 
- Projects are complex with many interfaces that must be managed effectively
- Gaining and communicating knowledge throughout the team and across industry is 
crucial 
And the research suggested that these practical things can be done: 

- Eliminate risk wherever possible and as early as possible 

- Don’t let time and cost pressures deflect effort 

- Expect change and deal with it 

- “Check, check and check again”
 
3.3 MANAGEMENT OF CATASTROPHIC EVENT RISKS
3.3.1 Overview of performance 
Although international statistics are not available to compare the performance of the UK 
construction industry in relation to catastrophic events, the research did not suggest a worse than 
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average performance. Other countries have suffered similar events and as the UK’s performance 
on safety matters generally is good, it is therefore likely that performance with respect to 
catastrophic events is also good.  
Attention then turns to how it can be made even better because, as was demonstrated in Section 
2, the consequences of a catastrophic event can be severe. All reasonable possible steps should 
be taken to avoid one, although deciding what is reasonable will always be open to debate and 
challenge. This overview is provided as context before examining how industry might respond to 
the research by identifying key issues. By thinking about these issues consciously, we should 
improve what is already world-class performance, bearing in mind that by their very nature there 
may always be an unpleasant surprise in store and that preparing and planning to prevent such 
events is sensible.
 ‘Chance favours the prepared mind’. 
Louis Pasteur
3.3.2 Proposed industry ‘key response issues’ 
Many detailed points have emerged which are documented in Part Two of this report, and these 
are summarised in section 10 (Summary of key issues from the literature review; on-line survey; 
case studies and industry consultation).
Eight proposed ‘industry response issues’ have then been identified which respond to the 
individual points as a family. They are:
§ Issue 1: The industry should recognise that catastrophic events need further 
attention
The research concluded that the special nature and importance of catastrophic events 
needs to be recognised and responded to (see 10.1).    
§ Issue 2: Corporate risk management systems should be improved
The research concluded that industry needs to respond to the risk of catastrophe at the 
highest level (see 10.2, 10.3).
§ Issue 3: Knowledge, skills and experience of safety risk management should be 
raised
The research concluded that more can be done to raise the overall standards of 
performance by people (see 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7).  
§ Issue 4: Communication and interface management should be improved
The research recognised the particular complexity of construction and the need to 
improve systems and performance in communication and interface management (see 
10.1, 10.6, 10.7).
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§ Issue 5: Competence is key
The research confirmed the importance of competence (see 10.4) and the range of 
complex issues identified suggests that gaining competence requires diligent attention to 
a range of competences. The importance of temporary works issues (see 10.6 and 
featured in issue 6) pointed up the particular importance of the role of the Principal 
Contractor1. 
§ Issue 6: Effective management of temporary works is crucial to success
Issues relating to the management of temporary works were identified as of particular 
importance in the research (see 10.6).
§ Issue 7: Independent reviews should be employed
The research identified the importance of independent checking and reviewing (see 10.9). 
§ Issue 8: The industry should learn from experience
The research identified the benefit to be gained by learning from events as they occur and 
not losing the benefit of past experiences (see 10.7).
If industry addresses these issues, they should provide a framework for responding to the 
individual issues which are described in more detail in Part Two of this report.
Issues 1, 2 and 8 are directed at ensuring that the salient points are understood and that the need 
to deal with them is addressed at the highest level in organisations.
Issues 3 to 7 address particular areas of activity which feed into the family of challenges 
identified in Section 10.
The issues are discussed further in section 4.
1 Noting that on smaller projects where there is no legal requirement for a Principal Contractor, the Main Contractor will assume 
overall responsibility for site safety.
28
  
 
        
   
 
 
 
             
          
        
           
         
     
           
         
        
 
            
        
 
       
    
 
             
  
 
              
    
 
            
           
              
           
              
           
 
 
       
         
        
        
         
  
4. 	 What are the issues which the UK construction industry needs to 
address?
4.1	 INTRODUCTION 
The key issues proposed for industry action in 3.3.2 are as follows:
§ Issue 1: The industry should recognise that catastrophic events need further attention 
§ Issue 2: Corporate risk management systems should be improved 
§ Issue 3: Knowledge, skills and experience of safety risk management should be raised 
§ Issue 4: Communication and interface management should be improved 
§ Issue 5: Competence is key 
§ Issue 6: Effective management of temporary works is crucial to success 
§ Issue 7: Independent reviews should be employed
§ Issue 8: The industry should learn from experience. 
All of the discussion which follows draws upon the research undertaken and is presented for 
further consideration and response by the industry as a whole. 
4.2	 ISSUE 1: THE INDUSTRY SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT 
CATASTROPHIC EVENTS NEED FURTHER ATTENTION 
As evidenced by the research, potential catastrophic events are agreed to be important by all 
concerned.
The response at board level was not researched, but there was considerable interest from senior 
representatives of some major contractors.
One important output from the on-line survey was the overwhelming support for the 
suggestion that where there was potential for a major hazard event, more precautions should 
be taken. Exactly how that might be done would depend on individual circumstances, but it is 
considered that, as for designers’ safety risk management, where there is still much 
improvement to be made, much more thought is needed and leadership shown to inform and 
inspire the people who are making the day-to-day decisions. 
We found general agreement that catastrophic events are a significant cause 
for concern and that they should be considered in an appropriate manner in 
the industry, taking additional steps beyond those normally taken. The 
industry will have to work out how that should be done; a forthcoming 
CIRIA guide on this topic will provide suggestions and case study examples. 
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4.3	 ISSUE 2: CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS SHOULD BE 
IMPROVED 
No firm statistical basis was identified to quantify the impact of catastrophic events. One 
indicator could be the insurance market, which responds when claims threaten to destabilise 
the ‘book’ which has been underwritten. This has happened in recent times due to tunnelling 
claims and currently there is concern about major losses from fires on developments using 
timber frame construction.  
However, whereas insurance does cover some of the direct costs, it was noted that (quite apart 
from issues of conscience and impact upon them personally) there were other commercial 
impacts which should concern directors:
§ Uninsured costs 
§ Risk of legal action against companies and directors
§ Senior management time devoted to the problem 
§ Loss of focus 
§ Damage to reputation and hence access to new work 
§ Difficulty with insurance going forward 
In some case studies examined, smaller companies had closed down as a consequence of a 
major event, and in one case the Managing Director had fled abroad.
The impact upon clients’ revenue streams due to delays was also in some cases significant, due 
to delays in completion. Of course, for the individuals who lost their lives or health, the impact 
was always catastrophic. 
Catastrophic events can cost lives, money and reputation.  
Directors and senior managers need to take this on board and
manage the risks in an appropriate manner.  
Directors are expected to manage risks to their company, in accordance with legislation and 
(for listed companies) following the Turnbull Report, and for the reasons stated above they 
have good reason to do so. The damage done to BP by events at Texas City and the Gulf of 
Mexico demonstrate the risks. Within the UK construction industry the demise of Jarvis might 
also be cited, following a period of decline which dates from the Potters Bar catastrophe.
An appropriate response is obviously to monitor performance, but with low frequency events 
there will normally be nothing to monitor directly. Leading indicators could be identified 
which might be considered when seeking to identify useful information which could be 
monitored, and in turn used to demonstrate how catastrophic event risks are being handled in 
an organization involved in construction. Similar work has already been undertaken in the 
chemical industry1.
1 HSG 254, Developing process safety indicators, HSE 2006, free download at http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg254.pdf
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The use of industry-relevant indicators should be explored, relevant to the 
risk of catastrophic events, to support the organisational safety risk  
management of companies, building on the work in HSG254, 
‘Developing process safety indicators’.
4.4	 ISSUE 3: KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE OF SAFETY 
RISK MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE RAISED 
Competence is achieved through the right combination of education, training and experience. 
This subject is therefore central to improving performance.
The management of catastrophic event risk has to be set in the context of the wider 
performance of the industry (designers and constructors) in managing health and safety risk.
The case studies frequently demonstrated a failure to adequately identify 
the full extent of hazards and address the risks arising appropriately; 
other sources demonstrated a considerable degree of uncertainty and a 
lack of confidence in the industry’s knowledge, skills and experience of 
safety risk management.  
These views were widely held. Whilst these views might be seen as depressing, they do in fact 
provide hope that accidents can be further reduced through addressing the issues.  
Two areas of skill identified by the research as needing improvement were:
§ Appreciation of hazards of all types
§ Safety risk management skills 
The issues pin-pointed by the research as requiring to be addressed by the industry were:
§ Education in risk management principles as a basis for subsequent development 
§ Continuing education, training and experience (CPD) for all in the industry (i.e. all 
CDM duty-holders)
§ On-the-job training and mentoring by qualified senior colleagues 
§ Improvement of management systems within organizations, to make them more 
relevant/useful and less bureaucratic.
Education in our universities and colleges needs to be reviewed to understand why the 
research has suggested that the necessary underpinning is not being delivered. The academic 
ideas do not require substantial periods to impart and other aspects can be effectively provided 
by cross-reference during project work (where risk aspects should be integral or the work will 
not be founded in reality). During topic lectures generally risk issues underpin many topics, 
including reliable strength, safety factors and code approaches (eg, normal/extreme design 
cases). It could be argued that an understanding of hazard and risk is a key learning in all 
education.
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The need for more continuous education, training and experience (CPD) in the industry was 
evidenced by the acknowledged concerns expressed above.
On-the-job training and mentoring has to be recognised as the main way people learn in the 
construction industry. The lack of confidence detected may be acting as a drag on that 
learning; if people have not been inspired during their education, have not developed a good 
skill-set and do not have confidence in the systems they operate, they will find it difficult to 
inspire and develop those entering the industry.
The management systems which are in use in organizations are presumably many and varied. It 
must be recognised that the explicit legal requirement to assess risks consciously and then 
manage them in an appropriate manner is relatively new (although it has been implicit for far 
longer); our collective response is therefore necessarily explorative and whatever systems are 
in use in different organizations must be generally susceptible to improvement. Reliance upon 
‘health and safety experts’ rather than the integration of safety risk management into general 
design and construction activity may be one cul-de-sac which should be avoided and also more 
guidance appears to be required on how to reduce beaurocracy.
It has to be recognised that increased education, training and experience working with 
competent colleagues using robust, practical systems are all necessary for an individual’s 
competence to grow and that only through attention to all aspects will the industry as a whole 
improve its performance. The industry is already on that journey but there are clearly 
opportunities for improvement, to build on what has been achieved and accelerate the rate of 
improvement. The challenge involves educators, qualifying bodies, trainers and organisations.
More emphasis needs to be given to safety risk management through: 
§ Education of those who will be entering the industry 
§ CPD and on-the-job training
§ Development of more effective safety management systems. 
The development of more sophisticated integrated design/construction approaches such as the
safety-driven-innovation approach in which cost reductions are sought hand-in-hand with 
enhanced safety control, will require the development of a cadre of designers and constructors 
who can understand the rigours of the approaches and the investments which are required (in 
terms of commitment and partnering) to realise the benefits123.
1 Powderham, A. J. 2008 Safety as a driver for innovation in design and construction of underground structures, Proc International 
Conference on Deep Excavations, Singapore, 2008. 
2 Powderham, A. J. 2009 The Observational Method - using safety as a driver for innovation, Vienna Terzaghi Lecture, Proc 
Osterreicheche Geotechniktagung, OIAV, ISSMGE, Jan 2009. 

3 Powderham A.J. 2010 Managing risk through safety-driven innovation, keynote paper , Proc. DFI/EFFC Conference, London, 

May 2010. 
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4.5 	 ISSUE 4: COMMUNICATION AND INTERFACE MANAGEMENT 
SHOULD BE IMPROVED
Systems for communication in construction are inevitably many and varied and the skills 
available vary too. Time pressures, contractual issues and interpersonal relationships will all 
influence the degree of success there is in achieving successful communication.
The underpinning influence which needs to be recognised is the organizational complexity of 
most construction projects. Not only is there complexity, it is usually handled by different 
teams of people on each project. Although some of the individuals (during the construction 
phase) may be co-located at site, many will meet only occasionally, if at all.
It is essential to appreciate this complexity and the fragility of the processes involved, arising 
from the difficulties. The people managing through all the difficulties appear to accept these 
problems (they have no choice) but they are real difficulties, as evidenced by the case studies 
examined (see Section 8).
Construction projects invariably involve complex relationships,  

making good communication essential. 

Managing communication about safety risk is essential. 

It is appreciated that interfaces between people and between organizations are important when 
considering safety risk and the following key issues were identified during the research:
§ Failure to work as a team in identifying risk of catastrophic events 
§ Failures in communication about particular problems (‘silo mentality’) 
There was also evidence (from consultation) of in-company resistance to facing up to 
potentially catastrophic hazards which had been identified: the ‘good news’ syndrome in 
which senior managers make it plain that they do not want to hear about problems – just 
progress.
Reference was made during consultation to the need for procurement to be undertaken in a 
manner which encouraged cooperation and communication, as required by CDM 2007. The 
research identified both human failures and organizational failures in the case study analysis; 
both people and company behaviour will however be affected by the contractual environment 
and further examination of this subject may be fruitful.
Taking CDM as the basis for interface management, the research suggests that there is often 
scope for better management of interfaces involving the designers and contractors, assisted by 
both the CDM Co-ordinator (including where temporary works design is concerned) and the 
Principal Contractor (or the Main Contractor for smaller projects), whose role on site is crucial 
in managing safety risk.
 ‘Risk thrives at interfaces’. 
John Carpenter, Secretary of SCOSS
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Organisations and individuals seeking to improve their management of these issues need to 
examine their cultural values as well as their systems; one question which was suggested for 
assisting in making improvements was ‘What to do when you see a potential problem’. This 
issue underlies many of the difficulties which adversely affect efforts to improve in-company 
and inter-company communication and cooperation; if people feel that raising a concern is not 
acceptable, they may well keep quiet.  
4.6 ISSUE 5: COMPETENCE IS KEY 
In many of the case studies it was apparent that hazards had not been appreciated and risks 
managed in a competent manner. This must spring partly from the concerns about knowledge, 
skills and experience expressed earlier but also from the lower degree of competence available 
on some projects, for a variety of reasons including smaller, less structured organisations being 
in control and sometimes the need for intermittent working by visiting teams, without a 
continuous site management presence.
Examination of the case studies suggested that the issue of competence (which underpins 
CDM 2007) was as expected seen to be important – but in particular in the fulfilment of the 
role of Principal Contractor. The organization fulfilling the role needed to be active on site. 
This role was vital because it often involved managing smaller companies with less reliable 
competence and also managing the interfaces between a number of organisations. 
In particular, management of work on smaller projects which carries potential catastrophic 
event risk needs to be improved but is obviously problematic, due to cost constraints. Note that 
whilst the largest events are likely to occur on large projects, there is scope for catastrophic 
events to occur on smaller projects, or small elements of larger projects, and about half the 
case studies examined involved work by smaller, less structured organisations. Some of these 
projects involved smaller organizations working for larger companies but without adequate 
supervision and control by the Principal Contractor1. It has been notable that recent 
prosecutions have laid blame on Main/Principal Contractors as well as those immediately 
culpable and this will hopefully encourage them to choose and supervise their subcontractors 
more carefully.
The issue of competence (which underpins CDM 2007) was as 
anticipated seen to be important – but in particular the competent 
fulfilment of the role of Principal Contractor on site was identified as 
central to avoiding many catastrophic events in construction.  
At present any person can set up a contracting company and any client can appoint such a 
company to carry out work next to a road, railway or adjacent structure etc. Although not 
within the definition used in this project to define criminality (see Glossary), the behaviour of 
some (particularly small or occasional) clients and some contractors was criminal in terms of 
compliance with CDM; they may be described as ‘evasive duty-holders’. Under current UK 
legislation there is no system of licensing (or ‘permitting’) of contractors and/or responsible 
1 Noting that on smaller projects where there is no legal requirement for a Principal Contractor, the Main Contractor will assume 
overall responsibility for site safety.
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individuals. Without that, society is reliant on the better training of the workforce as a whole 
having a trickle-down effect.
The industry should consider how best to ensure that all those 
responsible for sites where there are risks which could lead to 
catastrophic events have the necessary competence. 
It must be borne in mind that using permits to work would bring with it additional bureaucracy 
and cost, which would have to be weighed against the potential benefits.
Many catastrophic events have occurred on projects where the designers and constructors 
would have been able to show competence. In the case studies examined, although there was 
more evidence of incompetence than of error by competent people, there will always be 
incompetent people even in nominally competent organisations. For example, in the USA 
there have been many tower crane collapses despite apparently strict controls, suggesting that 
driving out poor attitudes and lack of competence etc is far from easy, even when there is 
strong inducement to do so.
It therefore appears that improving general levels of competence should be the prime 
objective. The bodies responsible for education, training and qualification will need to 
consider how to ensure that this objective is achieved, as discussed in 4.4 above.
This research has highlighted the heavy responsibilities placed upon site managers within 
contracting organisations, who are required to fulfil a wide range of roles. However, to 
maintain control of safety, any site manager’s skill-set must include good safety risk 
management skills and in selecting and training for this role those who lack this skill, 
regardless of their other skills, will present risks which should not be taken.
Only managers who are clearly competent in safety risk management 
should be put in charge of sites. 
Principal Contractors need to appreciate this and have in place systems to ensure that site 
managers have (a) been trained to a high level of competence and (b) have a high level of 
commitment to safety.
One aspect of risk which was noted in some case studies was management of change; three 
categories of risk were considered (a) design change, (b) change of planned method of work 
and (c) unplanned, last-minute change of method of work. Whilst design changes are clearly a 
concern, they did not feature highly in the case studies, but changes in work method did. Some 
were very late changes and obviously thereby at risk of not being thought through. One aspect 
of safety risk management which was evidenced was ‘dynamic risk assessment’ (see 
Glossary). It was apparent that considerable care is needed in the use of this technique where 
risk of a catastrophic event has been identified; additional time should be allowed and a fresh 
view sought before pressing ahead. It is likely to be the Principal Contractor who is best placed 
to ensure that the decision-making process and preparation of a thought-through amended and 
complete method statement is properly carried out without rushing and preferably with 
independent review.
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4.7	 ISSUE 6: EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF TEMPORARY WORKS1 IS 
CRUCIAL TO SUCCESS 
It was found that failure in the selection of temporary works solutions, plant and equipment 
and failure to design and manage their use in a competent manner was a significant factor in 
about half of the case studies examined.
Some of the actual or potential ‘catastrophic events’ identified during the research involved 
‘temporary works’ when the interfaces with plant and equipment used for construction were 
included in this term and their management needed to be considered carefully.
It was apparent from many case studies that insufficient consideration 
was being given to management of temporary works in its widest sense. 
Temporary works design, planning and execution must be taken 

seriously for all temporary works aspects,

and include interfaces with plant and equipment.

The recently revised UK Code of Practice BS59752 now extends the principles espoused in the 
Bragg Report3 to prevent formwork collapses to all forms of temporary works. It is clear that 
there is widespread ignorance in the industry about this important change and steps need to be 
taken to raise awareness of the Code of Practice and to ensure it is implemented 
proportionately to ensure improved management of Temporary Works. 
As this research started, a new grouping ‘The UK Forum for Temporary Works’ was being 
formed and it would be sensible that it should be developed into a pan-industry body to give 
focus to this important aspect of construction.
The potential impact of failures of temporary works needs to be 

carefully considered to reduce the likelihood of a ‘catastrophic event’ 

occurring, and the industry should consider how best to

improve performance. 

4.8 	 ISSUE 7: INDEPENDENT REVIEWS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED 
Independent review is a term which may be used to describe any process where people outside 
a working team are involved in looking at what is being done and take an independent view on 
it and make comments. There are many types of independent review activity in the 
construction industry and some of the more common ones are identified and discussed in the 
Glossary.
The purpose of all independent reviews is for ‘a fresh pair of eyes’ to take a view and make 
comments as appropriate. All people have blind spots and respond to pressures they are under; 
1 See Glossary for definition of temporary works.
 
2 British Standard Code of Practice BS 5975: 2008 ‘Temporary Works Procedures and the Permissible Stress Design of Falsework’ 

3 Falsework: Final report of the Advisory Committee on Falsework HMSO 1975 (The Bragg report).  
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independent review must therefore be undertaken by people who are experienced in the work 
being undertaken and able to express their independent review in a constructive manner, 
focusing on important issues and not unimportant minutiae. 
From examination of the case studies it was found that independent reviews could have 
assisted in identifying hazards and improving the management of risks. One of the solutions 
identified by the tunnelling community is the use of independent review: although this is not 
explicitly stated in the British Tunnelling Society/Association of British Insurers Joint Code of 
Practice1, it is however suggested in the code of practice that there is independent supervision 
of checking and the insurer should appoint an independent auditor.
The use of independent ‘peer review’ has been recommended2 by SCOSS (see Glossary) and it 
is commonly used in major hazard safety case exercises. Independent review should obviously 
be commenced at an early stage to achieve maximum benefit and minimum risk of 
embarrassment and entrenched positions. 
Use of independent review is common practice on major projects, with clients paying for it in 
order to check solutions are adequate and that low-risk cost savings have not been missed. 
Internal semi-independent review is also common in many organizations. The Gateway 
Process espoused by the OGC3 includes elements of independent review, with ‘gateways’ at 
which certain checks must be made (although not necessarily of a technical nature).
The issue of review as it impacts work on site was also considered; evidence was found in the 
case studies of projects where there was inadequate independent review of what was 
happening on site. When this concern was tested in a workshop meeting, opinion was divided. 
Notable changes in practice which were mentioned as having taken place on many projects in 
recent decades include:
§ Loss of RE (Resident Engineer) and CoW (Clerk of Works) function on site, replaced 
with site QA (Quality Assurance) function which may be weak or non-existent. 
§ Loss of regular site visits by designers 
§ Reduction in building control activity and reluctance of some building control 

professionals to ‘make waves’ due to perceived commercial pressure 

§ Subcontracting of risk to many small companies who have weak controls, often 

associated with the loss of a ‘controlling mind’ 

§ Return to ‘traditional’ price-led risk-shedding procurement, despite partnering and 
other cooperative forms of working demonstrably delivered better coordination and 
cooperation as required by the CDM Regulations and producing safer working, as 
reported by Constructing Excellence4, which reports accident rates 61% lower than 
industry average.  
Assessment of the extent and impact of such changes was not however included in this 
research.
1 The joint code of practice for risk management of tunnel works in the UK, 2003, Pub. The British Tunnelling Society
2 SCOSS Guidance Note Independent Review through Peer Assist, SC/09/034, 2009 
3 OGC, Office of Government Commerce, see http://www.ogc.gov.uk/
4 Constructing Excellence, see http://www.constructingexcellence.org.uk/ for the Demonstrating Excellence Report July 2004 
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4.9 ISSUE 8: THE INDUSTRY SHOULD LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE 
The industry and those who work in it should ideally learn from the experience of the industry 
as a whole, in the UK and where possible around the world. However, the mechanisms to 
achieve that (appreciating what is being learned, capturing it, testing and peer-reviewing it, 
making it available in a digestible form, storing the information and making it accessible, 
incorporating it into education and training) are currently poorly developed in the construction 
industry. In the most part the industry hears of incidents through the trade press or on the 
grapevine which inevitably fails to convey fully and accurately the detail or the important 
lessons to be learned. 
This situation compares unfavourably with the aviation industry where there are better systems 
in operation. The net result for the construction industry is that individuals have little support, 
beyond the updating of published codes of practice and industry guidance and these documents 
rarely explain the background to the advice they proffer.  
Within organizations, corporate memory resides with individuals, and few organisations (it is 
believed) have formal post-contract review processes which feed back into future decision-
making, although there are understood to be exceptions.
‘Corporate memories are weak and it is incumbent on every 

engineer in each generation to 

study failures and gain wisdom from them’. 

Dr. Allan Mann
In the UK, official reporting of safety failures in the construction industry is though RIDDOR 
and via. insurance companies. It is known that the levels of RIDDOR reporting are low (about 
a half of incidents are reported1). Although deaths are probably nearly always reported, many 
events involving injuries or dangerous occurrences go unreported. It is also not a requirement 
to report all ‘close call’ events where (by luck) a dangerous situation occurs but an accident or 
a dangerous occurrence (as narrowly defined) is averted. Reporting is thought to be patchy 
with high levels of reporting among the major contractors and low levels among smaller firms. 
HSE has recently strengthened its own system for promulgating safety alerts and notices, now 
making them available to subscribers via. E-bulletins and other electronic media. However, 
HSE faces certain constraints with regard to information release when there are potential 
criminal proceedings in play. This leaves a key role for the industry and its intermediaries to 
fill in order to get information out as quickly as possible. 
Also in the UK, there is a system of informal reporting of matters of concern generally, called 
CROSS established in 2005 by SCOSS, see Glossary. The on-line survey unfortunately 
revealed a low level of familiarity with CROSS (despite the average respondent being more 
likely to be ‘active’ on safety matters).  
1 When RIDDOR statistics are compared with LFS (Labour Force Survey) data.
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There was concern that learning from experience appeared not to be
well-rooted in the industry. There was lack of confidence that: 
§ Learning was well-shared, rapidly and widely 
§ Lessons were incorporated into education and training processes 
§ Information could be easily accessed. 
When there is change in work processes in the UK, the industry appears to be slow to learn, or 
re-learn, and institutionalise - for example through industry codes and guidance - how to do 
things safely. Learning from other countries would appear to be useful for everyone and it is 
possible that more could be done to promote the international sharing of experiences and ideas.
If ‘close calls’ were to be reported by RIDDOR or to CROSS, the industry would have a better 
view of where potential issues are brewing but (by chance) not yet visible. Reporting to 
CROSS should be non-threatening; however knowledge of CROSS was found to be 
inadequate. It is therefore necessary to identify how better reporting under RIDDOR and 
CROSS could be achieved, such as the promotion of a culture of reporting as per the airline 
industry (starting during education). Leadership (instilling a professional duty to report) is 
required.
In the practice areas identified in the study (tower-cranes, tunnelling etc) groups of people 
were identified who are working together to fill knowledge gaps and (in some instances) to 
seek agreement on how to respond to events which had arisen. It is beyond the remit of this 
study to track down and fully understand all the groups which exist. However, certain features 
of the groups became apparent which are worthy of consideration: 
§ Some groups are formed by Institutions or are closely associated with them
§ Many other groups are either funded by vested interests or are voluntary. They operate 
in a variety of ways, being for example based on membership of an industry 
organisation or a local gathering of interested parties.
§ Whilst major contractors share experiences through ‘safety alerts’ the wider industry 
does not have visibility 
§ In some particular risk sectors, there may be more than one group operating 
(sometimes at regional level) and there may also be independent sources of knowledge 
and experience such as in universities and other organizations or in different regions 
§ The HSE is often involved with such groups in an advisory capacity and in assisting in 
promulgating good practice guidance 
§ The speed at which such groups which provide industry guidance are able to respond to 
events is variable 
§ By the very nature of the UK construction industry, only a proportion of organizations 
who are active in a particular risk sector will engage with the relevant group; many will 
not have the time or inclination 
§ Disciplines who are not directly involved in a topic area such as ‘tower cranes’ are 
unlikely to have sight of the workings of the group (in particular designers, who make 
decisions affecting risks during construction). 
These points are made here with a view to seeking improvements in what is already a lively 
picture of activity.
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There is much industry activity which needs to be considered, including:
§ The activity of Institutions and their sub-groups 
§ The work of the various industry bodies and groupings
§ The work of SCOSS and CROSS 
This work should be recognised, celebrated, developed and encouraged.
4.10 CONCLUSION 
Based upon the research reported in Part Two, a number of key issues have been identified 
which require further consideration. The importance of the risk of catastrophic events has been 
supported during consultation and it is expected that the industry will be keen to participate.  
All of the issues identified require concerted action and agreeing the actions to be taken should 
involve all of the stakeholders; the issues cannot be pigeon-holed; the industry is complex and 
this means that potential changes need to be seen and discussed in their overall context.
It is possible that during discussion within industry the stakeholder groups will identify further 
issues which are seen as key to future improvement in safety risk management and 
performance.  
Risk of catastrophe is a real issue which requires proper 
consideration by all stakeholders, led by directors and senior 
staff. There are opportunities for improvement of performance 
and all stakeholder groups should be involved in agreeing what 
should be done and making the necessary changes. 
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PART TWO – Supporting Research 
Section 5 Research Approach
Section 6 Literature Review
Section 7 On-line Survey  
Section 8 Case Studies
Section 9 Consultation with Industry
Section 10 Research Conclusions
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5. Research Approach
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section describes the research design and provides an overview of the research methods 
used, with a particular emphasis upon the adoption of qualitative methods and the use of 
triangulation (see Glossary) to help facilitate rigorous data collection and analysis. The research 
approach is highlighted and the specific methods of data collection and data analysis (through the 
development of a ‘research instrument’) are explained and justified. 
5.2 CONTENTS OF SECTION 5
5.3 Aims and objectives of the project 
5.4 Research requirements 
5.5 Accessibility of the data 
5.6   Schedule and structure of the research 
§ Scope 
§ Specific areas of inquiry 
§ Project steering group 
5.7 The research methods 
§ Literature review 
§ Online survey 
§ Consultation events 
§ Industry consultation 
§ Case study investigation 
§ Research instrument for case studies 
§ Content analysis 
§ Triangulation 
5.8 Summary 
5.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The aim of the research was to identify and understand the immediate and underlying causes of 
catastrophes on construction projects, the effectiveness of current control measures and the need, 
if any, for further preventative action. The focus of the work has been to inform future HSE 
activities and raise industry awareness of any existing and emergent problems. As a means of 
achieving this aim, the research objectives were to: 
§ Revisit and update previous related work 
§ Strengthen the evidence base and analysis 
§ Present the findings in a way that will stimulate industry action
5.4 RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS 
Key to the research was the notion of developing a rich understanding of the causes and 
underlying influences of catastrophic events (or potential catastrophes) in construction (see 
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Glossary). It was therefore clear that the depth of information required to meet the aims and 
objectives of the project would necessitate the collection of in-depth data from a range of 
sources.  
In this respect an approach to the data collection process was preferred that followed a more 
qualitative approach although whilst also allowing for the processing of statistical data.  
Consequently a robust methodology was required that would enable the team to gather a diverse 
type of qualitative data related to how catastrophic events unfold on construction sites in the UK. 
5.5 ACCESSIBILITY OF THE DATA 
As is the case with much research, particular problems associated with data collection are in 
gaining physical access to respondents in their work environment, maintaining access and 
creating sufficient scope over the research period to fully address the aims and objectives.
Requests for access and co-operation may fail due to: lack of perceived value of the research; or 
the sensitive nature of the research topic; and/or concerns of privacy and confidentiality. Access 
to participants may also be limited which may have implications on sample size, subsequently 
affecting validity and reliability of findings.  In addition to these factors, organisations (or 
individuals) may not be prepared to participate if there are any cost implications or “down time” 
while completing lengthy questionnaires or interviews.  In order to combat these problems, a 
particular strategy was adopted that included: 
§ Adopting a multi methodological approach, 
§ Using existing industry contacts within the research team; 
§ Utilising personal contacts and professional networks; 
§ Providing a clear account to organisations of project aims, objectives and type of 
access required; 
§ Establishing credibility with intended participants; 
§ Identifying benefits to the industry and wider construction communities; and 
§ Using appropriate and suitable language. 
5.6 SCHEDULE AND STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
5.6.1  Scope 
To support the strategy, a compact research schedule was facilitated that enabled a range of data 
collection strategies to be utilised over the duration of the project (with the most intensive data 
collection activity occurring during a 6-month period between November 2009 and April 2010). 
The schedule of the research included the following interconnected tasks: 
Literature review: An iterative process conducted between October 2009 and June 2010. 
1.	 Online survey: Between January and March 2010 a bespoke on-line survey was accessed 
by a wide range of industry practitioners.
2.	 Consultation events: Two Construction Productivity Network (CPN) events were 
organised by CIRIA in January 2010 (one in London and one in Manchester) and an 
additional consultation event was run in London in April.
3.	 Industry consultation: This consultation consisted of individual interviews and 
discussions that were conducted by the research team between October 2009 and April 
2010. This included discussions at Steering Group meetings.  
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4.	 Case study investigations: Detailed information about 62 incidents on construction 
projects in the UK was scrutinised between November 2009 and April 2010.
5.	 Triangulation: The results of all the above phases (1 – 5) were consolidated and 
rationalised to produce meaningful discussion points for the industry.
5.6.2 Specific areas of inquiry 
The research that was undertaken consisted of a number of distinct but interlinked sub-tasks that 
included: 
A. Examination of the literature 
B. Population of a database of a range of ‘major hazard’ events (case studies)
C. In-depth interrogation of the case studies using both generic and incident-specific 
approaches 
D. Identification of the causes (triggers and causative factors) of the ‘major 
hazard’/catastrophic events 
E. Identification of the current state of control measures in the UK 
F.	 Analysis of the information gathered to ascertain the: 
§ Key messages that will assist with follow on actions 
§ The role of industry in addressing associated risks 
G. Assessment of industry awareness of, and attitude to, catastrophic event potential 
H. Verification of the results using experts to ensure credibility 
5.6.3 Project Steering Group 
CIRIA invariably works through Project Steering Groups (PSG) so the early establishment of a 
suitable PSG was an essential component of the project. The PSG was primarily established to 
contribute towards: 
•	 Input of ideas 
•	 Provision of contacts 
•	 Establishing industry credibility for the project 
•	 Iterative assessment of the quality of the research 
•	 Assistance with dissemination 
The PSG consisted of 20 members from across the construction industry that met on four 
occasions during the project, during the months of December 2009 and February, May and July 
of 2010.
5.7 THE RESEARCH METHODS 
5.7.1 Introduction
It has already been highlighted that to gather the diverse range and types of data that was needed 
to address the project’s aims and objectives, it would be necessary to utilise a number of research 
methods. These research methods will now be explained in further depth. 
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5.7.2 Literature Review 
The aim of the literature review was to inform professional and public understanding of the 
immediate and underlying causes of catastrophic events, the effectiveness of current control 
measures and the need, if any, for further action to improve the management of risks and their 
potential for causing catastrophic events, including taking additional proportional mitigation 
measures. This consisted of an iterative process that was conducted between October 2009 and 
June 2010. The review provided the contextual and theoretical underpinnings to the project and 
awareness of the ‘state of the art’ of major hazards and catastrophic events in construction. This 
review explored a wide body of literature, including industry reports, regulatory documents, 
media articles and research papers associated with major hazards and catastrophic events in 
construction. The literature review was organised into five sections (and is presented in the next 
section of this report): 
§ Types of major hazards, accidents and incidents 
§ Risk and causality 
§ People, processes & products 
§ Legislation 
§ The way forward 
5.7.3 Online Survey 
Between January and February 2010 a bespoke on-line survey was accessed by a wide range of 
representatives from industry. The survey that consisted of structured (largely closed) questions 
provided an opportunity for interested parties to air their views, grievances and suggestions 
regarding catastrophic events in construction. 
The use of online resources as a method of accessing people for survey based research has 
increased dramatically as a result of the access to the internet. Consequently, the internet has 
become a valuable resource for accessing large numbers of respondents due to its ability to have 
a wide reach whilst being extremely cost and time effective. The internet has facilitated the 
gathering of robust samples as well as those which are nationally representative. To this extent, 
the project chose to use an online system in order to reach widely dispersed target groups; the 
findings of which are presented in Section 7 of this report. 
A valuable reason for using online is that the anonymity the respondent feels allows for the 
generation of more ‘truthful’ responses (Saunders et al., 1997). Respondents are free to answer 
the questions without the immediate influence of an interviewer or observer. They are also not 
restricted by time constraints as the respondent can take their time navigating through an online 
survey.  This positive aspect may be especially useful when surveying topics of a particularly 
sensitive nature. Secondly, another advantage of self completion interviews is that the questions 
are always standardised, i.e. each respondent is presented with exactly the same question asked in 
the same format. Online surveys also reduce any interviewer bias arising through the use of more 
than one interviewer on a research project. 
A full-featured survey software system allowed for the efficient creation of a custom survey 
which invited construction professionals to participate, and the administration team to analyze 
the results. Participant responses were received and interrogated progressively, giving an instant 
insight to further contact details from individuals and an aggregation of the survey results. 
Utilising this critical feedback and data allowed for delivery of more targeted, segmented 
communications and activity within the study. Advantages of the system utilised in this study 
were: 
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§ Diverse Question Styles – Allowed respondents to choose from a variety of question 
types, including multiple choice, short answer, long answer, range, true/false, yes/no, 
and open-ended responses 
§ Flexible Survey Format – Enabled each question to be presented on its own page, or 
grouped together for strategic impact 
§ Complete Customisation – Allowed the administrators to tailor the look and feel of the 
survey 
§ Detailed Reporting – Allowed administrators to view multiple reports on the survey 
respondent's individual or multiple answers. 
5.7.4 Consultation events 
Two Construction Productivity Network (CPN) events were organised by CIRIA in January 2010 
(one in London and one in Manchester) and an additional consultation event was ran in London 
in April. These events were designed to elicit the views of industrial stakeholders and to assist in 
the focus of the research. Members of the research team from CIRIA and Loughborough 
University were present at each event which involved a total of 73 participants:
§ London CPN event - 28 participants plus five speakers 
§ Manchester CPN event - 25 participants plus five speakers 
§ London voting workshop - 20 participants plus representatives from Constructing 
Excellence 
5.7.5 Industry Consultation 
This consisted of meetings with individual industrial contacts to obtain detailed, and confidential, 
information about individual and institutional experiences of major hazards and catastrophic 
events in construction. A wide range of individuals were consulted throughout the research 
including members of the Project Steering Group – see section 9 for further details.  
This consultation consisted of nearly a hundred individual interviews, discussions and 
conversations conducted by the research team between October 2009 and April 2010. 
5.7.6 Case Study Investigation 
Detailed information about 62 incidents on construction projects in the UK was supplied in 
confidence by HSE representatives. This information provided rich context specific information 
about the underlying (direct and indirect) causes of incidents that did result (or could have 
resulted) in a catastrophic event on a construction project. 
A case study method was considered an ideal approach when it became clear that a holistic and 
in-depth investigation into catastrophic events was required. The individual cases were selected 
largely based upon the required levels of details that were required to undertake the necessary 
analysis. The case study research took a multi-perspective approach which meant that the 
research considered not just the perspective of individuals, but also of the relevant groups and the 
interaction between them. This aspect is a salient point in the characteristic that the research 
possessed. This gave the research a range of applications for the case study models: 
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§ To describe the incident/event itself 
§ To describe the context in which the incident/event occurred; 
§ To explain complex causative factors 
§ To explain control failures contributing to incidents/events 
§ To describe individual actions contributing to events; and 
§ To describe interactions between people and groups involved 
Data were collected from several sources including: HSE Reports, independent accident reviews, 
first hand individual accounts of incidents, accounts from HSE investigations; and media 
accounts from industry publications. The information was detailed using a case study research 
instrument, which used a series of 67 structured questions to examine each case study in detail 
(Appendix 8.1). The questioning process assessed the general project details, the hazard event 
and underlying causes, technical issues and the effectiveness of regulation and control. A series 
of open ended questions were also used to capture any unique features of the incident. 
Case studies were selected to represent a wide range of construction projects. Of an initial 
outline of 120 incidents, enquiries were made for 87 cases, of which meaningful scrutiny was 
given to 62 cases that possessed sufficient levels of detail to be considered as case studies. These 
case studies were then grouped into five broad practice areas for further analysis (Collapse of 
permanent structures, Collapse of temporary works, Cranes, Fire and Sub-terrain activities). 
5.7.7 Research Instrument for case studies 
A research instrument was developed which formed a template for gathering all case study data 
(quantitative as well as qualitative).  Following the gathering of specific project information 
researchers were encouraged to provide specific accounts of the event itself according to five 
principal questions: 
§ What happened? 
§ Why was this (actually or nearly) a catastrophic event?
§ Are the technical reasons for the problems experienced known? 
§ Are the key underlying reasons for the problems experienced known? 
§ What were the sources of information? 
Knowledge of the case study from these principle questions were further developed using 67 
interrogation questions (Appendix C) which were assessed by a team of researchers using 
influence criteria of “High”, “Medium”, “Low” or “Zero”. In the first instance this data was 
assessed quantitatively using numeric ‘scores’; these were then augmented with the addition of 
descriptive (qualitative) observations for each question through a “comments” and summary 
statement. 
The research instrument helped the research team to focus the investigations on exploring both 
the actual facts from the reports and the perceptions of investigators. The comments section 
(which contained the issues and topics) formed the basis for the qualitative coding structure 
required for the data analysis and identification of emergent themes. The template proved 
invaluable in gathering a range of in-depth data in an efficient and effective manner. 
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5.7.8 Content analysis 
The content analysis of the case studies involved using a set of procedures to make valid 

inferences from the multiple sources of information. The procedures involved the grouping of 

words or information deemed to have similar connotations (e.g. grouping together of similar 

entries implying a concern for CDM regulations). The essence of this was to reduce and re­
classify the vast amounts of textual material into more relevant and manageable categories. Two 

approaches were used for the grouping of data namely “a priori” and “emergent”; with a priori 

the categories were established prior to the analysis based upon suggestions from the steering 

group members, literature review and other sources of information during the development of the 

research instrument. In comparison emergent categories were established as they emerged from 

the data. This systematic process dealt with the objective description of facts (i.e. from reports) 

but also included the subjective interpretations of latent content of the events described. The 

process thus required understanding and co-operation between the researcher and the 

consultation participants. As the research dealt with often separately constructed data from both 

historical fact to perceptual judgment both coding processes were used.

To make valid inferences it was important that the classification or grouping procedure was 

reliable in the sense of being consistent and the extent to which it measured or represented the 

issue of concern it was meant to represent. As such the content analysis procedure involved four 

basic criteria for judging the soundness of the information:

Dependability - whether or not causative issues were observed more than once; 

Credibility - establishing that the results were believable from the perspective of the researcher 

and consultation participants; 

Transferability - the degree to which the information could be transferred to other case studies, 

contexts or settings; and 

Confirmability - the degree to which the results could be confirmed or corroborated by others 

(researcher or consultation participants). 

5.7.9 Triangulation 
The project adopted a ‘triangulated’ research strategy, which occurs when research uses multiple 
sources of data that is collected using a variety of methods. Two specific methods used were: 
‘Data source triangulation’, when the researcher looks for the data using different sources of 
information; and ‘Methodological triangulation’, when one research method is supported by 
another, to increase confidence in the validity of the data as well as the rigour of the data 
interpretation. Importantly for the scope of this project, triangulation is an approach that allows 
for a multi-perspective approach to the investigation of questions and is also a good foundation 
for the multi-disciplinary ‘team’ approach that was adopted on this project. 
5.8 SUMMARY 
This section of the report has highlighted that it was necessary to gather a diverse range, and 
types, of data to address the project’s aims and objectives. Consequently, it was necessary to 
utilise a number of research methods and adopt a triangulated research strategy to ensure that the 
data was valid and reliable and that the ensuing data analysis was rigorous. The specific findings 
from these components of the research are presenting in Sections 6-8 of this report and 
summarised in the discussion provided in Part 1.
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6. Literature Review
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This review explores a wide body of literature, including industry reports, regulatory documents, 
media articles and research papers surrounding the broad topic of Major Hazards in Construction. 
The aim of this review is to inform professional and public understanding of the immediate and 
underlying causes, the effectiveness of current control measures and the need, if any, for further 
action to improve the management of risks and their potential impacts. Achieving a sustained 
improvement in safety in the industry requires a concerted effort by all stakeholders, directed at 
all levels in the influence hierarchy.
This review is organised into six sections: 
§ Types of major hazards, accidents and incidents
§ Framework regulations 
§ Lessons from other hazardous industries 
§ Risk and causality 
§ People, processes and products 
§ Complexity, communication and interfaces
§ Summary 
6.1.1 Key points from the literature 
§ Focus has been directed at easily promotable risk and hazard reducing goals (for example 
‘zero accidents’), rather than the processes and methods needed to achieve them. 
§ Despite attempts to learn lessons over the years, major accidents continue to be a threat.
§ Complex chains of events (including organisational policies and decisions, individual 
behaviours and mechanical or technological failures) often combine to result in major 
hazard events or catastrophes. 
§ The major consequences and impacts of major hazards and catastrophes could be: 
multiple deaths and serious injuries to site personnel and the general public; the serious 
disruption of infrastructure and key services; damage or even destruction of organisations 
commercially; and political implications – public enquiries, demands for new legislation.  
A framework needs to be developed for consolidating and simultaneously considering 
these different types of major hazard consequences and their impacts.
§ The literature identified failures based on fundamental systemic failure, ie failures within 
systems of organisation, communications and procurement.  
§ Greater emphasis should be placed on the concept of ‘people, process and products’ in 
particular when developing the competence of the industry’s people in relation to risk and 
major hazards. 
§ There is a need for further research and for advancing the use of confidential reporting 
mechanisms 
6.2 MAJOR HAZARDS, ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS 
On all projects, the management function should conduct a rigorous risk analysis for the project. 
It will then use this information to develop a comprehensive risk management plan and generate a 
49
  
               
                
            
              
 
                 
            
         
                
              
                
              
             
 
   
 
             
              
             
            
          
             
             
               
             
              
 
            
       
      
         
       
             
              
                 
       
 
                
          
             
          
           
           
          
             
               
             
            
range of cost estimates to communicate the uncertainty in the project to the internal and external 
potentials of hazards. A “hazard” is a condition or event with the potential to cause harm.
“Risk” (R) is the probability (P) that harm from a particular hazard will occur combined with the 
likely severity (S) of the harm; or, in simple terms, R = S x P (ACE 2006). 
An accident may be defined as any unplanned event that results in injury or ill health of people, 
or damage or loss to property, plant, materials or the environment (HSE 1983).  However the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) (OGP 1999) prefers the advanced use 
of the term “Incident”, which is defined as “an event or chain of events which has caused injury, 
illness and/or damage (loss) to assets, the environment or third parties”. Catastrophic events are 
incidents are the issues, or result of an identified or apparent hazard with large scale implications.
In this review the terms event (major hazard event) and incidents are used intermittently as it is 
felt that these reflect in greater detail the nature of occurrences that are under review. 
6.2.1 What is a major hazard? 
An important consideration of risks arising from major hazards and catastrophes is the analysis of 
the probability of an event occurring. This is particularly true when addressing risks from events 
which occur infrequently (low probability) but have a severe and significant impact when they do 
occur (high consequence), such as a commercial airline crash, nuclear accidents, toxic chemical 
spillage, earthquakes or hurricanes. Such events have a far higher perceived impact (on the 
affected working groups, the general public as well as the commercial and physical infrastructure 
- built environment and business) than events which occur more frequently, but with less severity 
per event, such as a individual trip, fall or a single car crash. The main characterisation of Major 
Hazards (for the purposes of this review) is that the associated risk is of “low probability: high 
consequence” which may be measured by way of one or more of the following impact features 
(risk profiles): 
A. Potential for multiple deaths and serious injuries affecting workers and members of the 
public (MOPs) on and/or offsite in a single incident 
B. Serious disruption of infrastructure and services 
C. Potential to damage or even destroy organisations commercially; and 
D. Political implications – public enquiries, demands for new legislation 
The assessment of an event by ‘low probability: high consequence’ plays an important role is 
assessing the risk of a catastrophe. However, in mitigating for major events and catastrophes the 
risk profiles (A – D) can prove problematic as it can be difficult to identify which characteristic is 
most prevalent in an individual case. 
Where the risk profile is placed in a hierarchy of consequence will depend on the perspective and 
discipline of decision makers (i.e. accountant may consider organisational commerciality as most 
important).  The requirements of health and safety to address the risk to people (A), the built 
environmental (B), commercial enterprise (C), and or public or political profiles require uniquely 
separate interventions which may not always be in harmony. For example, measures necessary to 
safeguard personnel in emergencies may have adverse environmental effects, and vice versa. 
However, joint and consolidated consideration of health and safety, built environmental, 
commercial and political matters provides a framework within which such issues can be resolved, 
and so an appropriate balance might be struck (Bell and Healey, 2006). Value judgments across 
types of impacts will often have to be made. From a policy perspective, severe economic 
disruptions such as temporary business closures cannot be seen as ‘equivalent’, for example, to 
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severe safety impacts such as deaths. As such frameworks for addressing different types of 
consequences and their impacts are required. 
6.2.2 Top Events 
A concept to consider is the notion of a “Top Event”. Top Event is a term used largely within 
nuclear and petro-chemical industries and is a component part of a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
process which falls under the wider body of theories contributing to systems thinking. The 
United States’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission produced a “Fault Tree Handbook” (Vesely et al.
1981) which was developed to serve as text for courses on Systems Safety and Reliability, and to 
make available otherwise undocumented material on fault tree construction and evaluation for 
nuclear industries.  It was recommended that a fault /top event tree methodology should be more 
widely used to assess the potential for major hazards and catastrophic events during the early 
development stages of nuclear systems. 
A fault tree analysis can be simply described as an analytical technique where a systems critical 
safety failure is specified and the system is then analysed in the context of its environment and 
operation to find all credible ways in which the failure can occur. The fault tree itself is a 
graphical model of various parallel and sequential combinations of faults that may (or may not) 
contribute to the predefined event. These faults could be innate product failures, human errors, 
and faults with systems for implementation or any pertinent events which may lead to the failure.  
The graphical model (or tree) thus depicts the logical interrelationships of the immediate 
events/incidents and underlying factors/incidents/events that lead to the ultimate failure at the top 
of the tree – the “Top Event” (Vesely et al. 1981). 
However it is pointed out that a fault tree is rarely a model for mapping all possible system 
failures or possible cause for system failures (Vesely et al. 1981). Each fault tree is generally 
tailored to the particular top event which corresponds to a particular aspect of a system failure; 
therefore each fault tree may only include the faults that contribute to that event, and are not 
exhaustive of all potential top event scenarios (and the immediate or underlying events that might 
be credible to that particular failure).  
Complexity surrounds the process modelling required for predicting top events (major hazards 
and catastrophes). This is further complicated by the often subjective nature of data available to 
conduct the analysis for particular disciplines. However, the complexity of the process is not 
overwhelming and the benefits of the outcome can be extremely valuable. There are many 
methods and tools available for quantitatively combining and assessing risks. However the 
selection of a method may involve a trade-off between top events and risk profiles based on the 
sophistication of the analysis method and the ease of use. In the wider analysis, adherence to 
sound risk analysis techniques will lead to more informed decision making and a more 
transparent allocation of project risk. Whether it is relevant to Construction however requires 
further consideration.  
6.2.3 Types of accidents and incidents 
Due to the nature of work conducted on construction projects several major hazards and risk 
potentials exist during the active phases of construction. Typically, larger, more complex 
projects are likely to have more major hazards to be managed. However, smaller projects are not 
exempt.
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Over the course of history major incidents, including ‘near misses1’, occur which result (or could 
result) in multiple fatalities, serious disruption of infrastructure, public services and with the 
potential to damage or even destroy organisations commercially.  Although the immediate 
physical risk is to workers in close proximity to the event, there is often a high risk to the general 
public. Examples include the collapse of buildings, tunnels and scaffolds during construction and 
failure of major plant such as cranes and piling rigs. The identified events featured in this review 
are: 
• Collapse of Permanent Structures 
• Collapse of Temporary Works
o Static – eg Facades, propping, formwork 
o Dynamic – eg tower cranes, mobile cranes, large mobile plant 
• Major Fires 
• Collapse of Tunnelling 
• Major Disturbance of Underground Services 
As alluded to earlier, some sectors of the industry call such major incidents ‘Top Events’. While 
the key scope of investigation on such incidents is often the ‘most severe impact, there is always 
the existence of relatively minor but cascading incidents (or decisions) that can lead to the major 
incident.  In this respect, key features of safety and the related concepts of risk and hazard need to 
be defined and explored, as follows. 
6.2.4 Collapse of permanent structures 
A structure is safe if it will not fail under foreseeable demands and if it is unlikely to fail under 

extraordinary demands or circumstances (Elms 1999). A number of reports and research provide 

commentary on collapse of permanent structures including: Dam’s (Muhunthan and Pillal 2008); 

Bridges (Burgoyne and Scantlebury 2008; Collings 2008); Buildings (Barber 1963; Griffiths 

1968; Barber 1971).    

Collings (2008) reviewed the histories of large bridges that failed or required repair due to a 

weakness in design either during construction or shortly after being brought into service. The 

identified failures played a significant role in developing the civil engineering profession’s 

knowledge of structural action and materials behaviour. The failures have helped to define the 

known limits of the design rules used and have spurred research into particular fields.  

However Collings (2008) also states that there are still issues to be addressed by the profession, 

particularly in the dissemination of the vast amounts of information available to an increasingly 

specialised group of designers. Ongoing work hopes to capitalise on historical knowledge applied 

in the context of construction catastrophes. 

The Standing Committee on Structural Safety (SCOSS) was formed 30 years ago and is primarily 

charged with giving warnings to relevant bodies where unacceptable risk is believed to exist.  

They identify trends and practices in the field of structural engineering and have considered 200 

topics which have led to authoritative guidance or a change in design requirements.  However, 

continuing structural failures indicate that civil and structural engineers need to remain vigilant 

and continue to manage risk carefully (Carpenter 2007).

1 ‘Near miss’ should in the context of this report perhaps be ‘near hit’ or ‘near accident’. 
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A more formal system to obtain additional data on trends in failures (and potential failures) 
CROSS (Confidential Reporting on Structural Safety) was launched in 2005. In a similar vein to 
SCOSS, CROSS aims to improve structural safety and reduce failures by using confidential 
reports to highlight lessons that have been learnt, to generate feedback and to influence change 
(Soane 2007). With a similar view of training, education and the sharing information Soane 
(2007) suggests that the lessons highlighted by CROSS should be widely disseminated 
throughout the industry to enhance shared understanding on risk and hazards.
6.2.5 Collapse of Temporary Works: Static
Temporary works include any temporary structure or provision required to facilitate the 
construction of the permanent works. Typically items of plant and equipment used in the 
construction process are not included as temporary works, but the support of such items would 
be. For example whilst a piling rig is not temporary works the temporary working platform is.
Temporary works will include, but are not limited to formwork, falsework, scaffolding, 
temporary platforms and structures. 
Any failure of temporary works may lead to the collapse of the permanent structure or item of 
plant that is being supported. This could cause injury or death to those working on or near to it, as 
well as loss of time and money. Scaffolding and temporary works must be capable of being 
constructed without the need for major intervention into the existing building fabric. This must be 
borne in mind by designers and erectors of scaffolding and temporary works (HSE, 2003). Much 
of the literature has concentrated on falsework and scaffolding. 
6.2.6 Falsework and Scaffolding 
Falsework is used to support a permanent structure or item of plant/equipment while it is not self-
supporting, either in new construction or refurbishment.
Historically there have been many studies of temporary structure failures: Feld (1968) pioneered 
the observation of falsework and formwork collapses; Elliott investigated several cases of 
falsework bridge failure (1973); predominantly in North America. Allen (1979) and Fraczec 
(1979) investigated errors in concrete structures; and Houser (1979) performed an extensive 
observation of European failures by collecting 800 cases from insurance files, many of which 
dealt with construction-related failures. In the general analysis, the causes of many of these past 
failures of falsework were foreseeable and could have been prevented by proper consideration 
when planning, erecting, loading or dismantling the falsework. Investigations into falsework 
collapses have identified a lack of co-ordination between the various trades and suppliers of 
falsework as a major cause (HSE 2003).  Failures often occur on fairly simple structures erected 
by smaller falsework contractors, who may not employ design staff. The law requires falsework 
to be erected and dismantled only under the supervision of a competent person; and as early as 
possible, a person should be appointed for each site as a temporary works co-ordinator, with 
responsibility for co-ordinating the various items and stages of use of the temporary works (HSE, 
2003 and BS 5975:2008) 
As a consequence of growing concern over an area of work not well regulated at the time, the 
Bragg Report was commissioned with a wide remit to investigate the use of falsework. Bragg 
made a number of pointed recommendations: 
1 To provide a ‘full written brief’ to be implemented in conjunction with the design 
procedure outlined in the Report 
2 For the design to be checked, approved and countersigned by a competent supervisor 
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3	 That the permanent works designer should have the opportunity to comment on falsework 
proposals 
4	 To nominate a single individual (with appropriate responsibility and authority) to act as 
Temporary Works Co-ordinator (TWC) 
For suppliers to provide relevant test data to justify loads used. 
Although some are now incorporated into industrial practice, others remain a concern and 
accidents which may be regarded as “foreseeable” are not being prevented by proper 
consideration when planning, erecting, loading or dismantling the falsework.
According to the HSE (2003) the causes of many past failures were foreseeable and could have 
been prevented by proper consideration when planning, erecting, loading or dismantling the 
falsework. Investigations into falsework collapses have identified a lack of co-ordination between 
the various trades and suppliers of falsework as a major cause. Failures often occur on fairly 
simple structures erected by smaller falsework contractors, who may not employ design staff 
(HSE 2003). 
'Independent tied' scaffolds will normally be provided for painting, pointing or other maintenance 
work. They consist of two rows of standards (the vertical supports) connected by ledgers and 
transoms (the horizontal elements). 'Independent' scaffolds are not quite what their name 
suggests. They are termed 'independent' because they derive no vertical support from the building 
and 'tied' because they must be tied to the building for horizontal stability. Because of the need to 
avoid damage, tying scaffolding to the facade of historic buildings can sometimes present 
difficult problems. Sometimes, if the building is fragile, it will not be capable of providing the 
horizontal restraint that the scaffolding needs and this must be achieved in other ways, such as by 
providing external scaffold buttresses or by tying the external scaffold to an internal ‘birdcage’ 
framework scaffold (Hume 1997).
6.2.7 Collapse of Temporary Works: Dynamic
Construction projects are highly mechanised and the working environment is dominated by 
material handling and lifting equipment (Shapira et al. 2007); and because of their high 
adaptability and productivity, cranes are the most common form of lifting equipment seen on UK 
construction sites (Hanna and Lotfallah 1999). However, occupational fatalities and injuries 
caused by the operation of cranes pose a serious public problem.
Eight people in the UK have been killed in incidents involving tower cranes since 2000 (HSE 
2009). The Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998 sets out the legal 
requirements. In February 2010, new laws to improve the safety of tower cranes on construction 
sites were laid before the UK Parliament. The regulations include a statutory registration scheme 
for tower cranes. Developed by the HSE, the measures are in response to increasing concerns 
about crane safety.
Following an investigation on three construction sites Sertyesilisik et al. (2010) conducted case 
studies and interviews with general site staff, managerial staff, and appointed persons into lifting 
operations on construction sites. They explored the different options, their effectiveness, and the 
relative effect on safety of processes, factors and levels of worker competence required when 
operating equipment. The findings revealed six main points to improve safety in lifting 
operations: through planning; training; equipment selection, use and inspection; feedback / 
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communication; use of the appointed person’s role; and development of safety databases. 
Thorough the effective planning of lifting operations the authors identified that positive effects on 
safety could be achieved; they concluded that there were needs for tighter accreditation of all 
qualifications in the lifting operations field (Sertyesilisik et al. 2010). 
Guidance was subsequently prepared under the aegis of the Strategic Forum and this, together 
with other industry guidance accessible through the HSE website, is considered as industry best 
practice; this includes advice that companies should avoid authoritarian working culture to 
facilitate efficient feedback to improve safety; that the appointed person should have a site based 
role; and that site inspections and maintenance should be monitored on a national database form. 
6.2.8 Major Fire
Although much has been written about in-use fires, little has been found about fires during 
construction.
The UK Timber Frame Association has published brief guidance (UKTFA, 2007). The guidance 
concentrates on measures to prevent fires, detect fires, control fires and escape from fires.
6.2.9 Collapse of Tunnelling and Major Disturbance of Underground Services 
The design and construction of underground structures create unique challenges. Ground related 
problems and conditions can often adversely affect costs, completion time, profitability, and 
health and safety issues on a project of any scale. These risks can affect all those involved in 
construction - including the client, designer and the constructor. Guidelines, titled ‘Managing 
Geotechnical Risk’, produced by Clayton in association with the Department of Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, provide best practice guidance on the management of geotechnical 
risk by all parties concerned, and also explain why such risks occur (Clayton 2001). These 
guidelines suggest that once the design begins to be formulated and investigation is proceeding it 
is possible to develop geotechnical risk registers (Clayton 2001). 
Powderham and McDonald (2008) present examples of two case histories from major 
transportation projects to illustrate this theme. Both examples featured substantial challenges in 
underground construction and show how safety was a key driver for innovation. One example 
was the Heathrow Express (HEX) which was set to provide a new major rail link between Central 
London and Heathrow. It involved substantial underground construction in the Central Terminal 
Area (CTA) of the airport. In October 1994 the project suffered a major setback when the CTA 
station tunnels, some 30m below the surface, collapsed (HSE 2000 and Carpenter et al., 2008).
This was a ‘NATM’ (New Austrian Tunnelling Method) and although there were no injuries, 
many people were put at risk and the consequential cost was significant. The HSE report (HSE 
2000) cites the direct cause of the tunnel collapses as a chain of events involving: 
• 	 Substandard construction in the initial length of the CTA concourse tunnel 
• 	 Grout jacking that damaged the same length of the CTA tunnel plus inadequately 
executed repairs 
• 	 Construction of a parallel tunnel in failing ground 
• 	 Major structural failure and progressive failure in the adjacent ground along with further 
badly executed repairs 
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Although these immediate causes were identified, there were particular underlying causes more 
related to overall management functions such as decisions and actions surrounding procurement 
and site control which impacted on risk management. The event was identified as having all the 
hallmarks of an ‘organisational accident’ (HSE 2000). In particular hazards were not identified 
by all the parties and risks were not controlled (HSE 2000). There were also significant technical 
shortfalls including decisions on tunnel construction without correlation with available data on 
the settlement of the ground surface above the tunnel.  A number of the lessons arising from this 
collapse can be applied to engineering projects generally.
6.3 FRAMEWORK REGULATIONS 
While the issues detailed in 6.2 are cause for concern, there is a broad system of Framework 
Regulations which create duties for employers, employees and the self employed to ensure, so far 
as is reasonably practicable (see SFARP in Glossary) that workplaces are safe, which should 
include consideration of potential catastrophic events. The aim is to improve health and safety 
management and to make more explicit what is required from employers. Existing health and 
safety regulations are a continuum of a larger legal framework of law. Acts and regulations which 
currently remain prominent are: 
§ Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HSW Act) 
§ Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 
§ Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR) 
§ Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998 (LOLER) 
§ Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (PUWER) 
§ The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 
(RIDDOR), 
Since the introduction of legislation in the early 1990s, a more systematic and better-organised 
approach to safety was encouraged. The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 
1994 (CDM) came into effect on the 31st March 1995, implementing EC Council Directive 
92/57/EEC1 which relates to the provision of minimum health and safety requirements at 
temporary or mobile construction sites. The regulations have been superseded by the 
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007.  The fundamental principles on which 
the CDM Regulations are based are: 
§ Competence 
§ Communication 
§ Coordination and Cooperation 
The CDM Regulations bring health and safety management, on an obligatory basis, into the 
planning and design of construction work. In principle the contractor should no longer be left 
with the sole responsibility of health and safety. 
1 In the European context, the 2004 Bilbao Declaration resulted in the formation of the European Construction Safety Forum that 
was facilitated in its work by the European Agency for Safety & Health at Work. The European Federation of Engineering 
Consultancy Associations (EFCA) and the Association for Consultancy and Engineering (ACE) published has published the useful 
“Designing for Safety in Construction” as an outcome of its work with the European Construction Safety Forum. 
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6.4 LESSONS FROM OTHER HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIES 
In terms of Major Hazards, cues may be taken from the oil and gas industries where the 
consideration of major incidents and catastrophes are paramount to operations. The HSE 
commissioned the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) to carry out a review of the existing 
literature on the causes of major hazard incidents and the relevant control measures and 
behaviours that can prevent incidents occurring. The industries covered by this programme 
included: nuclear industries, offshore oil and gas industries, and onshore industries including 
chemical industries, mines, biological agents, explosives and gas supply/pipelines, The 
subsequent research (Bell and Healey 2006) was an important step in indentifying the risks 
associated with major hazards as opposed to general risk and contributed to the major hazard 
agenda by taking stock of the existing evidence base, identifying gaps in major hazard analysis 
and suggesting how these gaps might be addressed by further research. 
The review by Bell and Healey (2006) detailed fourteen major accident case studies dated from 
1966 to 2003, including: Aberfan (1966); Flixborough (1974); Three Mile Island (1979); Bhopal 
(1984); Chernobyl (1986); and the Challenger (1986) and Columbia (2003) Space Shuttle 
Disasters. The review surmised that in most cases, the combination of management decisions, 
specific events and circumstances on the day of the incidents were extremely complex; and 
numerous factors contributed to the incidents (Bell and Healey 2006). Some of the main causes of 
the major incidents focused on the contribution of human and organisational factors as underlying 
causes and that despite attempts to learn lessons over the years, major accidents continue to be a 
threat. After reviewing a range of previous catastrophic events Kletz (1996) observed that it is 
also important to recognise that new problems can arise out of the solutions to old problems. 
By mapping the causes of the incidents by the varied industry sectors Bell and Healey (2006) 
identified that there were consistencies in the dominant failings, and this was true not only for the 
major hazard industries. The information collated from the case studies and research papers 
showed that in the majority of major incidents, complex chains of events combined to result in 
the incident. These included organisational policies and decisions, individual behaviours and 
mechanical or technological failures. While there were wide and varied individual behaviours 
that resulted in the immediate cause of an incident they all related to wider underlying 
organisational factors symptomatic of poor safety culture in the respective industries. It was 
identified that in all sectors several individuals, organisations, professions and disciplines were 
involved and that poor safety culture (and failings at wider organisational levels) may have been 
due to pervasive differences between organisational groups (operators, engineers and directors) 
that hinder effective learning and communication.  
By contrast Weame (2008) utilised a case study methodology to report on 18 cases of engineering 
failures across several industries to demonstrate lessons that may be common. Causes of the 
failures ranged from faults in prioritising responsibilities, procedures, use of expertise and lack of 
thought about unusual operations, to lack of inspection, checking and attention to warning signs.
Each of these causes of failure was seen in more than one case, but none was considered 
dominant.
The investigation highlighted: faults in design decisions and assumptions in seven cases; faults in 
the operation and maintenance of assets in a further seven cases; and fault in manufacturing and 
construction in four cases.  While the distribution of faults was not statistically significant, it 
served to highlight that engineering failures were not necessarily design faults; and occurred at 
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any stage during the project life-cycle, from initial project specification, asset operation, 
maintenance, or rebuilding for a change of use. 
The reported causes of the failures identified in Weame (2008) indicated that none of the 
incidents were caused by “hitherto unknown physical phenomena” but were the result of failures 
to use available information for: 
§ prioritising
§ responsibilities
§ procedures
§ expertise
§ attention to unusual operations
§ lack of inspection
§ lack of checking
§ lack of attention to warning signs. 
These failures identified as “institutional risks” were primarily due to failures within systems of 
organisation, communications and procurement. 
6.5 RISK AND CAUSALITY 
Risk is an estimate of the probability of loss from a range of hazardous opportunities..  It is easier 
to identify hazards than to evaluate associated risk and in risk assessment; professional judgement 
is by far the most important component. Various methods of assessment can be used to provide 
indications as an aid to professional judgement, but these methods cannot be considered as a 
substitute for it.  Of course, professional judgement can be wrong on occasion.
In recent years, site health and safety management has gained in importance (Boyd 2009; 
Rawlinson and Farrell 2010). Following the implementation of the revised Construction Design 
and Management (CDM) regulations in 2007, client focus has turned to site health and safety as a 
factor when awarding work (Klein 2008). Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has to varying 
extents encouraged growth in, and raised the profile of, site health and safety management further 
within the construction industry as a whole (Boyd 2009). Notwithstanding the basic desire to 
protect their workforce, the construction industry has devoted considerable effort to improve 
health and safety performance (HSE 2009).
Project risk management (PRM) can provide a decisive competitive advantage to building 
sponsors.  For those sponsors who address risks consciously, anticipate adverse changes, protect 
themselves from unexpected events and gain expertise to price risk, gain a leading edge (Barkley, 
2004). However, the realisation of this commercial advantage on design-intensive multi­
disciplinary capital projects hinges to a large extent on the approach to the initial identification of 
hazards. The very way the identification process is conducted will have a direct influence on the 
contribution that risk analysis and management makes to the overall project management of 
construction projects.  However, safety planning in construction project management is often 
separated from other planning functions, such as scheduling. This separation creates difficulties 
for the analysis of what, when, why and where safety measures are needed for preventing 
accidents (Chantawit et al. 2005). 
A list of risk control measures has been developed applicable to all places of employment (The 
Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management 1997; HSE 2006; ACE 2006), namely: 
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a) The avoidance of risk. 
b) The evaluation of unavoidable risks. 
c) The combating of risks at source. 
d) The adaptation of work to the individual, especially as regards the design of places of 
work, the choice of work equipment and the choice of systems of work, with a view, in 
particular, to alleviating monotonous work and work at a predetermined work rate and to 
reducing their effect on health. 
e) The adaptation of the place of work to technical progress. 
f) The replacement of dangerous articles, substances or systems of work by non-dangerous 
or less dangerous articles, substances or systems of work. 
g) The development of an adequate prevention policy in relation to safety, health and welfare 
at work, which takes account of technology, organisation of work, working conditions, 
social factors and the influence of factors related to the working environment. 
h) The giving to collective protective measures priority over individual protective measures. 
i) The giving of appropriate training and instructions to employees. 
These general principles of prevention are probably less problematically applied within the 
manufacturing industries where there is, generally, a constant, stable workplace. Within 
construction, while there may be similarities between projects, every site is unique, every 
building/structure is unique and the set of persons involved is unique; furthermore, a construction 
site is constantly changing from day to day (ACE 2006). In many of the construction cases 
considered in this review, a clear lack of planning contributed to the catastrophic event.  If this is 
to be regarded as true then the majority of accidents are not caused by careless workers but by 
failures in control which ultimately is the responsibility of management. However aside from 
major events, a recurring theme within the industry is that people are often injured or killed 
during very simple, routine work activities (Baxendale and Jones 2000) and outside of 
construction related activities (Gibb et al. 2006), although it must be appreciated that events are 
rarely the result of isolated incidents or faults but a culmination of small, medium of large failures 
of people (worker or manager), machinery or systems.
The ERIC acronym (Eliminate, Reduce, Inform, and Control) represents a generic set of 
principles applicable in the construction industry (CITB, 2007) – see also Glossary.
To a greater or lesser extent, many contractors have readily adopted health and safety issues as a 
high priority.  The industry in Great Britain has been instrumental in moving towards the creation 
of a fully competent health and safety scheme through the Construction Skills Certification 
Scheme (CSCS) and the CSCS card as a minimum requirement for entry to work (CSCS 2009). 
However this does not necessarily correlate to a competent risk and hazard aware workforce 
(Spanswick 2007; Donaghy 2009).   This industry direction correlates with current government 
approaches, and the creation of bespoke safety management programmes by industry innovators.  
However, it has been suggested that this is largely to do with the influence of corporate social 
responsibility placed on organisations, in which case the industry is accused of focusing on the 
promotable rather than the practical solutions towards hazard and risk, and bureaucracy has 
overtaken practicality in the direction of health and safety management on construction sites 
(Chantanawit 2005).
In order to further investigate current industry innovation and direction in site health and safety 
management, Rawlinson and Farrell (2010) conducted an examination of contractors’ 
promotional material. This provided a measure of the extent to which industry has currently 
homogenised with contemporary government and academic approaches, or indeed has appeared 
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motivated by health and safety factors.  In the analysis Rawlinson and Farrell (2010) suggested 
that industry focus may have shifted from how to achieve the goals towards setting the goals 
themselves; contemporary direction has arguably become focused on the packaging and
presentation of construction site health and safety management, rather than the fundamental 
methods and processes of implementation. It is also suggested that innovation and developments 
in construction site health and safety management may become diluted during the implementation 
of corporate social responsibility (Rawlinson and Farrell 2010). 
6.5.1 The balance of operational risk against cost 
Operational Risk Management (ORM) is defined as a continual cyclic process which includes 
risk assessment, risk decision making, and implementation of risk controls, which results in 
acceptance, mitigation, or avoidance of risk. ORM is a broad approach to operational risk, 
including the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes and systems, 
human factors, or from external events. However, the mitigation of risk must often consider 
complex and competing operational, legal, political and economic demands impacting on 
decision makers. One key consideration is “cost”.
The development of a cost conscious culture of companies dedicated to efficiency and 
profitability should be the principal quantifiable benefit of the CDM regulations. It was estimated 
that on small to medium sized construction sites a reduction in accidents of 33 percent could 
bring estimated benefits to the industry of £220 million each year (Joyce 2007).   
6.5.2 The causes of accidents 
Within the industry there is a commonality of events and causal factors that can contribute 
indirectly to an accident (Baxendale and Jones 2000).  In a special issue of the ‘Proceedings of 
the institution of Civil Engineers’ Civil Engineering’ journal several leading authors investigated 
case studies of engineering failures. The authors point out that with ever-increasing 
specialisation in civil engineering projects, communication and understanding at every point are 
vital to preserving safety (Mann 2008). Others have suggested that more attention could be paid 
to the psychological aspects of learning from failure (Kletz 2008). An interesting message 
relayed is that just as ‘problems’ have been rebranded as ‘challenges’, perhaps ‘failure’ should be 
replaced with something less emotionally charged. But after almost all of the incidents reported, 
opportunities for the industry to improve safety are missed (Byfield 2008). 
Protecting construction workers and others against risks to health and safety arising from work 
activities, requires a firm set of procedures, protocols and criteria for assessing successes and 
failures. The HSE’s philosophy for securing the health, safety and welfare of persons at work is 
set out in “Reducing Risk Protecting People”. The document commonly referred to as “R2P2” 
(HSE 2001), sets out the basis and criteria by which the HSE, in complying with its functions, 
decides upon the degree and form of regulatory control that it believes should be put in place for 
addressing occupational hazards.  It considers the way scientific evidence (or the lack of it) and 
uncertainties are taken into account and how the balance is struck between the benefits of 
adopting a measure to avoid or control the risks, and its disadvantages. The findings of the R2P2 
investigation studies reveal a combination of factors for each fatal accident of which the most 
frequently cited are: 
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a) the incidence of training factors, experience; 
b) information and advice deficiencies; 
c) risk perception; 
d) rescheduling of work without planning;
e) minor / one-off jobs; 
f) compliance; and
g) equipment operability, space, personal protective equipment (PPE) issues and tools 
not designed to fit the user / task. 
Government departments have paid considerable attention to these findings (Donaghy 2009). 
However given the speed at which the industry is subject to change (technology, process and 
procedure), stakeholders must review practice, change and review in the context of future safety 
challenges. 
In a detailed study of 100 construction accidents, (Haslam et al. 2003a, 2003b; Gibb et al. 2005, 
2006) identified where safety on construction projects is compromised and why. Illustrating the 
hierarchy of influences in construction accidents through 13 broad causal factors (see Table 1). 
Gibb et al. 2005 also point to failings in education, training and the industry’s lack of a safety 
culture typified by only a superficial appreciation of health and safety considerations from 
workers both on and off sites. The authors conclude that stakeholders responsible for the 
immediate accident circumstances, shaping factors and originating influences must all work hard 
to remove flaws in their safety systems to ensure that accidents are reduced (Haslam et al. 2003a, 
2003b; Gibb et al. 2005, 2006). It should be noted that the accidents studied were not major 
accidents although the research team did attempt to evaluate the likely outcomes if the accident 
conditions had been slightly different, with many of the incidents having the potential for major 
injuries or fatalities, although generally not multiple fatalities which are the focus of this research. 
Table 1: Results and implications for the industry (Gibb et al. 2005; 2006) 
Workers 
Problems arising from workers or the work team, especially worker actions or behaviour 
and worker capabilities, were judged to have contributed to over two thirds (70%) of the 
accidents. These problem points to inadequate supervision, education and training. 
Communication 
Poor communication within work teams contributed to some accidents, due to the 
physical distance between work colleagues or high levels of background noise. 
Non –construction 
activity 
Many accidents occurred when those involved were not actually performing a 
construction task (e.g. moving around site). 
Workplace factors 
Workplace factors, notably poor housekeeping and site layout and space availability 
problems, were considered to have contributed in half (49%) of the accident studies. 
Standards of housekeeping and workplace layout are low in construction compared to 
other industrial sectors. 
Poor analysis of 
causality factors 
Despite poor weather often being cited as one of the reasons for construction’s poor 
safety record, there was little evidence in support of this. 
Equipment 
Shortcomings with equipment, including personal protective equipment (PPE), were 
identified in over half (56%) of the incidents. Poor equipment design and inappropriate 
use of equipment for the task were prominent aspects. Designers, suppliers and 
purchasers of equipment appeared to give insufficient attention to the safety of users. 
Material 
Deficiencies with the suitability and condition of materials, including packaging, featured 
in more than a quarter (27%) of incidents. The operation of the supply/purchase appeared 
to act as a barrier to innovation as far as safety is concerned. 
Risk management 
Originating influences, especially inadequacies with risk management, were considered to 
have been present in almost all (94%) of the accidents. Frequently, no risk assessment 
had been undertaken covering the circumstances involved in the accident. Where a risk 
assessment had been carried out, it was often found to be superficial and unlikely to have 
prevented the accident. 
Habitual factors PPE was relied upon habitually as a substitute for risk elimination or reduction at source. 
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Design 
It was judged that up to half of the accidents could have been mitigated through a design 
change and it was found that, despite the CDM regulations, many designers were failing 
to address the safety implications of their designs and specifications. 
Investigation 
protocols 
Accident investigation by employers or supervising contractors was frequently superficial 
and of little value to improving safety. HSE investigations seemed to focus on safety 
failures in the activity being undertaken, without capturing the upstream influences upon 
these. 
Client safety 
consciousness 
The influence from clients on safety appeared limited in the construction sectors 
predominant in this research (civil engineering, major building, residential). This was, 
again, despite the responsibilities on clients imposed by CDM. 
Generic safety 
risks 
Many of the incidents were caused by commonplace hazards and activities that will 
continue to occur on site whatever design changes might be made. The widespread 
presence of the many generic safety risks accompanying construction needs to be 
tackled before the benefits of design improvements will be realised. 
6.5.3 Hazard causation models 
According to many sources (Reason 1997, 2007; Haslam et al. 2003a, 2003b, Gibb et al. 2005, 
2006; Carpenter et al. 2008) engineering failures are nearly always caused by the aggregate effect 
of a number of influences that come together at one particular time to cause collapse, distress or 
ultimate failure.  The nature of the failure may often be ‘systemic’ i.e. it is not related specifically 
to an event, but is instead related to the manner in which an organisation, or project, is managed 
and organised.  If this is not identified and acted upon there is a chance of the same, or similar 
failure, occurring again even if the individual associated with the original fault is replaced. Such 
an organisational failure may lie within the project team structure, within the management of one 
or more of the parties involved, or in the manner in which they inter-relate through contractual 
arrangements (Carpenter et al. 2008). 
Evidence taken from industry reports on practice and experience (Toft and Reynolds 1994; 
Lancaster, 1996) and empirical evidence (Vaughan 1996) from research suggests that a number 
of approaches to hazard causation exist which may be used to frame the way analysis of hazards 
can be undertaken: 
§ Hazard Barrier Target Model - sees hazards as the result of a continuous threat (the 
hazard) on a target. This target is shielded from the hazard by a barrier (which may be one 
barrier or several).  These barriers need to be maintained. The maintenance of the barrier 
has to be secured by a – barrier – management system, also called safety management 
system or SMS. Barriers may be imperfect or absent as a result of technical or human 
failure. 
§ Barrier model - In many systems not one but several barriers can be identified that shield 
the target from the hazard. 
§ Domino model – This simple model sees hazards as a chain of events which is initialised 
by some event, just as the tipping of the first domino in a row of dominos make the whole 
row fall. 
§ Tripod – specifies the nature of the various events in three kinds, faults, latent failures
and preconditions. This way of distinguishing between different types of events is meant 
to take away the usual way of designating the cause of the incidents as the last fault or 
mistake made, which usually also puts the blame on the operator 
§ Functional resonance – this defines incidents as independent simultaneous events that 
may occur randomly. 
§ Human error – Human performance to a large extent depends on preconditions shaped 
by the organisation or system in which people work.  Failures to any aspect of 
management, organisation or system may lead to human error. 
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§ Contributory factors – This may be seen as a compendium of negative factors: choice of 
developer and contractor; general shortage in innovation; relationship between main 
contractor and sub-contractor (characterised by price competition); price competition and 
subsequent impact on quality and safety; inadequate training in construction and design 
and the minor role of post-initial education and lifelong learning. 
6.5.4 Reason /ConCA Model1 
In his book, ‘Human Error’, James Reason introduces a model to describe the causes of accidents. 
His work concentrates on major incidents such as Chernobyl, Challenger and Kings Cross 
Underground fire and he argues that most safety systems have a number of layers, or plates. Each 
of these plates aims to prevent a potential incident passing through them. However, according to 
Reason, due to human error, none of the plates are impervious – they all have holes. These holes 
allow the potential incident to pass through the plate, or that layer of the safety system. In most 
cases, the next layer in the system will intercept the potential incident and prevent its occurrence. 
However, this next layer also has holes. Reason’s theory explains that when holes in all the 
plates’ line up, the potential incident become a reality – the accident actually occurs. This theory 
neatly illustrates the role of chance in accident causality. Reason’s approach brings in the 
Possibility of multi-causality, as a number of different holes could line up to allow the 
trajectory of accident opportunity. Whilst Reason’s model was based on major incidents, Gibb et 
al. (2005) applied the approach to the ConCA accident causality research. Thus the plates become 
the immediate circumstances, shaping factors and originating influences. 
Figure 1: Reason/ConCA Model
1 The acronym ConCA refers to Haslam et al, Causality of Construction Accidents report [Haslam, R.A., Hide, S.A., Gibb, 
A.G.F., Gyi, D.E., Atkinson, S., Pavitt, T.C., Duff, R. & Suraji, A. Causal factors in construction accidents, Health and Safety 
Executive, HSE Report, RR 156, September 2003, 222 pp, ISBN 07176 2749 7, www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr156.pdf ]
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6.6 PEOPLE, PROCESSES & PRODUCTS 
Although construction is one of the most labour-intensive industries, people management issues 
are given inadequate attention (Dainty et al. 2003). Human Resource Management (HRM) 
arguably has a key role to play – as many problems and operational issues arise on projects due to 
the management of people (Dainty et al. 2003). 
However, while people issues may be key, it is important that they are considered in relation to 
other issues, such as those related to the processes and products that people design and utilise. 
What is often needed for successful projects is a firm grasp of CDM principles where a robust 
design is complemented by the designer’s appreciation for materials, structural detail, 
construction practice and operation and with responsible people in charge (CROSS 2008). This 
illustrates very well the ‘People, Process and Products’ or ‘3Ps’ approach (See Glossary) that is 
promulgated by SCOSS (SCOSS 2007, 2008) to illustrate the wide causes of failure. Table 2 
gives one such model.
Table 2: People, process and products - Three P’s 
People Those involved exhibiting a lack of structural engineering competence such that the safety 
critical implications of the work were not recognised.  
Process Lack of attention given to the procurement of the work and in particular to ensure that one 
competent party is responsible for the overall design. A failure to appreciate that these 
support systems are just as important as primary structural members. Lack of supervision 
and checking of installations.
Product Failure of a correctly specified product to perform. 
Source: CROSS (2008) SCOSS (2007, 2009) 
6.6.1 Proximal (near) and Distal (far) Causes - Levels in the Hierarchy 
It may be established that the primary components on a construction project are People, Process 
and Product.  It can then be determined that for dealing with Major Hazards the main focus 
should be on these as possible contributors to major incidents or catastrophic events. However, a 
major objective of this research is to stimulate industry debate and action to reduce the likelihood 
and severity of disastrous outcomes during construction. This requires extensive knowledge, not 
only about what influences safety but also about how this influence occurs. 
The safety climate of any organisation (and project) consists of employees' (people’s) attitudes 
towards, and perceptions of, health and safety behaviour. Construction workers' attitudes towards 
safety are influenced by their perceptions of risk, management, safety rules and procedures. The 
influences of the three P factors will always operate on different levels in the organizational 
hierarchy (such as the ConCA/Reason Model, see 6.5.4) and at different periods of time because 
many health and safety initiatives may only exist for finite periods of time (Lingard and 
Rowlinson, 2005).  For instance the site team will probably be directly involved or responsible 
for immediate circumstances; the project management team and detailed designers will have an 
influence in the shaping factors surrounding the circumstance; client teams will have an influence 
over the industry as a whole; and there may be a whole series of shaping factors which stem from 
the wider society.
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As these influences change over time according to the introduction of new practices/processes as 
influenced by new products and any relevant legislation (introduced as the result of past events), 
we should also consider factors in a temporal context. This could help to recognise the 
construction climate at any particular time in history within the context of general safety and the 
wider legislative frameworks.
By elaborating the wider issues of: time; society; industry; project; and site as well as the 
individual people involved in the case study events, we may begin to understand the wider 
climate in relation to safety performance, and thus a more comprehensive understanding of major 
hazards and their outcomes might be achieved. 
6.6.2 Link between People, Processes & Products
The People–Process–Product issues act individually on a continuum although the 
interrelationship can be explained on a simple graph to map a comprehensive picture.  Figures 2 
through to Figure 5 show a graphical view of the three Ps borrowed from “Systems Thinking” 
(Weinberg 1992), although the model demonstrates the “external” aspect of production (project 
deliverable). Figure 2 shows one relationship among people, process, and product. In an 
adaptation of the graph, the regions depict the difficulty of developing a product; with products 
near the origin being easier to build. Easy products do not require much capability from people 
(vertical axis) or process (horizontal axis). As products move away from the origin, they become 
more difficult and demand more from your people, your process, or both. 
Capability of 

the people 
 Quality 
/Difficulty in 
use or 
development 
of the product 
Capability of 
the Process 
Figure 2: People, Product and Process 
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Figures 3 through 5 show that the added capability needed to build a more difficult product can 
come through different combinations of improving people (Figure 3), process (Figure 4), or both 
(Figure 5).  
Capability of 
the people 
Capability of 
the Process 
2
1 
Figure 3: Building a more difficult product by increasing the capability of people
In each of these figures, the product moves from a difficulty of 1 to 2. Product 2 has the same 
difficulty in all three figures. In Figure 3, the needed capability comes from people (vertical 
movement only). This extra capability could be achieved by adding experts or training your 
people.  Figure 4 shows that the same amount of extra capability can come from improving your 
process instead of your people. Using an incremental delivery model or stretching the schedule is 
a way to add capability.  
1 2 
Capability of 
the people 
Capability of 
the Process 
Figure 4: Building a more difficult product by increasing the capabilities of the process 
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Figure 5 shows that the extra capability can come from improving both the capabilities of the 
people and process. This could be done by bringing in a consultant engineers, increasing training, 
using off-site on one part of the process and using an incremental delivery system on another.
Although this graph (to a greater extent) ignores the extent that quality products contribute 
towards the final process, it can be used to illustrate how the P’s work in tandem.
Capability of 
the people 
Capability of 
the Process 
2 
1 
Figure 5: Building a better product by increasing the capabilities of both people and 
process 
The point of the graphs is to illustrate that building a more difficult product requires an increase 
in capability, be it in people, process, or both. Difficult products demand process models that 
allow for experimenting and learning. Easy products call for process models that are simple, 
straightforward, and efficient. Difficult products become easier when you bring in people with 
knowledge of the product. 
It may be established that the primary components on a construction project are People, Process
and Product.  It can then be determined that for dealing with Major Hazards in construction the 
main focus should be on these as possible contributors to project failure (or so called ‘Top 
Events’).  Nonetheless, there is a need to question which factor is more important to the dynamics 
of major hazards and catastrophes; is it people, process or products? 
Construction accidents result from a variety of basic root causes such as lack of proper training, 
deficient enforcement of safety, unsafe equipment, unsafe methods or sequencing, unsafe site 
conditions, not using the safety equipment that was provided, and a poor attitude towards safety 
(Toole 2002). Often the role of the various contractors is unclear as some contractors may try to 
transfer responsibility for safety to others.
Reason (1997) argues that three ingredients are vital for driving a company’s safety engine, all of 
them the purview of top managers: commitment, competence and cognisance - the three Cs. But 
managers come and go. This is a fact of life. So how does a company maintain a commitment to 
safety in the face of personnel turnover, volatile market forces and economic reality? Reason 
suggests that this is where an organisation’s safety culture comes in to play. Reason states that 
“A good safety culture is something that endures and so provides the necessary driving force.” 
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6.7 COMPLEXITY, COMMUNICATION AND INTERFACES 
Enhancing the potential for successful risk management may lie in directly addressing the 
perceived constraints. However ensuring an acceptable level of safety is essential and presents 
special challenges in construction innovation. Innovation is also fundamentally important but its 
benefits often remain untapped due to complex issues that surround the construction process.  
Typical constraints include tradition, lack of awareness or expertise, risk aversion, the desire for 
certainty, and of the time pressures on delivery.
6.7.1 Complexity 
Generally, construction project management understands the project as an ordered and simple – 
and thus predictable – phenomenon which can be divided into contracts, phases, activities, work 
packages, assignments etc to be executed more or less independently. The project is also seen as a 
mainly sequential, assembly-like, linear process which can be planned in any degree of detail 
through an adequate effort and executed in accordance with the plans. As a consequence, project 
management acts top down, mainly by management-as-planning as suggested by Koskela and 
Howell (2002). Several authors have looked at project management from the complex systems’ 
point of view (Gidado 1996; Williams 1999; Wild 2002; Kim and Wilemon 2003); however, 
often these authors use a specific perspective to relay their messages. Williams (1999) 
characterises complexity as structural uncertainty and uncertainty in goals and methods only, 
whereas Wild (2002) looks at the social system in projects. These authors usually use complexity 
as a general characteristic of projects without applying the complex systems theory to their 
studies. Gidado (1996) as well as Kim and Wilemon (2003) take an ordered approach to assess 
complexity in projects. 
6.7.2 Interfaces 
In the analysis of the construction project as a system, there are underlying problems which 
circumscribe the course which the construction process must steer. Most of these problems 
assume the role of interfaces, which are a combination of product interfaces, system interfaces, 
subsystem interfaces, disciplinary interfaces and geographical interfaces to name but a few.
Interfaces may be described as the facts, problems, considerations, practices, and or procedures 
shared by two or more construction disciplines; or a common boundary or interconnection 
between systems, equipment, concepts, or human beings (Mann 2008).
There has been a significant amount of commentary addressing interfaces between various 
construction disciplines and practices (Mann 2008).  Interface areas can for example, include the 
linkages between procurement, design management or construction management (in project 
management); and operation and maintenance, or other ‘whole-life’ issues (in asset 
management); as well as other potential synergies in the management of the projects and their 
resulting built environment assets. Interface areas may also be addressed through relevant issues 
in Public Private Partnerships (PPP), infrastructure security/resilience or sustainability etc.
Most of the structures that civil engineers create interact with other engineering disciplines. The 
profession scarcely ever has the luxury of designing a civil or structural entity on its own and 
even when it does; there may be internal interfaces between ‘design’ and ‘construction’ or 
between ‘steel’ and ‘concrete’ for example. Furthermore, on complex projects, within ‘design’ 
68 
               
        
          
           
              
           
            
            
            
    
 
 
 
         
             
           
            
          
     
 
    
 
              
              
              
         
   
                
         
         
             
            
           
             
              
              
            
             
                
           
            
             
              
            
          
                
            
there is an interface with analysis and its translation into reality, which is a human problem of 
comprehension between the ‘analyst’ and the ‘practical engineer’.
Burland (2006) has discussed problems on the interface between structural and geotechnical 
engineering. Since all these disparate skills are specialised, there are plenty of opportunities for 
misunderstandings so, whenever there is an interface, the rule is to be on guard. Those involved 
need adequate dialogue as, although civil engineers think of their work as technical, a vast 
amount is about comprehending the true system demand and thence communication about intent, 
design and construction. Within engineering circles worldwide this is a source of concern 
(Burland 2006) and poor communication is a recurrent theme. There can be particular difficulties 
across technical and contractual boundaries. 
6.7.3 Communication 
As people develop their professional competence, they acquire a vocabulary and an 
understanding of the meaning of different words when used in the contexts of their discipline 
(semantics).  They also develop a lexicon – an understanding of how language and technical 
words relate to each other (Tutt et al. 2010). This language diversity is a prominent feature, 
leading to an inability to interpret messages regarding workplace hazards conveyed by 
supervisors, managers and peers. 
6.8 UNDERLYING PROBLEMS WITH REPORTING AND RESEARCH 
Because of the low probability of catastrophic events historical data is very sparse. Due to this 
very limited data, the sample sizes of statistical analyses would be very small, leading to high 
variances and poor (in the sense of imprecise) risk estimates. Without further knowledge, the 
likelihood and severity of low-probability, high-consequence events are thus difficult to estimate 
from historical data alone. 
However, much has been written on the need to learn and remember the lessons of the past (Kletz 
1991, 2008), and with it comes advanced opportunities for prediction, monitoring, feedback and 
teamwork opportunities for learning (Powderham 2002). However it is important to recognise 
the limitations of this type of approach. Some of the most significant limitations include various 
concerns about potential bias. Media accounts may suffer from biases of both inclusion and 
exclusion. They may report on sensational stories that are unimportant or inflated from the 
standpoint of societal impact. On the other hand, they may fail to report on important impacts for 
any number of reasons, lack of information, lack of awareness, and lack of attention if another 
issue is dominating the news cycle. These limitations suggest the need to validate and supplement 
data from accounts with information from actually case studies and other sources. However, it is 
reasonable to expect that reporting issues may be of lesser concern in the case of truly significant 
societal impacts; that is, a major fire that causes numerous deaths is likely to be reported in any 
circumstance. 
In the introductory statement to the ‘Special issue’ of the ICE Proceedings, Byfield (2008:3) 
draws our attention to hindsight as “something that engineers must learn to harness”. Certainly 
obtaining good information on recent engineering failures or near misses can be difficult due to 
the complex and often protracted legal issues involved. The occurrence of an event can be 
brought about by a number of cascading problems such as arithmetic error, lack of essential 
training for key personnel, lack of experience, use of inappropriate software within a design 
office, or a failure to supervise. However there is often a tendency to draw conclusions from the 
immediate and sometimes apparently ‘obvious’ causes of a failure; but could engineers not learn 
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from ‘near misses’ instead? A point Collings (2008) raises repeatedly in a paper on bridge 
failures suggesting that often precedents are unnoticed and key warnings are ignored. The 
industry must be mindful of obvious conclusions as vital evidence and experientially crucial 
knowledge may be lost (Burgoyne and Scantlebury 2008).   
Reporting and research into types of events that are embraced by this report should look at the 
physical causes of the incidents as well as focusing on the systemic management culture and 
human error processes that contribute to the event. Major Hazard incidents rarely just happen, 
but are usually the result of failures of technology, failures of people or a combination of both. 
These causes are seldom simple and singular. In modern technological systems causes 
sometimes are complex constellations of directly contributing events and existing preconditions 
and system properties.  Failures to report on single incidents or series of subsequent incidents 
may build up into a catastrophic event. The collection of data surrounding Major Hazard 
incidents involves three main stages: 
1.	 Ensuring that all significant incidents are reported; 
2.	 Checking for non-reporting of the type of incidents concerned; and 
3.	 Recording details of the incidents reported in order to mitigate for such events in the 
future. 
Unfortunately, the understanding of the underlying causes of many disasters can be stymied by 
the legal process, which can mean that the evidence is limited in its circulation. The profession 
needs to study and learn from its failures as much as its successes (Byfield 2008). 
There are barriers to reporting and one is that the identity of the author, their employer, the client, 
the site, or a product may be revealed with negative consequences (Soane 2006). The model for 
CROSS was Confidential Human Impact Reporting Programme (CHIRP), the UK aviation 
system which in turn has links to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) - the incident 
reporting service for pilots in the USA. The process for handling reports has been adopted by the 
construction sector and adapted from their procedures; this is clearly a move in the right 
direction.
6.9 SUMMARY
This section of the report has provided an overview of the extant literature related to professional 
and public understanding of the immediate and underlying causes of catastrophic events in 
construction. This literature review has also sought to understand the effectiveness of current 
control measures and the need, if any, for further actions to improve the management of risks and 
their potential for causing catastrophic events on construction projects. The review has 
highlighted that there is a paucity of relevant publications on major hazards in the context of 
construction. Nonetheless, examples from other industries and a legacy of ‘near miss’1 events 
suggest that approaches are needed to improve industry preparedness for future major hazards 
and their disruptive effects.  
The literature reviewed has highlighted a number of key points, namely: 
§ Despite attempts to learn lessons over the years, major accidents continue to be a threat.  
§ Complex chains of events (including organisational policies and decisions, individual 
behaviours and mechanical or technological failures) often combine to result in major 
hazard events or catastrophes. 
1 Near miss’ should in the context of this report perhaps be ‘near hit’ or ‘near accident’ 
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§ The major consequences and impacts of catastrophes are likely to be: multiple deaths and 
serious injuries to site personnel and the general public; the serious disruption of 
infrastructure and key services; damage or even destruction of organisations 
commercially; and political implications – public enquiries, demands for new legislation.
§ The literature has identified failures based on fundamental systemic failure, for instance 
failures within systems of organisation, communications and procurement. To date, focus 
has been directed at easily promotable risk and hazard reducing goals (for example ‘zero 
accidents’), rather than the processes and methods needed to achieve them. 
§ Greater emphasis should be placed on the concept of ‘people, process and products’ in 
particular when developing the competence of the industry’s people in relation to risk and 
major hazards. 
§ There is a need for further research and for advancing the use of confidential reporting 
mechanisms 
There are a number of circumstances which contribute to the explanation of the problems which 
may manifest a major hazard into a catastrophe. However, it has been noted that it is impossible 
to submit broad policy recommendations for the construction industry and the government on the 
basis of any one single case without raising methodological questions.  This is compounded by 
the ever increasing complexity of building and construction systems. 
Past incidents within (and outside of) the construction industry suggest that there needs to be 
ongoing monitoring of incidents (national and global) and ongoing evaluations of the systems in 
place. The following sections, that present the findings from an on-line survey, 62 case studies 
and numerous industry consultations, will provide a more detailed discussion and analysis of 
these key issues.
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7. On-line Survey Analysis
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
As part of the research, an on-line survey was commissioned in order to identify attitudes towards 
and experience of catastrophic events1 and associated risk management as perceived by 
individuals working within the industry. The method is described in Section 5.  The online survey 
achieved 350 active responses which helped to generate narrative accounts of incidents/events; 
and to provide contacts for any further research. This phase of the research was important as it 
produced valuable primary data that was used to challenge the stereotypes that are still widely 
held about catastrophic events and risks generally during construction projects (see section 6, 
literature review). By bringing individual accounts and perceptions of the industry to the 
forefront, conducting open discussion and increasing awareness of issues in context by the UK 
construction community a base for further and ongoing research was formed.
7.2 KEY POINTS 
The respondents’ view what causes catastrophic events can be grouped as: 
§ Client and procurement issues 
§ Overall management issues 
§ Design issues (permanent and temporary works) 
§ Checking and review issues 
§ Site management and worker issues. 
Key control factors to prevent or reduce catastrophic events can be grouped under the following 
headings: 
§ Good quality, competent people 
§ Interfaces, teamwork & coordination 
§ Hazard & risk management 
§ Design & pre-construction planning 
§ Checking and review 
§ Project management, procurement and resources 
§ Site management and supervision 
§ Information and communication 
§ Legislation and codes. 
And in this respect:
§ The failure to recognise hazardous scenarios was the most significant contributor to 
catastrophic events. Lack of site control also had a major impact on events. 
§ The most significant control failure was not thinking deeply as an individual and as a team 
about hazards. Having good people and adequate resources could also be controlled better 
by the industry. 
§ Interface problems between various construction practices and issues of communication 
featured highly in several individual accounts of catastrophic events. 
1 In this on-line survey the term ‘major Hazards’ was generally used rather than ‘Catastrophic Events’ – for the purposes of this 
section, the two phrases should be seen as interchangeable 
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Respondents considered that, although the industry generally did actively strive to eliminate 
hazards, they considered that extra precautions should be taken where the potential for 
catastrophic events was recognised. 
7.3 WHAT ARE CATASTROPHIC EVENTS IN CONSTRUCTION? 
Respondents were asked “Have you any 

experience of working on a project 

where things have gone (or have 

threatened to go) seriously wrong, 

harming a lot of people?”. Figure 7.1 

shows that, of the 298 active responses, 

35% replied “Yes” they did have such 

experiences; and 65% suggested that 

they had not. The research used a 

confidential and anonymised open ended 

component to gain insight into the type 

of events experienced by respondents. 

100 open ended responses were 

gathered, identifying more than 80 

examples (Table 7.1) which ranged from
 
minor incidents to larger scale events. For example:

§ Lift engineer killed when testing a life 
§ Inadequate trench support system used by the contractor in deep open cut works in heavy 
clay, leading to punching of ‘acrow’ props into baulk timbers. This was resolved by use of 
trench boxes. 
Respondents were asked if they would be prepared to discuss the particular incident further in 
strict confidence. In doing so the study assessed the level and extent that confidential reporting 
systems may be developed and utilised in the future. 231 out of the sample indicated a response 
with 60% replying “Yes”; and 40% not wishing to talk further. 
Respondents having been asked about events where there had been (or had threated to be) harm to 
‘a lot of people’, there was some debate about how many was ‘a lot’ in terms of the number of 
people harmed. A valid comment was made that even ONE death was one too many.
Whilst the numbers involved are insufficient to draw any statistically significant conclusions, 
these free-text responses did suggest the types of incidents that respondents felt were catastrophic. 
A break-down of the categories of incidents is given in Table 7.1. There were a number of 
additional non-construction incidents identified but these are not recorded here. Many of the 
incidents involved railway work (10) and bridges (3), but there were also other transportation, 
building, civil engineering, nuclear, refurbishment and demolition projects. Excavation works (8) 
and works associated with disturbance of underground services such as electricity and gas (8) 
were also featured as were fires (3). 23 examples were provided where there had been a failure of 
temporary works, including falsework or formwork. Failure of permanent works was identified in 
seven cases and one demolition example. Five examples of tunnel collapses were included, and a 
further thirteen projects involved complete or partial collapse of buildings or structures.  
Examples involving cranes (5) and plant & equipment (4) mainly covered collapse or overturning.
These incident types map well across the case study examples featured in Section 8. 
Figure 7.1. Experience of major hazard events
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Table 7:1 Types of catastrophic events witnessed by respondents (free text responses)
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1 Construction of bridge abutment adjacent to railway where method statements are 
general in nature - do not recognise hazardous situations, relying upon people on 
site without the requisite information 
X X
2 Working on a disused rail track doing maintenance work which caused a road bridge 
to collapse only by luck no one was hurt. X X X
3 Damage to a bridge over railway lines X X
4 Temporary structure failing with potential of collapsing onto a railway. X X X
5 A week after I left the railways as a recently chartered engineer in my mid twenties,
three members of the track gang who had been 'protecting me' in my last week of 
employment were hit by a train and killed when working on the same completely 
open straight length of track to where I'd been in my last week. It seems clear that 
the look-out lost concentration and the men stopped looking out for 
themselves as well... A lesson I learnt was to make sure I looked after myself at all 
times and also tried to look after others I work with. 
X
6 A bridge on temporary bearings dropped a few inches, dropping concrete planks onto 
a railway below almost causing a derailment and stranding several trains X X
7 Involved with collapse of railway tunnel X X X
8 Part of newly constructed station platform collapsing on three individuals. X X
9 My previous experience in rail industry included 4 major rail disasters. I also initiated 
the Safety Risk Model to formally analyse such incidents, including Fault and Event 
tree modelling of potential rail "major hazards" 
X
10 DLR blowout on the Isle of Dogs X
11 Striking underground services:
1. Unmarked and in a different field to the one we were told they were in; i.e. poor 
Utility records.
2. Temporary site cables not shown on the 'current' site services drawing quickly 
enough; i.e. speed of recording new services too slow.
3. Digging without permission; i.e. ignorance of dangers because of inadequate site 
induction. 
X X
1 These were events that the respondents considered were major hazard events – they have not been evaluated against specific criteria 
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12 Inadequate trench support system used by a contractor in deep open cut works in 
heavy clay, leading to punching of acrow props into baulk timbers. Resolved by use 
of trench boxes 
X
13 Excavation at foot of natural slope failed to take account of overall slope instability - 
at root of a dam. Continuation by contractor in face of evident partial collapse (and 
designer refusal to reconsider the design calculations / assumptions) could have 
caused total dam failure. The geotechnical investigation was limited to immediate 
area of new build, ignored wider landscape features upslope.
X X 
14 I was involved in a construction project where a large embankment slipped. No one 
was injured but potentially they could have been. X X
15 Fire in refuelling, storage area. Stores person hospitalised due to constricted means 
of escape X
16 Fire dampers and fire stopping very improperly installed by supposedly competent 
contractors, and the problems "missed" by designers, inspectors & Building Control 
(has happened on two recent projects)
X
17 Large scale fire at power station, investigation unable to determine cause, but likely 
to be smoking in unauthorised areas and poor housekeeping. X
18 Gas main strike on busy site X
19 A HP gas main running close to a school was ruptured because it was not where 
shown on record drawings X X
20 Hitting of a major gas main by an excavator, which lead to the evacuation of several 
adjoining buildings to the site. X X X
21 Gas explosion and collapse of a building X X
22 Tipper truck backed into overhead power line X X
23 Live electrical cable cut (luckily containing very minor current) because of 
communication problem and belief electricity was switched off. X
24 The damage of critical electrical services to a specialist unit in a hospital. X
25 collapse of a temporary walkway on a bridge project. No one was seriously hurt 
but in different circumstance could have caused many injuries. X X X
26 Flooding of roundabout where client had allowed a culture of allowing the contractor 
to work at risk outwith the agreement. Similarly at collapse of a bridge temporary 
works which the contractor refuted as a major incident under RIDDOR until into next 
reporting year. 
X X X
27 Bridge collapse, 1967 X X
28 Potential bridge collapse due to failure of critical element of the structure caused 
by poor quality material. Too much focus on "safety" not enough on "quality". The 
two are intrinsically linked 
X X
82 

  
        
        
  
 
 
 
 
     
                           
                            
      
   
   
    
 
 
 
                         
                                
    
                             
      
        
  
      
    
    
      
     
    
    
   
        
    
       
    
     
     
      
     
     
    
       
      
 
       
        
       
      
     
     
                          
Ref Catastrophic events witnessed by respondents (free text responses)1 
R
a
il 
S
e
ct
o
r
B
ri
d
g
e
E
x
ca
v
­
a
ti
o
n
n
G
a
s 
E
le
ct
ri
c
T
e
m
p
 
W
o
rk
s
P
e
rm
 
W
o
rk
s
C
ra
n
e
P
la
n
t
T
u
n
n
e
l
D
e
m
o
R
e
fu
rb
 
P
u
b
lic
Fi
re
C
o
lla
p
se
 
29 Various structural collapses (permanent and temporary works) resulting in 
multiple fatalities and injuries. X X
30 Temp works during auger bore under a river X
31 Temporary works designers & Cat 3 checkers did not consider how permanent 
shuttering to precast beams over railway could be installed under temporary cross 
bracing. Positive location of stability bracing totally inadequate. Agent took designers 
advice re using large shallow hardwood wedges which compensated for poor TW 
design.
X
X
32 As a forensic investigator for shoring and scaffold collapses involving injury and 
death. X X
33 We have had several failures of temp works or partially completed permanent 
works that could have led to multiple fatalities X X
34 On a site where precast concrete units were being used as a permanent formwork for 
a floor there were two incidents in which a precast unit collapsed. Luckily no one was 
injured.
The first incident was due to unauthorised removal of some props the night before an 
early morning pour was to take place. Some electricians working late needed to get 
some fairly heavy equipment into place on the floor that was being used to prop the 
precast slabs, and removed and displaced slabs at one location to take a dumper 
through; the props were not put back in there original positions afterward. The 
propping had been checked by the contractor and then myself the evening before 
and all props were correctly positioned. The slab collapsed when everyone was at the 
breakfast break.
The second precast unit that collapsed was in a section where I had pointed out 
significant deficiencies in the fixing of timber lattice beams supporting the units 
above a ramp between floor levels. Wedging of the lattice girders in the u-heads of 
the props was totally inadequate in both directions and the wedges had not been 
nailed in place. Vibration caused one or two wedges to fall out.  A lattice beam 
became unrestrained and twisted in the u-heads sufficiently to cause a large section 
of slab to fall onto the ramp below. The contractor thought that he had fixed the 
lattice beams adequately and proceeded to concrete without asking me to carry out a 
re-check. Again the collapse happened at break time and there were no casualties.
The investigation found that three carpenters had been working on the ramp below 
as the pour was proceeding. As a result of these incidents the contractor took the 
decision never to use this type of permanent formwork on any future work. In 
completing the remaining work the contractor introduced another early morning 
check for displaced props if checks had been carried out the previous afternoon. He 
also had a carpenter stationed on the level below the pour to ensure that no one 
passed under the pour area, which had been taped off.
For the second incident the contractor did not have a signed check sheet, and so did 
not follow procedures. Too often contractors believe that method statements are only 
to comply with the regulations, but do not need to be followed. 
X X
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35 Girder launching gantry for concrete segmental construction collapsed, since 
responsible party arrogantly ignored. manufacturer's recommended use manual and 
installation procedures In another instance, improper concrete anchors were 
approved for use, resulting in death of motorist from fallen object in tunnel 
X X X
36 Near miss major birdcage scaffold falsework failure X X
37 Lack of site understanding temporary works concepts. X
38 Failure of temporary works on a major and complex roof structure requiring the 
evacuation of over 4000 site workers. X
39 Contractor undertaking major alterations didn't put props in place as required on the 
drawings. Fortunately I was near the site so popped by to have a look. Client sacked 
the contractor the following day. 
X
40 Formwork failure on 12m high wall casting X
41 Concrete shutter collapsed during concrete pour at weekend because of rushing 
(time pressures) and inadequate supervision/ checking of shuttering joiner. X X
42 3 people injured 500Kg slab fell on operatives following removal of temporary props. X X
43 A building collapse. The structural integrity of the building was not sound and could 
not have been built to specification at the outset. The client, having been in receipt 
of expert reports suggesting this to be case, commissioned a separate report 
summarising the previous reports. This, unsurprisingly, failed to highlight the 
problems. The proposed temporary propping system between the floors - which then 
appeared over engineered - was then questioned by our temporary works team and 
the clients expert advisers accepted an alternative proposal. The building - in a city 
centre location - partially collapsed during demolition as the columns punched 
through the floor slabs. There was insufficient tie-in between the column heads and 
individual floor slabs. Fortunately no-one was killed - though several people were 
either working on the uppermost floor slabs, or within the building at the time.
X X
44 I have had to stop works for scaffolding being incomplete, guardrails missing and 
trestle systems not being erected correctly which were overloaded. X
45 Failure of a major scaffold by display banners being attached without calcs on wind 
loading. Fell over footpath in major town. No injury to public. X X
46 The undermining of a sheet pile cofferdam by over-excavation. Staff were evacuated 
from the excavation just prior to the sheet piles failing. X X
47 Precast framework of buildings collapsed due to improper support or design in the 
erection process X X X
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48 I was involved in the structural design of a 4 storey office block. The structural frame 
was a reinforced concrete flat slab, with no column heads. We had detailed loose 
reinforcement throughout the slabs with the exception of the shear reinforcement to 
the columns, where we had specified the shear hoop prefabricated reinforcement, on 
a separate drawing (which was fully referenced on the loose bar reinforcement 
drawings). This scheme was being constructed by a well respected contractor and 
was a D&B contract. By chance myself and a colleague were on site shortly before 
the first section fo the first upper floor slab was going to be cast. My colleague 
happened to notice that none of the shear hoops had been placed, which we 
quickly brought to the attention of the site staff. The shear reinforcement was 
essential for the slab design and if the slab had been cast without this reinforcement 
it is very likely that catastrophic failure would (at some point) have occurred. I 
believe that this error (which had the potential to cause catastrophic collapse) would 
not have happened if there had been an RE on site. The main contractor claimed that 
they had quality procedures in place, and as such should have been checking for 
such fundamental errors as this (they clearly did not). 
X X
49 Major structural elements not designed or detailed correctly. X
50 Crane collapse and an uncontrolled earth collapse near a busy street. X X X X
51 Falling of crane in to tunnel X X X
52 I am a loss adjuster involved in a number of crane related incidents on sites in Uk & 
Europe. X
53 Crane collapse X X
54 One operative dead due to falling formwork when tower crane knocked column. X X
55 A number of piling projects where either rigs have nearly fallen or have fallen but 
luck has prevented serious injury or fatality. X
56 A high rise mast climber fell to ground with two men on board. The men survived 
but were seriously injured. The report by HSE was confidential, but cause is believed 
to be lack of servicing to the motor and breaking mechanism. 
X
57 Tunnel collapsed during construction (with no injuries), due to failure of arch 
during backfilling. X X
58 Tunnel collapse where engineering structure was not strong enough and where 
effects of trying to recover time where not risk reviewed X X
59 urban tunnelling work where adequate control of face stability has been lost X
60 Flying rock fragments from blasting work due to excessive muck at the toe of the 
slope. X
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61 I have worked on a project where some major items would have been unstable (and 
would probably have collapsed) during erection. It was an oversight, which was 
picked up due to final review of the design within the design team, and was 
corrected before the situation arose - but it was a near miss. 
X X
62 On a number of projects I have worked on, things have threatened to go seriously 
wrong, fortunately each time the hazard was identified at the last minute and 
controlled.
Hazards have included: lack of stability during construction, very low concrete 
strength in piles, design requirements not communicated to subcontractor's 
designers, design concepts not able to be safely constructed when detailed. 
X
63 During a demolition process we had a substantial unplanned collapse due to 
unforeseen inadequate building techniques used on the structure - re-bar in the 
original building was missing and incorrectly positioned leading to an inherent 
weakness in the structure 
X X
64 Old retaining walls collapsed allowing cliff section above the works to slide into site 
taking part of a public road with it. By chance no buses or public on road, no one on 
site (out of hours) and no injuries. 
X X X
65 Failure to control public access to a site on a University campus X
66 Public access through a city centre development X
67 In renovation work not everything is found to be constructed as it should be ie rot 
problems or walls tied together X
68 Wet concrete poured into a confined space containing operatives.
69 The drilling of a third party Hazardous Underground Oil Pipeline  
70 Refurb of building built in 18th Century. Wall was opened up for a shop front on 
ground floor. Whilst opening was open (waiting for correct steel), water board made 
a hole through the basement right under the pier supporting the corner of the 
building (ancient rubble masonry). Building was quickly shored. 
X
711 8.6 billion transportation project with ???? poor oversight, poor design, and owner 
pushing time over safety 
72 Nuclear 1999 HSE report highlighting 133 recommendations
73 Design change not carried fully through. Lack of checking. 
74 The design of extensions to schools where pressures of time and budget led to 
inadequate checking and led to poor designs. 
1 Events 71-80 provided little or no detail to enable them to be categorised – However, they are retained as they refer to causal factors which are drawn out in table 7.3. 
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75 Have been involved on projects where fatalities have occurred due to risk taking and 
others a detailed method statement not being considered, reviewed and 
implemented 
76 Design change not carried fully through. Lack of checking. 
77 Client bullying post award of contract (small structural project); Request for design 
changes post contract award - lack of understanding by client and contractor of 
design process and time pressures to produce revised information. 
78 As HSE Manager I have had to deal with a number of situations. I would generalise 
that poor design and incompetent supervision are the two biggest areas of concern. 
79 Lift engineer killed when testing a lift 
80 client wanting things done to speed things up 
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7.4 WHAT CAUSES CATASTROPHIC EVENTS IN CONSTRUCTION?
7.4.1 Ranking of pre-selected causal factors 
Although hazard events may be attributable to a complex interplay of factors, the consultation 
exercise and preliminary research had identified a range of 23 causal factors (a to w) influencing 
construction catastrophic events and survey respondents were asked to assess the significance of 
these pre-chosen factors in turn. See Appendix C for the list of factors.
Respondents were asked to rate each factor as having a high, medium, low or zero significance to 
major hazard events. Table 7.2 presents the 23 identified factors and indicates: the number of 
respondents registering a complete response (n) for each factor; the computed total score assigned 
to the factor1 (s); the mean score value (m = s / n); and the rank.
It is important to consider the ranking carefully, to prevent misunderstanding and over­
simplification. By calculating and then comparing the relative significance of the score values, 
five tiers of factors were identified. The research demonstrated that a failure to recognise 
hazardous scenarios and influencing factors was the highest ranked factor in major hazard events 
(tier one).
‘Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios and influencing factors’ was the most significant 
factor in major hazard events. 
The following 15 ranked factors were much closer to each other and therefore can be considered 
together as a second tier group, with a slight increased importance the higher they are in the list:
§ Lack of site control 
§ Interface problems between the various parties 
§ Lack of checking and of competent reviewing 
§ Lack of involvement on site by designers 
§ Designers working in boxes; no-one responsible for providing overview
§ Design which didn't consider/explain how construction could be done 
§ Ignorance, incompetence 
§ Unreasonable time pressures 
§ Poor team-working 
§ Lack of experience 
§ Drawings not clear 
§ Design process 
§ Lack of proper change control 
§ Conscious risk taking 
§ Inappropriate maintenance or modification 
1 Respondents were asked to rate the factors as High, Medium, Low or Zero Low impact. Scores of 3, 2, 1 & 0 respectively were 
allocated. The score in table 7.4 is the sum of these individual scores 
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Table 7.2 Factors affecting Catastrophic Events in construction
Factor 	 Number of Total Score Mean Rank Significance1 
responses (s) 
(n) (M=s/n) 
Ti
er
1 
2 
Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios 
and influencing factors (b) 
Lack of site control (j) 
320 
320 
771 
702 
2.409 
2.194 
1 
2 
0.000 
0.216 
Interface problems between the various 
parties (g) 
Lack of checking and of competent 
reviewing (e) 
Lack of involvement on site by designers
(w) 
Designers working in boxes; no-one 
responsible for providing overview (r) 
Design which didn't consider/explain how 
construction could be done (v) 
322 
318 
319 
318 
320 
692 
672 
672 
664 
668 
2.149 
2.113 
2.107 
2.088 
2.088 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0.045 
0.036 
0.007 
0.019 
0.001 
Ignorance, incompetence (c) 319 652 2.044 8 0.044 
Unreasonable time pressures (p) 320 645 2.016 9 0.028 
Poor team-working (i) 324 649 2.003 10 0.013 
Lack of experience (h) 319 621 1.947 11 0.056 
Drawings not clear, significant risks not 
apparent or highlighted (s) 
Design process not effective, not 
coordinated (q) 
318 
320 
615 
618 
1.934 
1.931 
12 
13 
0.013 
0.003 
Lack of proper change control (n) 318 611 1.921 14 0.010 
Conscious risk-taking (k) 319 605 1.897 15 0.025 
3 
Inappropriate maintenance and/or 
modification of a structure (m) 
Underlying lack of "robustness (a) 
Over-complex procurement with unclear 
responsibilities (t) 
Error (by people who are competent) (d) 
317 
306 
318 
322 
600 
547 
568 
574 
1.893 
1.788 
1.786 
1.783 
16 
17 
18 
19 
0.004 
0.105 
0.001 
0.004 
4 Underfunding (l) 315 505 1.603 20 0.179 
Over-reliance on software analysis which 319 461 1.445 21 0.158 
cannot be easily verified (u) 

Over-reliance on codes (f) 316 421 1.332 22 0.113 

5 Vandalism or malicious act (o) 	 315 299 0.949 23 0.383 
A third tier is then: underlying lack of robustness; over-complex procurement with unclear 
responsibilities; and error by people who are competent. 
A fourth tier is underfunding followed by over-reliance on software analysis and over-reliance on 
codes. Finally, vandalism and malicious acts was considerably lower placed as the least 
significant factor in tier five.
The fact that failure to recognise hazardous scenarios (b) emerged as a main contributing factor 
requires some comment. Construction professionals should have the skills to recognise hazards, 
1These data use a statistical method of determining the significance between ranked items – the larger the figure the more 
significant the difference between the mean scores. 
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estimate or calculate the consequences of a failure and act to eliminate a hazard or mitigate the risk 
and its final impact. Difficulty in recognising hazards and reducing their consequence was 
therefore nevertheless. There are both subjective and objective reasons for this situation, a detailed 
discussion of which exceeds the scope of the current section but will be assessed in the case study 
analysis and subsequent discussions. 
Lack of site control as the second contributing factor raises serious concerns about how 
construction projects are managed. Success from the project management's viewpoint is achieving 
the highest quality, with no major project disruption. This means bringing all disciplines in a 
coordinated manner to limit liabilities of cost, schedule, quality, safety, labour productivity, 
materials consumption and waste as well as managing safety, so good site control should improve 
management generally as well as managing safety risks.
Interface problems, identified as the third most significant factor, recognises that in any project, 
especially a construction project, many different and sometimes conflicting interests must be 
considered. Having identified the main responsibilities on a project, various disciplines must 
communicate effectively to facilitate project success. Interface or communication problems can 
severely obstruct the implementation of the construction process. Such communication problems 
will cause cost overruns and exceeded time schedules due to conflicts and controversies 
concerning project design (e, w, r and v) and implementation, and could also lead to catastrophic 
hazard events.  
7.4.2 Respondents’ free text opinions on causal factors 
Respondents offered their opinions regarding causal factors on around half of the incidents (Table
7.3). These opinions have not been independently tested and therefore must be considered in that 
light. The various causal factors1 raised were as follows, where frequency of a topic being 
mentioned is shown in brackets: 
§ Inappropriate action or inaction by the client or client’s advisor (4) 
§ Pressure from time or money (6) 
§ Inadequate design or (late) design changes of permanent or temporary works2 (12) 
§ Incorrect as-built drawings and information (2) 
§ Inappropriate or generic method statements (3) 
§ Problems with materials or equipment (3) 
§ Poor communication (2) and coordination (2) 
§ Ignoring information, guidance or ‘tell-tale’ signs of an imminent problem (3) and breaking 
rules / failing to follow agreed procedures (4) 
§ Lack of, or inadequate checking or review (9) 
§ Lack of competence (3) 
§ Poor housekeeping (1) 
§ Poor supervision (4) 
§ Poor work quality (10) 
§ Lack of concentration (1) 
1 It should be noted that many of these incidents may have involved a number of these causal factors, but each has only been noted 
where it was specifically raised. 
2 Note that Temporary Works design is typically the responsibility of the contractor 
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Table 7:3 Suggested causal factors in catastrophic events witnessed by respondents (where indicated) (free text) 
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71 8.6 billion transportation project with VERY poor oversight, poor 
design, and owner pushing time over safety X X X X
77 Client bullying post award of contract (small structural project); 
Request for design changes post contract award - lack of 
understanding by client and contractor of design process and time 
pressures to produce revised information. 
X X X
80 An example of when the client wanting things done to speed things up X X
43 A building collapse. The structural integrity of the building was not 
sound and could not have been built to specification at the outset. The 
client, having been in receipt of expert reports suggesting this to be 
case, commissioned a separate report summarising the previous 
reports. This, unsurprisingly, failed to highlight the problems. The 
proposed temporary propping system between the floors - which then 
appeared over engineered - was then questioned by our temporary 
works team and the client’s expert advisers accepted an alternative 
proposal. The building - in a city centre location - partially collapsed 
during demolition as the columns punched through the floor slabs. 
There was insufficient tie-in between the column heads and individual 
floor slabs. Fortunately no-one was killed - though several people were 
either working on the uppermost floor slabs, or within the building at 
the time. 
X X
41 Concrete shutter collapsed during concrete pour at weekend because 
of rushing (time pressures) and inadequate supervision/ checking of 
shuttering joiner. 
X X X X
58 Tunnel collapse where the engineering structure was not strong 
enough and where effects of trying to recover time where not risk 
reviewed 
X X X  X
74 The design of extensions to schools where pressures of time and 
budget led to inadequate checking and led to poor designs. X X X
45 Failure of a major scaffold by display banners being attached without 
calcs on wind loading. Fell over footpath in major town. No injury to 
public. 
X
47 Precast framework of buildings collapsed due to improper support or 
design in the erection process X
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49 Major structural elements not designed or detailed correctly. X
62 On a number of projects I have worked on, things have threatened to 
go seriously wrong, fortunately each time the hazard was identified at 
the last minute and controlled.
Hazards have included: lack of stability during construction, very low 
concrete strength in piles, design requirements not communicated to 
subcontractor's designers, design concepts not able to be safely 
constructed when detailed. 
X X  X
72 Design change not carried fully through. Lack of checking. X
78 As an HSE Manager I have had to deal with a number of situations. I 
would generalise that poor design and incompetent supervision are the 
two biggest areas of concern. 
X X X
31 Temporary works designers & Cat 3 checkers did not consider how 
permanent shuttering to precast beams over railway could be installed 
under temporary cross bracing. Positive location of stability bracing 
totally inadequate. Agent took designers advice re using large shallow 
hardwood wedges which compensated for poor TW design. 
X X
11 Striking underground services:
1. Unmarked and in a different field to the one we were told they were 
in; i.e. poor Utility records.
2. Temporary site cables not shown on the 'current' site services 
drawing quickly enough; i.e. speed of recording new services too slow. 
3. Digging without permission; i.e. ignorance of dangers because of 
inadequate site induction. 
X X
19 A HP gas main running close to a school was ruptured because it was 
not where shown on record drawings X
67 In renovation work not everything is found to be constructed as it 
should be ie rot problems or walls tied together X X  X
34 Precast concrete units were being used as a permanent formwork for a 
floor there were two incidents in which a precast unit collapsed.
Luckily no one was injured. 
The first incident was due to unauthorised removal of some props the 
night before an early morning pour. Some electricians working late 
needed to get some fairly heavy equipment into place on the floor that 
was being used to prop the precast slabs, and removed and displaced 
slabs at one location to take a dumper through; the props were not put 
back in there original positions afterward. The propping had been 
checked by the contractor and then myself the evening before and all 
props were correctly positioned. The slab collapsed when everyone was 
at breakfast. 
X X
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(NOTE: Judgement as to the significance of these events 
was made by the respondents)  Cli
e
n
t/
a
d
v
is
or
 
p
ro
b
le
m
s
T
im
e 
&
 m
on
ey
D
es
ig
n
 &
 
ch
a
n
g
es
A
s-
b
u
ilt
 
d
ra
w
in
g
s
M
et
h
o
d
 
S
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
P
oo
r 
M
a
te
ri
a
ls
 
o
r 
E
q
u
ip
m
en
t
P
oo
r 
C
om
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
P
oo
r 
C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n
Ig
n
or
e 
si
g
n
s,
 
in
fo
, 
g
u
id
a
n
ce
P
oo
r 
C
h
ec
ki
n
g
 
o
r 
R
e
vi
e
w
La
ck
 o
f 
C
om
p
et
en
ce
P
oo
r 
H
ou
se
ke
e
p
in
g
P
oo
r 
S
u
p
er
vi
si
o
n
P
oo
r 
W
o
rk
 
q
u
a
lit
y
P
oo
r 
C
on
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
B
re
ak
in
g
 r
u
le
s 
The second precast unit that collapsed was in a section where I had 
pointed out significant deficiencies in the fixing of timber lattice beams 
supporting the units above a ramp between floor levels. Wedging of 
the lattice girders in the u-heads of the props was totally inadequate in 
both directions and the wedges had not been nailed in place. Vibration 
caused one or two wedges to fall out. A lattice beam became 
unrestrained and twisted in the u-heads sufficiently to cause a large 
section of slab to fall onto the ramp below. The contractor thought that 
he had fixed the lattice beams adequately and proceeded to concrete 
without asking me to carry out a re-check. Again the collapse 
happened at break time and there were no casualties. 
The investigation found that 3 carpenters had been working on the 
ramp below as the pour was proceeding. As a result of these incidents 
the contractor decided never to use this type of permanent formwork 
again. In completing the remaining work the contractor introduced 
another early morning check for displaced props if checks had been 
carried out the previous afternoon. He also had a carpenter stationed 
below the pour to ensure that no one passed under the pour area, 
which had been taped off. 
For the second incident the contractor did not have a signed check 
sheet, and so did not follow procedures. Too often contractors believe 
that method statements are only to comply with the regulations, but 
do not need to be followed. 
1 Construction of bridge abutment adjacent to railway where method 
statements are general in nature - do not recognise hazardous 
situations, relying upon people on site without the requisite information 
X
75 Have been involved on projects where fatalities have occurred due to 
risk taking and others a detailed method statement not being 
considered, reviewed and implemented 
X X X
12 Inadequate trench support system used by a contractor in deep open 
cut works in heavy clay, leading to punching of acrow props into baulk 
timbers. Resolved by use of trench boxes 
X
35 Girder launching gantry for concrete segmental construction collapsed, 
since responsible party arrogantly ignored manufacturer's 
recommended use manual and installation procedures. 
In another instance, improper concrete anchors were approved for use, 
resulting in death of motorist from fallen object in tunnel 
X X
28 Potential bridge collapse due to failure of critical element of the 
structure caused by poor quality material. Too much focus on "safety" 
not enough on "quality". The two are intrinsically linked 
X  X
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70 Refurb of building built in 18th Century. Wall was opened up for a shop 
front on ground floor. Whilst opening was open (waiting for correct 
steel), water board made a hole through the basement right under the 
pier supporting the corner of the building (ancient rubble masonry). 
Building was quickly shored. 
X
13 Excavation at foot of natural slope failed to take account of overall 
slope instability - at root of a dam. Continuation by contractor in face 
of evident partial collapse (and designer refusal to reconsider the 
design calculations / assumptions) could have caused total dam failure. 
The geotechnical investigation was limited to immediate area of new 
build, ignored wider landscape features upslope. 
X
39 Contractor undertaking major alterations didn't put props in place as 
required on the drawings. Fortunately I was near the site so popped by 
to have a look. Client sacked the contractor the following day. 
X  X
16 Fire dampers and fire stopping very improperly installed by supposedly 
competent contractors, and the problems "missed" by designers, 
inspectors & Building Control (has happened on two recent projects) 
X X
48 I was involved in the structural design of a 4 storey office block . The 
structural frame was a reinforced concrete flat slab, with no column 
heads. We had detailed loose reinforcement throughout the slabs with 
the exception of the shear reinforcement to the columns, where we 
had specified the shear hoop prefabricated reinforcement, on a 
separate drawing (which was fully referenced on the loose bar 
reinforcement drawings). This scheme was being constructed by a well 
respected contractor and was a D&B contract. By chance myself and a 
colleague were on site shortly before the first section of the first upper 
floor slab was going to be cast. My colleague happened to notice that 
none of the shear hoops had been placed, which we quickly brought to 
the attention of the site staff. The shear reinforcement was essential 
for the slab design and if the slab had been cast without this 
reinforcement it is very likely that catastrophic failure would (at some 
point) have occurred. I believe that this error (which had the potential 
to cause catastrophic collapse) would not have happened if there had 
been an RE on site. The main contractor claimed that they had quality 
procedures in place, and as such should have been checking for such 
fundamental errors as this (they clearly did not). 
X  X
61 I have worked on a project where some major items would have been 
unstable (and would probably have collapsed) during erection. It was 
an oversight, which was picked up due to final review of the design 
within the design team, and was corrected before the situation arose - 
but it was a near miss. 
X
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37 Lack of site understanding temporary works concepts. X
17 Large scale fire at power station, investigation unable to determine 
cause, but likely to be smoking in unauthorised areas and poor 
housekeeping. 
X X
65 Failure to control public access to a site on a University campus X
44 I have had to stop works for scaffolding being incomplete, guardrails 
missing and trestle systems not being erected correctly which were 
overloaded. 
X
56 A high rise mast climber fell to ground with two men on board. The 
men survived but were seriously injured. The report by HSE was 
confidential, but cause is believed to be lack of servicing to the motor 
and breaking mechanism. 
X
63 During a demolition process we had a substantial unplanned collapse 
due to unforeseen inadequate building techniques used on the 
structure - re-bar in the original building was missing and incorrectly 
positioned leading to an inherent weakness in the structure 
X
59 Urban tunnelling work where adequate control of face stability has 
been lost X
5 A week after I left the railways as a recently chartered engineer in my 
mid twenties, three members of the track gang who had been 
'protecting me' in my last week of employment were hit by a train and 
killed when working on the same completely open straight length of 
track to where I'd been in my last week. It seems clear that the look­
out lost concentration and the men stopped looking out for themselves 
as well... A lesson I learnt was to make sure I looked after myself at all 
times and also tried to look after others I work with. 
X
26 Flooding of roundabout where client had allowed a culture of allowing 
the contractor to work at risk outwith the agreement. Similarly at 
collapse of bridge temporary works which the contractor refuted as a 
major incident under RIDDOR until into next reporting year. 
X
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7.4.3 Comparison of pre-set and respondents’ experience on incident causality 
Drawing together the data regarding the causes of catastrophic events, it is interesting to note the 
significant overlap between responses to these fixed options with the free text responses to 
particular events that had been witnessed by the respondents (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4 Comparison of pre-selected causal factors and factors 
identified from respondents’ experience 
Pre-selected factors based on previous Factors indentified from respondents own 
research experience of events 
Client & Procurement issues
Over-complex procurement with unclear Pressure from time or money
responsibilities
Unreasonable time pressures 
Inappropriate action or inaction by the client or client’s 
advisor
Underfunding 
Overall Management issues
Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios and Poor communication and coordination 
influencing factors Ignoring information, guidance or ‘tell-tale’ signs of an 
Interface problems between the various parties imminent problem
Lack of proper change control 
Design issues (Temporary and Permanent Works)
Underlying lack of "robustness” Inadequate design or (late) design changes of permanent or 
Lack of involvement on site by designers temporary works
Designers working in boxes; no-one responsible for Incorrect as-built drawings and information
providing overview 
Design which didn't consider/explain how 
construction could be done 
Drawings not clear, significant risks not apparent or 
highlighted 
Design process not effective, not coordinated 
Over-reliance on software analysis which cannot be 
easily verified 
Over-reliance on codes 
Checking & Review issues
Lack of checking and of competent reviewing 	 Lack of, or inadequate checking or review
Competence, Experience, Training & Education issues
Ignorance, incompetence Lack of competence
Poor team-working 
Lack of experience 
Error (by people who are competent) 
Site Management & Worker issues
Lack of site control 	 Poor supervision
Conscious risk-taking 	 breaking rules / failing to follow agreed procedures
Inappropriate or generic method statements 
Problems with materials or equipment 
Poor housekeeping 
Poor work quality 
Lack of concentration
Miscellaneous 
Inappropriate maintenance and/or modification of a 
structure 
Vandalism or malicious act 
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7.5 WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT CATASTROPHIC EVENTS? 
7.5.1 Ranking the effectiveness of pre-selected control factors 
When asked “How effective do you think the following "controls" are in reducing extreme risks?” 
respondents were asked their opinion on the formal construction process and how effectively this 
was managed in a wider context. The control options offered were based on the preliminary 
research. 
Table 7.5 presents the 17 identified controls a to q (see Appendix C) and indicates: the number of 
respondent registering a complete response (n); the relative total computed score assigned to the 
factor (s); the mean score value (average score: m = s / n); and the rank.
Significantly highest amongst control failures was having good people involved and available which 
points to issues such as recruitment, training and risk management abilities of key construction 
personnel i.e. competence.
As a second tier, there was a close relative ranking of the next four control failures which were: 
managed interfaces, communication and cooperation; Thinking deeply individually and as a team 
about hazards; having adequate resources relative to controls; then checking of detail on site.
Considering risks consciously was in a third tier.
Sensible programmes, well managed was considered significantly less important to the second tier 
controls; and a further fourth tier was established of the next four factors that included: Good 
management of information; adequate access to knowledge (especially records); good change 
management; and sensible programmes well managed.
Following good practice for normal situations was in a fifth tier.
Once again, it is important to consider the ranking carefully, to prevent misunderstanding and over­
simplification. By calculating the relative significance of the score values, the research was able to 
demonstrate that having good people involved and available was the highest ranked control in 
reducing major hazard events and was considered to be significantly more important than the other 
controls. 
‘Having good people involved and available’ was the most significant control in reducing 
major hazard events. 
The finding here reinforces some widely held views amongst industry commentators that people 
management issues remain a concern to the industry. Managing the human resource component on 
projects is vital to any project but also keeping people inspired and involved is vital for project 
success.
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Table 7.5 The effectiveness of controls in reducing catastrophic events 
Ti
er Controls 	 Number of Total Mean Rank Significance responses Score (see note 
(n) (s) (m=s/n) below) 
Having good people involved 1 	 301 789 2.621 1 0.000 and available (h) 
2 Managed interfaces, 
communication and cooperation 301 755 2.508 2 0.113 
(i) 

Thinking deeply individually 
 299 749 2.51 3 0.003 and as a team about hazards (e) 

Adequate resource (j) 302 744 2.464 4 0.041 

Checking of detail on site (p) 301 737 2.449 5 0.015 

3 Considering risks consciously(f) 301 731 2.429 6 0.020 
4 	 Sensible programmes, well­ 301 703 2.336 7 0.093 managed (l) 
Good management of 301 685 2.276 8 0.060 information (m) 

Adequate access to knowledge 
 300 675 2.250 9 0.026 (especially records) (k)

Good change management (q) 300 662 2.207 10 0.043 

Following good practice for 5 	 300 656 2.187 11 0.020 normal situations (d) 
6 	 Checking of concepts (n) 297 609 2.051 12 0.136 
Checking of calculation (o) 299 612 2.047 13 0.004 
Independent review and 
7 	 checking of design within the 299 605 2.023 14 0.023 
team (b) 
Applying CDM 2007 principles 8 	 298 560 1.879 15 0.144 for risk management (g) 
9 Independent certification (c) 294 520 1.769 16 0.110 
10 Our legislative framework (a) 296 495 1.672 17 0.096 
NOTE: These data use a statistical method of determining the significance between ranked items – 
the larger the figure the more significant the difference between the mean scores.
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It should be noted that there were a number of factors that were linked to checking, review and 
certification: 
§ checking of detail on site 
§ checking of concepts 
§ checking of calculation 
§ Independent review and checking of design within the team 
§ independent certification 
It may be that, by including these several items, the relevant scores for each of them may have 
been adversely affected with some respondents not being able to distinguish completely between 
them. Notwithstanding, the overall significance of the views that checking and review are 
currently a problem and improvement would be of significant benefit is evident.  
Improvement of in-house and independent checking and review during both design and 
construction would be a significant factor in helping to reduce catastrophic events. 
Once again none of the control failures outlined in the study were seen to have zero impact and 
score values suggest all control failures outlined did have a medium level of impact on major 
hazard events (in order of least impact). The lowest five control measures were: 
§ Checking of calculation (o)
§ Independent review and checking of design within the team (b) 
§ Applying CDM 2007 principles for risk management (g) 
§ Independent certification (c) 
§ Our legislative framework (a) 
Of the lowest control failures there were significant differences amongst respondent scores for the 
lowest three which were: our legislative framework; independent certification; and applying 
CDM 2007, although independent review and checking of design within the team and checking of 
calculations had little significant difference between them.
7.5.2 	 Respondents’ views on what more could be done to prevent catastrophic 

events 

In addition to the closed question discussed previously, 299 respondents answered the question: 
“When construction involves a major risk such as a risk to lots of people, should extra 
precautions be taken?” and 106 offered more details and comments on their answer.  The key 
comments have been grouped by content and presented in Table 7.61 The groups are not precise 
nor mutually exclusive and in some cases a complex comment has been split between different 
groups to reduce unnecessary repetition. As the question was asking for ‘problems’ or ‘solutions 
to problems it is not surprising that almost all of the comments were negative. A number of 
reassuring statements that much was being done were also offered. It should also be noted that a 
number of these comments are very pointed and dogmatic – they are, of course, the views of 
individuals and should be interpreted in that light. Notwithstanding, they do reflect some of the 
views held by people in the industry.   
1 Italicised text has been added to aid comprehension 
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The main thrust of these comments are summarised as follows1: 
Accidents have multiple causes and cannot be treated simplistically.  We need to be better at 
recognising the hazards in the first place and we need to deal with unusual hazards.
Whenever possible, we should eliminate the hazard, especially during the design and pre-
construction phases.  It was acknowledged that, at times this was difficult but that this must still 
be the primary aim – there was considerable feeling that this was not being done well at the 
moment.  Several respondents argued that using engineering judgement and compliance with 
existing codes and advice is important, but it was noted that more advice needed and so some 
subjective decisions may still be necessary. 
Removing one hazard may create others and things will change so we still need to manage 
the residual risk and we still need good supervision. Many respondents stressed the need to 
check that things are actually done by review and monitoring both during design and 
construction. The importance of independence in such reviews was emphasised. We also need 
better teamwork, coordination and communication
In assessing and managing the risk we must beware of just ‘ticking the boxes’ and we should 
beware missing the ‘big picture’ by concentrating only on ‘everyday’ risk management. We 
should beware complacency and not accept that we can do something just because it is ‘the way 
we have always done it’.   
Competence and experience of all involved is essential and currently lacking in many quarters.
Respondents argued that clients need to fulfil their role effectively. There was considerable 
strong feeling that some designers don’t do as much as is needed. 
We need to face the challenges from other project priorities such as time, cost, quality and 
aesthetics. It was agreed that small projects and small organisations have some special 
challenges.  We need to address complications with the supply chain and procurement 
methods, particularly dealing with sub & sub-subcontracting and interfaces. 
Some respondents claim that we are generally doing ok – but it is patchy.  Finally, all people 
involved in the process need to take responsibility. 
Table 7.6 Respondents’ examples of what more could be done to prevent catastrophic 
events - categorised free text
Examples of what more could be done to prevent catastrophic events 
Accidents have multiple causes 
Very rarely was a failure down to a single factor 
They try, sometimes they underestimate the magnitude of them or changes to the planned circumstances 
affect the controls and it passes un noticed. 
A risk identified and planned for normally is no longer a risk of any magnitude--accidents occur because of a 
particular combination and/or a risk not recognised as a risk. 
We need to be better at recognising the hazards in the first place 
They would do something if they recognised the hazards! Many don’t recognise the hazard 
People will take action only if they are made aware of the hazards and they can be convinced that even if the 
likelihood is low the severity could be catastrophic. 
1 The style here is intentionally in the first person to reflect the fact that many people have taken the time to make personal 
contributions. 
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They will only identify the ones they know, or that have been pointed out to them. 
Not many project teams start by seriously analysing and understanding the hazards associated with the job 
In my experience people are not aware of what hazards are! 
You cannot consciously eliminate a hazard unless you have identified it. Too many people have blinkers on. 
Once designers recognise a risk, they then usually try to eliminate or reduce the risk. 
We are not good at seeing the hazards especially at change points 
We need to deal with unusual hazards 
Current focus seems to be on eliminating those hazards unusual and infrequent nature they can difficult to 
account that are less obvious, as per CDM 2007, however, due to their nature they are difficult to design out. 
we still find that the majority of hazards are posed by users i.e. the unfamiliar, and that such hazards can be 
dealt with through good design and residual risk management. 
For major works, hazards are considered - the lower the perceived risk the less they look at hazard reduction 
People look at hazards, but do not recognise the hazardous situations that can result - especially when there 
are unusual initiating factors. 
We should eliminate the hazard wherever possible 
Hazard notification and reduction seem to occur far more often than hazard elimination 
People try and put mitigation measures in place rather than eliminate hazards, often wasting time and money 
when it would have been easier to eliminate something
Generally people, particularly designers, are too reliant on a last resort such as 'access must be by trained 
personnel with appropriate PPE with suitably erected scaffold', rather than trying to eliminate a hazard at 
source
The attitude is that hazard elimination is not possible, because we have always done it this way and it would 
be too expensive / time consuming. 
Yes a lot of people do try to eliminate, but I do think do a lot more could be done at design stage - this is best 
time to eliminate and we don't do enough 
Identify hazards and eliminate it is prime response of all Engineers in construction 
You will never eliminate human error, but having alert, experienced staff reviewing what is happening 
minimises the risks.
Elimination at design stage by designer 
Hazards are usually identified and mitigation measures considered 
Certainly in contracting we spend a lot of time considering and trying to eliminate hazards 
We need to reduce the risk of their occurrence, eliminating hazards is not practicable. 
Hazards generally need to be eliminated early in the design stage and it is often this element that is missing 
Elimination is usually done for reasons other than CDM. 
People generally apply precautions to lower the risk but do not remove the source 
Traditional approaches still prevail in the industry and consideration of elimination of hazards is rare. 
The correct choice of design solution can eliminate hazards 
You cannot start a design with hazard elimination being the main driver otherwise all buildings would be a 
single storey box. I think hazard elimination only starts properly after stage C by which time some of the key 
irreversible hazards are in place.
Particularly at the design stage, hazard removal is infrequently utilised 
Eliminating hazards is not yet fully embedded into the design culture. It is often an add-on at a too late stage 
in projects. 
I think those involved in the management and supervision actively try to eliminate hazards as far as they can. 
This is something we are addressing through our Zero Harm programme, which requires elimination of risk of 
serious injury/fatality. 
Elimination of hazards is the first part of design that any design should consider. 
The hierarchy of control is not always followed fully 
Using engineering judgement and compliance with existing codes and advice is important 
It is down to 'engineering judgment' 
There are few projects which contain 'problems' that lie outside accepted 'best practice' on these situations 
then the input from suitably experienced engineers is essential.
It would be good if we all simply complied with existing guidance / requirements from Standards, Codes etc. I 
suggest that most of our construction accidents are a failure to comply with the present clear industry best 
practice. 
If existing procedures eg BS5975 are applied rigorously & conscientiously, risk of accidents is vastly reduced 
More advice is needed 
There is very poor advice on what is 'acceptable risk' and 'un-acceptable risk'. 
Subjective decisions may still be necessary 
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Quantifiable data is hard to come by 
Removing one hazard may create others and things will change 
…they are replaced by something else 
It is often the case that eliminating one hazard will only introduce another. While eliminating hazards is an 
admirable goal, efforts should be focussed on reducing and managing the residual risks. 
Late changes both design and especially construction sequence/programme, time pressures all reduce the 
actual effectiveness of the hazard elimination.
The hazards may change from those foreseen at the design stage but a new review of hazards is not then 
carried out because the Team haven't recognised the extent of the differences or because they have 'no time' 
to do so. 
We still need to manage the residual risk 
Elimination is usually done for reasons other than CDM. Managing the hazard and risk is the big challenge and 
should be where concentration of effort is focussed. 
We still need good supervision 
Too much reliance on briefings and not direct supervision. As workforce will take the easiest quickest option if 
unsupervised. 
Time pressure on workers means close management and supervision is needed at all times to ensure the 
detail and big picture are kept in mind by all concerned.
We need to check that things are actually done – Review & Monitoring 
Many hazards "dealt with" by use of standard phrases in risk assessments, e.g. use a banksman, but who 
checks whether these processes are followed? 
We are always looking to reduce risks as team. We go over scenarios repeatedly and then monitor in site that 
things are going as planned. 
Far too often designers follow 'codes' for 'their specialism' and are reluctant to allow 'third party questioning' 
Planning always needs to be re-checked throughout the construction process 
Paperwork exercises are carried out to make it appear things have been done but these are rarely 
communicated and implemented
Formal risk analysis is rarely conducted. Though, even if it were, the majority of failures I've investigated 
were caused by the lack of proper execution of routine operations, which would probably go below the radar 
of most risk analyses. 
Too often a lack of checking takes place, eg has the best method of construction been used, have all the 
hazards been covered, is rigorous checking being carried out both at design and construction stages. 
You will never eliminate human error, but having alert, experienced staff reviewing what is happening 
minimises the risks. 
Very rarely was a failure down to a single factor - this led to my paying great attention to specific aspects of 
work in which I was involved, particularly the design and site checking of falsework. 
The major problem is that engineering has become a "JOB", a 9am to 5pm occupation; the extra work of 
checking is avoided and covered with contract disclaimers 
Usually down to common sense or at least the designer (of the permanent or temporary works) being given 
the opportunity to see that the contractor has interpreted the design properly 
The formal risk process needs independent review by an experienced team who have no direct involvement in 
the project. 
The hazards may change from those foreseen at the design stage but a new review of hazards is not then 
carried out because the Team haven't recognised the extent of the differences or because they have 'no time' 
to do so. 
We need better teamwork, coordination and communication 
No-one co-ordinates the process effectively (including the CDM-C who is often not involved in such 
deliberations 
Paperwork exercises are carried out to make it appear things have been done but these are rarely 
communicated and implemented 
Hazards identified are evaluated in a team approach, in most instances 
Early involvement of contractors is paramount. 
We must beware of just ‘ticking the boxes’ 
It appears to be tick box exercise. 
Many hazards "dealt with" by use of standard phrases in risk assessments, e.g. use a banksman,
Too much emphasis on design risk assessments, often numeric, done too little too late. 
People often only apply procedural or administrative controls 
Paperwork exercises are carried out to make it appear things have been done but these are rarely 
communicated and implemented 
We try an informal way. Formal ways seem to be tick box situations of paperwork only. 
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Procedures (beyond a certain minimum level) just dull the senses. 
People tick boxes but we need to instil conscious awareness 
Some people do not know why they are doing it, they just go through the motions because they have to. 
There is a great deal of emphasis on box-ticking type procedures that distract rather the concentrate attention 
on relevant factors. 
Risk assessment becomes superficial and serves only as a prerequisite paperwork before construction starts. 
We should beware missing the ‘big picture’ by concentrating only on ‘everyday’ risk management 
They worry too much about the well known risks and miss the big picture (for major accidents) 
Numeric risk assessments do not adequately address low probability, high consequence events (Parallels with 
e.g. petrochem where e.g. BP Texas City were too busy with relatively minor consequences and took their eye 
off the process safety ball)
We tend focus on the common hazards and miss the less popular ones 
All of the risk assessment processes I've been involved with focus on 'manageable' risks (i.e. on site 
processes) rather than issues of structural safety for instance (it is almost a given that the structural engineer 
will deal with this independently). 
It is important that major hazards are identified in the first place - there can be too much dependence on 
identifying and addressing the 'good housekeeping hazards' and not enough real in depth thought on the 
project specific hazards. 
We should beware complacency – ‘the way we have always done it’ 
Traditional approaches still prevail in the industry 
In my experience it is rare for accidents - especially major accidents - to happen where the personnel 
involved have not been aware of the hazards and risks ..They invariably believe they are in control and that 
an incident will not happen. (e.g. the team know an underground service is in the immediate vicinity but will 
use an excavator to try to clear as much material away from the area - and as close to the service as they 
think they can 'get away with' - before proceeding with hand digging. 
Some people have their own way of doing things and it’s hard to change when you don’t stand over them 24 
hours a day 
The workers do not think like that (i.e. about risk)
We have done it this way before and we did not have an accident 
Competence and experience of all involved is essential and currently lacking 
Unfortunately, not everyone has a high degree of competence in this, which creates additional risks in itself. 
Designers do not have the competence or drive to take this forward.
People only do things as far as their experience permits 
It depends on the character/knowledge of the team involved and their experience.
It’s usually down to common sense 
If aware, hazards are reduced, its ignorance that creates hazards 
PPE is generally considered first because of cost and a lack of understanding. 
Hazards are easily perpetuated in designs without appropriate depth of site experience 
The major challenge is to make sure individuals are competent to do the job they are employed to do.
Computers seem to have overtaken the lateral thinking process that used to be put in during the process, 
when we used to do hand calculations in respect of structural design. Some of the younger generation are too 
much reliant on computers and have very little experience of actual site works or the practicalities of how the 
actual construction works will take place of their proposed design. In other words, designing something 
without knowing/imagining how it will be actually achieved on site. 
CDM 2007 is great in principal, but where is the policing of this. Far too many designers have little or no 
knowledge of what is required from them. 
We need clients to fulfil their role effectively 
Basically people do try to eliminate risk but its clients who hold the final say 
Action only occurs when driven by Client or his representative 
In my most recent experience, the designers & contractor have not adequately considered the risks and have 
had to be guided/forced to do so by the Client. 
As a contractor, clients appear to be very weak (in my view) at actively managing the permanent works 
design process to eliminate hazards. 
Of course, depends on the project-- some clients get it, a lot don't 
If there's insufficient time & resources people will take the risk. Project owner should allow realistic timeframe 
& budget to do the work in a good practice manner. 
Some designers don’t do as much as is needed 
Designers tend to still think risk should be Contractor's problem 
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Some people try; some don't even think about it; few identify why they have eliminated a hazard and fail to 
pass that information to others (e.g. clients, others in the design team and constructors). 
Architects do not consider how a building is to be constructed when producing designs. They are more 
concerned with the aesthetic than safety. Design risks are passed to the Constructor. CDM has not changed 
this fundamental problem. 
Workers at the "face" will attempt to reduce them. There is however often lack of appreciation of these by 
office based designers despite CDM
Far too often designers follow 'codes' for 'their specialism' and are reluctant to allow 'third party questioning' 
Much design will still resort to an entry in the designer's risk assessment as "by competent contractor"
Many Contractor Designed Portion elements within the procurement framework present such a risk interface. 
Designers generally do not understand their duties. Architects are very bad. 
What a designer considers to be a positive measure is not always seen as such by some contractors. 
Many designers do not appear to value hazard analysis. 
Sometimes there simply seems to be a lack of imagination amongst engineers, it might be rare but if it can go 
wrong eventually it probably will. 
We try to deliver good design in everything we do. The idea of separately identifying risk reduction can 
sometimes seem contrived. 
I have requested that a school building be moved 3m west to avoid conflict with services. The architect 
understood that this was a significant risk that could be eliminated and so moved the building (post planning, 
pre detailed design). 
Some designers more driven by design quality than risk elimination 
On the whole, most people endeavour to eliminate hazards 
Designers still need educating and training to consider the significant risks (and passing on relevant 
information) and stop extolling about small risks and telling competent Contractors what they should do. 
We need to face the challenges from other project priorities 
Small construction projects are often very cost driven 
Unfortunately, there is still the issue of time and money that those at the ‘coal face’ sometimes allow to cloud 
their judgement 
Cheapest, quickest solution – we have always done it like this 
Eliminating hazards is considered but is secondary to producing a cost effective design for the Client. 
Risks are taken when time and/or money is severely restricted. 
Time constraints seem to be more important 
PPE is generally considered first because of cost and a lack of understanding. 
Procedures may be in place but commercial/time/resource pressures induce short cuts 
We must also recognise that the industry is reliant on individual operatives being paid for production. 
In my experience, the greatest number of "potential" major accidents/incidents are due to experienced people 
rushing to get started or finished in possession works - and this allows problems to occur as available 
important safety critical information is sometimes overlooked due to the pressurised activity in hand. This 
means close management and supervision is needed at all times to ensure the detail and big picture are kept 
in mind by all concerned.
Example: live overhead cable, details briefed to all on site, but the gang gets carried away with the rush to 
start or finish the works that materials or tools are raised above head height without thinking. Equally, when 
there is a change to the planned works, the change is not always fully understood and therefore not properly 
acted upon by each individual.
For example, we work for 3 nights with isolation of the services, then due to operational difficulties elsewhere, 
we cannot have an isolation on the 4th night - so we devise a safe way of working without an isolation. The 
briefing is not understood by and individual or in the rush to get things done quickly, an individual raises 
tools/materials above head height - as they are still in the mind set of the previous 3 nights’ work and have 
not taken cognisance of the potential impact of the briefed change. 
Designers are quite often expected to work under tight budgets and thus often forget to consider H&S or 
possible hazards during construction.
Late changes both design and especially construction sequence/programme, time pressures all reduce the 
actual effectiveness of the hazard elimination.
The hazards may change from those foreseen at the design stage but a new review of hazards is not then 
carried out because the Team haven't recognised the extent of the differences or because they have 'no time' 
to do so. 
Costs tend to conflict with H & S. 
Small projects have some special challenges 
It is very much dependant on the industry sector we are considering e.g small construction projects are often 
very cost driven 
Probably this depends on the size and 'reputation'(culture) of the organisation and size of the project 
including resources 
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We need to address complications with supply chain – sub & sub-subcontracting and interfaces 
The majority of incidents / hazards creation occur when the planning / appointment of labour (mainly subbies) 
process has been by passed / not adhered to 
The modern tendency to package work into boxes reduces hazards to secondary considerations rather than 
primary. 
There are hazards presented further down the supply chain i.e. a subcontractor to a subcontractor etc. 
Some claim that we are generally doing ok – but it is patchy 
Method of works and how we achieve them are always considered in a safe way. 
If appropriate procedures are employed the risks are identified and addressed prior to any works 
commencing on site or even identified at design stage 
We apply a rigorous process of risk management and evaluation throughout the life of a project 
Risks are continually assessed on our sites. Risk management is an endemic process within our business 
It is getting better but still work to be done 
Extent of trying can vary 
Some people try; some don't even think about it; 
Improvement is needed 
Most projects have good quality management teams and good liaison with the Principal Contractor 
I work in the nuclear industry with has a very strong focus on health and safety.
The Civil Engineering industry is behind the Energy sector – Risk management in Civils is very inconsistent - 
polarised even 
People need to take responsibility 
But most often I see people regard the duty to reduce or manage the hazard as someone else's responsibility 
People may see hazards but do not accept the reality of risk. Do do so is not macho. 
Most hazards are accepted as part of the risk in doing the job. 
This is not dealt with sufficiently. There is an acceptance of hazards as part of work 
People try to underplay the hazards if it causes them problems elsewhere 
This IS done, but not always and reluctantly if it effects their design considerably 
7.5.3 Respondents’ views on key priorities for reducing catastrophic events 
Respondents were asked: “What do you think that (above all else) should be done to prevent 
catastrophes in construction?” 230 people responded, some mentioning more than one priority 
(see Table 7.7). A number of focus areas were identified as follows: 
§ Safety risk management 29 
§ Think 'worse case' 7 
§ Overview essential 4 
§ Leadership 7 
§ Accountable 'designated' persons 11 
§ Culture 10 
§ Client issues & procurement 19 
§ Resources - Time 20 
§ Resources – Money 10 
§ Planning 22 
§ Design 27 
§ Manage change 4 
§ Collaboration / coordination 9 
§ Communication 7 
§ Checking / detail 4 
§ Independent review 3 
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§ Independent site inspections 1 

§ Training 8 

§ Education / universities 5 

§ Feedback / learning 3 

§ Competence 9 

§ Regulation / HSE / Campaigns 9 

§ Supervision / site control 8 

§ Site management systems 6 

§ Misc 2 
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Table 7.7 What do you think (above all else should be done to prevent catastrophes in construction?
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M
is
c 
Number of mentions 29 7 4 7 11 10 19 20 10 22 27 4 9 7 4 3 1 8 5 3 9 9 8 6 2 
Need to consider the biggest "what if" and 
work back from that. X X
Robust risk assessment process that 
focuses on identifying hazardous situations 
and the lines of defence that are being relied 
upon.
X X
Promotion of a culture of systematic hazard 
recognition and risk management. A lot of 
lip service is paid to risk assessment but 
very few project teams really use risk 
management techniques as a tool to control 
work. 
X  X
Adequate hazard and risk management at 
design and construction stages. X
Awareness identification and involvement of 
all construction people at all levels. X
Design out hazards, communicate out 
residual hazards, then supervise, control, 
monitor site. 
X  X X  X
Detailed critical risk management 
procedures with the introduction of 'hold 
points'. 
X
Effective assessment and management of 
risks on site X
Identification and awareness of any residual 
hazards X
Proper well thought through risk 
assessments. X
Robust assessment of risks and effective 
arrangements to manage/communicate 
significant risks to others. 
X
Thorough planning, risk assessment, 
information and adequate resources. X  X  X  X
Design competence is crucial in every 
aspect, and being able to interpret designs is 
of equal importance. Value engineering often 
is the root cause of failures where designs 
are not re-evaluated, simple altered, and 
construction needs to pay more attention. 
X  X  X  X
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Above all else, what should be done to 
prevent catastrophes in construction? 
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Assess and manage the risk. X
There should always be a systematic and 
formalised assessment and management of 
risk on construction projects. 
X
Awareness of risks by open and frequent 
discussion. Don't ever think processes or 
legislation will prevent them. 
X
Consistent application of policies and 
procedures adopted to ensure that sensible 
safety is being applied to every operation 
that is undertaken during all construction 
activities. 
X  X X
Greater degree of risk management and 
commitment to same by all parties. X
Ban codes of practices, allow engineers to 
think creatively and identify all risks that 
arise from their design and proper mitigation 
procedures. 
X
Encourage a balanced approach to hazard 
control. Good engineering practice and 
controls are paramount to ensuring safety. 
By concentrating on "safety" alone another 
element causes the accident to happen. 
X
People on the whole recognise risks and 
don’t want others to get injured, however 
people's threshold of what is an acceptable 
risk and response to it varies a great deal. 
Risk registers should always be compiled by 
the team to cater for the varied views.  
X  X
Keep assessing risks, keep advertising 
safety campaigns, employ good safety 
professionals at planning stages. 
X  X  X X
Stand back - take advice - speak to the 
designer. X  X
Coordination and proper risk analysis. X  X
Clients need to appreciate the whole 
process from cradle to grave and not just 
appoint duty holders because they have to 
by regulation. There needs to be a better 
understanding of hazard evaluation and risk 
reduction. The project team needs to review 
designs. 
X  X  X  X  X
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Above all else, what should be done to 
prevent catastrophes in construction? 
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M
is
c 
Allow time for competent designers to 
consider effectively risks and remove 
processes which hinder that ie many that are 
generated through the CDM Regs and CDM­
C in particular. 
X  X  X
Provide appropriate experienced staff with 
sufficient time to work as a team, with all 
parties, to identify risks and then be allowed 
to fully consider implications. 
X  X
Early risk assessment and involvement of 
insurance people (who have more 
knowledge about losses than anyone else) 
at an early stage in the construction process 
and then all the way through. 
X
Don't take risks. Fully assess what they are, 
and plan them out. X  X
A no fault system of reporting near misses 
should be used. Knowledge of what could go 
wrong and has gone wrong on other projects 
should be widely disseminated so we all 
learn from it. 
X  X
Education. Firstly to students as a safety 
module as an integral subject at University. 
Secondly to ICE Graduates/Members as 
Case studies of significant failures. 
Unfortunately there is only a limited number 
of researched case studies available. 
X  X X
Teach people to think what can possibly go 
wrong with my project/design/concept.  X  X X
Design Teams and site management should 
work closely together on site to highlight 
potential hazards. 
X  X
Greater level of formal communication 
between project team members on a “What 
if” basis, endorsed by the client. 
X  X
Have an experienced person within the 
organisation who has the responsibility to 
take an overview and the authority to 
intervene when necessary. 
X  X
Follow procedures but understand the intent. X  X
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Above all else, what should be done to 
prevent catastrophes in construction? 
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In my experience the design of a structure 
has to be turned around as soon as possible 
as the fees for the structural engineering 
process keep getting lowered.  This does not 
leave a massive amount of time to take a 
step back and consider all aspects with 
regards to safety. I do not think the design 
and build system lends itself to this either. 
X  X X
Single person designation - not all in it 
together with none named.  Serious problem 
in lack of support or interest from high level 
management 
X X
Empowering those at most risk. Hold senior 
staff accountable.  X X
Adequate planning and engaged visible 
leadership X  X
A culture set from the top which sees 
learning from every near miss as an 
opportunity not a problem 
X  X
Good safety leadership, ensuring every 
employee is not only aware of hazards and 
risks but looking for them and avoiding them, 
a proper chain of responsibility where 
managers are watching their staff. 
X  X  X
Management and leadership. X
Make the client responsible and in line for 
prosecution if it is their pressure that has 
caused the accident 
X  X
Design out risk. On large projects, consider 
the Temporary Works Co-ordinator role as 
stand-alone rather than as a tack-on to other 
significant duties. 
X  X
Place responsibility on a single professional, 
with adequate authority and require that that 
person assure that adequate care, 
experience and education be brought to 
bear. (No harm shall be allow to occur for 
lack of knowledge, effort and care
 X  X X
Single point of responsibility in each 
organisation involved in the design, 
procurement and construction process ­
"safety coordinator." Ideally similar to the 
SER system of design certification, where 
the individual is personally responsible.
 X
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Above all else, what should be done to 
prevent catastrophes in construction? 
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Hold people personally responsible-- for 
every major injury, owners/managers/supers 
should face criminal charges with real jail 
time. 
X
Greater awareness of potential prosecution 
and accountability within the 
design/construction team. 
X  X
Individuals should be held accountable for 
their actions. X  X
Communication and joint working between 
all parties on projects, with a commitment to 
individual and collective responsibility for 
safety. 
X  X
Define responsibilities clearly (instead of 
trying to make everybody responsible) and 
have one level of independent scrutiny. 
X
Develop a caring awareness that we are an 
industry that provides a service to people. X
I have been on sites worldwide with 7 deaths 
generally due to bravado. I was a H&S 
consultant for 4 years - CDM was ineffective 
with no backup and lots on board for no 
intelligence money making. Real lateral 
thinking using experience is needed on all 
projects. 
X
Reiterate personal responsibility and the 
need for common sense. A receptive 
environment for people to report concerns. 
X
Good procedures will resolve such issues 
ahead of such occurrences. Much though 
depends on the attitude of the contractor.  
The exercise must look at the tier of building 
being undertaken by companies with an 
annual turnover below £100m
 X  X
Always work safely. X
There is no single thing - in my experience it 
is the culture of people always being aware 
and thinking about H&S that prevents 
catastrophes. This culture exists because of 
the sum of all the individual things that 
promote health and safety - so it's important 
X
Culture change at workforce level. X
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M
is
c 
A better understanding from ALL parties on 
site, of their roles, responsibilities and risks 
before carrying out an operation. A change 
of mindset that taking a risk to get the job 
done isn't worth it. 
X  X
Shared learning / better publicise the 
incidents which do occur. Encourage a 
questioning approach. Chartered Institutions 
should discipline practitioners who will not 
acknowledge mistakes can be made. 
X  X
Set realistic time frames for projects that 
allow proper planning and re-consider areas 
such as L & AD's, pain and gain clauses that 
can put unreasonable pressure on 
contractors to take unacceptable risks. 
X X  X
Good, thought through design having 
eliminated risk - combined with a detailed 
conceptual plan of how the structure will be 
constructed. Once this has been produced, a 
fair contractor appointment process that 
ensures sufficient funding has been built into 
the process for a safe time to construct, safe 
methods to be employed and training for all 
those involved in the construction process 
on site - ensuring only competent personnel 
are employed to undertake tasks on site. 
X  X
Impress on Client Organisations that 
irrational programming looks great on paper 
but caries serious safety consequences. 
X
Use forms of contract where contractor and 
specialists involved at a very early stage in 
order that all parties can identify and 
eliminate hazards and risks. 
X
Promote a 2 stage tendering process to 
Clients to allow experienced contractors into 
the design team at an early opportunity. 
X
procurement methods that allow 
collaborative working so that all can share 
information and address risk. 
X
Procurement routes by clients need to take 
account of the type of project and focus on 
many aspects.  There tends to be an 
emphasis on cost over other differentiators. 
X
Educate people continuously and remove 
safety costs from the assessment of tenders. X  X
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M
is
c 
Joint training courses. i.e. architects, 
designers, constructors share at least part of 
their courses together and more site visits. 
Better representation from clients i.e. clients 
too powerful forcing prices down and 
shortening programmes. 
X  X
APPROPRIATE FUNDING, TRAINING AND 
REGISTRATION OF SUBCONTRACTORS 
(NOT cscs) 
X  X
H&S should be legally established as a 
separate % budget set for all tenderers, 
divorced of the technical submission ie. say 
a minimum of 2-5% of the project value, 
calculated on the basis of risk assessment 
by the Client. Tender bids would then be 
only completing on technical ability and 
commercial aspects of this in the 
reassurance that H & S is already 
adequately budgeted for. Also more 
accountability on Clients, Designers CDMC's 
and Delivery Partners needs to happen. 
X  X
Severe consequences that can really be 
applied would, I believe, drive improvements 
in independent oversight of the entire 
process: Budgeting, Tendering, Design, 
Planning, Resourcing, Execution. 
X  X
Clients taking proper responsibility for their 
actions. I have not yet seen a client 
prosecuted under CDM 2007. 
X  X
All projects should be collaborative, starting 
with meaningful client briefings and 
knowledge sharing. Client must take advice 
and not assume that he knows best. 
X
Clients should fully understand the 
implications of their projects and should 
ensure the budget, programme and contract 
strategy reflects the demands/significance of 
the project. 
X
Client expect work to be completed far too 
quickly often with little time for proper 
consultation and design consideration. 
X
Competent management, with adequate 
resources, including time. X X  X
Adequate time, money and resources 
available. X X
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M
is
c 
Reduce overburdening time and money 
pressures on design staff created by senior 
management striving for commercial
success on the slimmest of margins. 
X X
Sensible time periods both for design and 
construction. Experienced, competent 
people carrying out the work. Right price for 
the project to avoid cutting corners to save 
money. 
X X  X
A better balance between programmes, cost 
and checking. X X  X
Take more time to think carefully. X  X
Allow sufficient time at each stage of the 
project. X
Allow sufficient time to consider the risks and 
engage knowledgeable qualified persons to 
review. 
X  X
The right people with adequate knowledge 
and time is the key ingredient to ensuring 
effective management. 
X  X
Ensuring people have sufficient time to do 
the job, whether the design, or the 
construction. 
X
Having competent, well resourced and 
managed staff who have the time to under­
take the task they are being asked to do. 
X  X
jobs should be slowed down as the rush of 
programmes and deadlines cause more 
problems and accidents than anything else. 
X
More attention given to ensuring a realistic 
and therefore safer time window for all 
contractors working on a construction site. 
X
Realistic timescales both at design stage 
and post contract award. X
Safety is of high importance. But time scale 
often drives the risk of cutting corners. X
Sensible timescales at the design and 
construction phases of a project. X
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M
is
c 
Construction Managers for all contractors 
should be incentivised for safety above all 
other motivators; i.e. profit should be 
weighted below safety in the actual rewards 
system. In most companies profit is 'king' 
and this is reflected in behaviours. 
X
Adequate resources to manage all aspects 
of the site team. X
In my opinion the underlying cause will 
always go back to financial constraints. X
Better Planning X
Better planning, cooperation and pre-task 
inspections. X  X  X
Considering appropriate means of escape.
Better procedures & better designed storage 
area. 
X  X
Detailed planning of works should be 
undertaken which involves those directly 
undertaking the works. Where this is not 
practical (in many cases it won't be) there 
should at least be a detailed briefing with 
those undertaking the works. 
X  X
Better planning and preparation to realistic 
timescales. X
Good site prelim discussions with clear 
duties allocated. X
Good well thought out planning. X
Plan more X
Plan, gather information, evaluate risks and 
make sure the information reaches the right 
people. 
X  X
Planning X
Planning and resourcing reviews with others 
outside the project team prior to high risk 
operations. 
X
Proper and timely planning and assessment 
by experienced personnel followed by strict 
management protocols undertaken during 
site process. 
X  X
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M
is
c 
The seven P's always! Proper preparation 
and planning prevents pp performance! X
Robust Planning and control of sub 
contractors. Behavioural attitude training. 
Management adhering to the systems which 
are in place. 
X  X X
Those in the industry planning and 
managing construction works. X  X
Detailed prior planning. X
Designers considering the constructability 
and installation of equipment and the 
structure. 
X
Good design and frequent site inspections 
by experienced personnel. X  X
Have robust buildable designs that reduce 
risk upfront. X
Designers should be more aware of the 
temporary supports and arrangements 
necessary for construction rather than 
focussing purely upon the finished design 
and leaving 'temporary works design' to the 
contractor. Ad-hoc on site design/method 
statement change 
X  X
Client to pay for evaluation of design 
principles through design teams and again 
prior to starting construction on site to 
ensure designs a robust and risks fully 
identified 
X
Site briefing by designers. X
Proper design resources, independent 
checking of design (other than very minor 
structures), proper independent supervision 
on site. 
X  X  X
More design reviews X
All designers should have a fundamental 
knowledge of how buildings are constructed 
and should fully appreciate the impact of 
their designs on the safety of people. This 
knowledge should begin at the very start of 
the designer’s education. 
X  X
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M
is
c 
Better training of site management team and 
most importantly better understanding by 
designers of the CDM Regs. 
X  X
Training, Training and more training for 
designers. X  X
Full implementation of CDM 2007 regs. X
More frequent site visits & inspections by 
HSE & BCO, and more in-depth scrutiny of 
the designers actions in reducing or 
removing hazards. 
X  X
Overhaul CDM regs, give more power to the 
CDM-C, take more enforcement action 
against designers, better regulation 
processes that are more likely to give risk to 
major catastrophes. 
X  X  X
The CDM 2007 Regulations with regard to 
designers responsibilities should be more 
fully implemented and more aggressively 
checked and actioned by HSE. 
X  X  X
Client, CDMC and Designer responsibilities 
for design enforced. X  X
It should become law that a project does not 
commence on site without a fully 
coordinated and integrated design which has 
been verified by building regs (properly).The 
procurement world is driving a culture that 
makes our industry start on site with 80% of 
the design still to be done by subcontractors. 
This is wrong. 
X  X
An experienced person should review and 
take responsibility for the design. X  X
Principal Contractor & Designers to take 
more responsibility for safety during 
construction. Frequently lip service is paid to 
this by both parties, often this is due to 
unrealistic programming. 
X  X
For some types of important temporary 
works there should be a register of approved 
Temporary Works designers. 
X
Clear communication of design intent to site 
team and ensure everyone involved 
understands risks and limitations of the 
design. 
X  X
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M
is
c 
Behaviours in project teams should change 
so that all proposed changes to a design for 
temporary works are properly checked and 
approved. 
X
More training. Higher quality personal 
development project. More apprentices - 
gain experience. Improved and clearly 
identified communication links and 
responsibilities. STRONG CHANGE 
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES. 
X  X  X
Clarity and agreement on how we manage 
changes to the work, and when the rules do 
not fit- ie the gap between work as imagined 
and work as performed. 
X
If a hold is enforced when something 
unplanned occurs however insignificant it 
may appear to be then we may eliminate the 
majority of failures. 
X
Mandatory site co-ordination, checking and 
tool box talks involving the construction 
specialists in conjunction with the designers 
to ensure the operatives fully understand the 
risks and control measures that must be 
implemented. 
X  X
Better collaboration between parties without 
fear of litigation or claims for extra payment. X
Assistance. Never one individual to blame. 
Sites need more supports, no one is an 
expert in everything. 
X
Training and communication are vital X  X
Industry wide Lessons Learnt detailing 
previous incidents so we can all learn from 
them and avoid it happening on our projects. 
X  X
Close supervision and genuine 
communication between 
supervisors/workers about the real risks 
involved and their consequences. 
X  X
Good management undertaken by 
experienced people, communicating with 
whole project team. 
X  X
Clear lines of communication to ensure risk 
are understood and actioned/controlled. X
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M
is
c 
Communication and planning, working in 
proper sequence of work X  X
Communication is vital, now that verbal 
communication with workers can be 
impaired, due to difficulty with language 
X  X
Everything we do is about effective 
communication between all parties.  If 
communication breaks down then inevitably 
there will be problems. 
X
Improvements in sharing of information on 
outcomes and future prevention control X  X
Better communication by ALL parties X
Proper handover is required (never happens 
in my experience) between the design team 
and the contractors (and subbies) so that the 
reasoning behind design is understood on 
site. That way people wouldn't endanger 
themselves by thinking that there is a 
cheaper way, when in reality it was 
discounted on H&S grounds. Working at 
height seems to be the main issue but I have 
no idea how we can mitigate that without 
reducing the height of buildings.. 
X
Appropriate Commitment by all parties within 
Construction Industry including signing up to 
a Charter which outlines individual authority 
to stop work at any time to review decisions 
already processed so the risks can be 
evaluated. 
X X X  X
Independent inspection allowance to be 
identified and ring-fenced by all clients, 
which must be used to allow interrogation of 
design teams /contractors and work 
practices. 
X X X
Supervision and inherent checking (i.e. not 
just as a procedure one has to do) at all 
stages in the conception, design, tendering 
and construction. 
X  X
Checking criteria and assumptions. X
Design compatible with actual conditions 
and integrated management. X
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M
is
c 
Formal checking design reports & drawings 
in design office and on site. X
The only sure means to prevent construction 
catastrophes is to prevent construction -- 
which is not an option.  To reduce 
construction risks, I believe that diligent 
checks of design and field work by qualified 
people both prior to and during operations is 
essential. 
X  X
Competent site managers checking work X  X  X
DETAILED Method Statements, fully 
reviewed. X  X
Promote the need for 'technical competence 
and attention to detail throughout the project 
process. 
X  X
'Peer' review of designs / method statements 
/ similar by trained and experienced 
competent personnel who are independent 
of the design process - a fresh pair of eyes. 
X X
Checking of designs/site works by 
competent persons i.e. chartered/ 
experienced designers, etc should become a 
formal legal requirement with 
drawings/reports signed off. 
X X
For items that are identified as being high 
significance have independent review. X
Independent body must be included in 
design stage. X
Place emphasis on peer review type 
procedures and away from box-ticking and 
form-filling which human nature turns into 
rubber-stamping. 
X
Core supervision on site through 
independent bodies. X  X
Supervision on site by independent bodies 
on a regular basis. X  X
There should be a hierarchy of Chartered 
Engineers ON SITE with clearly stated 
responsibilities in a chain of command to 
ensure the design is safely and appropriately 
implemented. 
X
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M
is
c 
Education for all levels of personnel involved X X
Inclusion of Modules of Construction Risks in 
all training courses. Mandatory training of 
CDM all levels in industry. 
X X
Increase the awareness of those involved in 
construction of the risk of major catastrophe 
and provide them with the motivation and 
skills to limit the risks. 
X X
More emphasis on education throughout the 
industry. X X
Much better awareness of the risks. X X
Better training for individuals including a 
required standard (set by industry &/or 
legislation) of general HSE training for all 
operatives. 
X
Adequate training and supervision. 
Adherence to site best practices and 
providing the necessary safety equipment at 
all times. 
X  X X
Better investment in training. X
Training on site and control of personnel 
allowed to work on site. X  X
Better training throughout industry - more 
practically minded. X
Ensure that there is sufficient adequately 
trained staff to successfully carry out the 
task/project 
X  X
More supervisor training. X
Need to upskill the industry and better retain 
competent people. This needs increased 
application of initiatives such as "Respect for 
People." The industry must get much better 
at sharing lessons learned from incidents. 
Some progress in the work the work of the 
UK Contractors Group . 
X  X
Trained & Experienced managers. X  X
Trained and competent people following the 
processes. X  X
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M
is
c 
Get rid of the numerous money making 
schemes such as CSCS passport for safety 
and replace with one scheme. 
X  X
Education in cause and effect. Case studies 
etc. X
Experienced but, most importantly, well 
educated site teams. X  X
Improve the communication link between 
parties in this industry and the universities. X
Reduce the reliance on People with Degrees 
as they are no match for experience Degree 
or not. 
X  X
Honest reporting on Near Misses in Blame 
Free Culture. X
Better corporate knowledge sharing, training 
and instruction. X
Educating people with construction 
responsibilities by examining past failures. X
Learn from the past and learn ' there but for 
the grace of God! Be aware it really can 
happen. 
X
A corporate conscience and memory; learn 
the lessons of the past.  X
Share information so that lessons can be 
learned from the experiences of others and 
continuously update the lessons. 
X
Having engineers in charge of design and 
construction activities not technicians or 
accountants. 
X  X
Competence remains the main criteria to 
ensure people have the option of making the 
right choice. 
X
Ensure competent people are employed at 
all levels form designers to operatives. 
Ensure operatives are well briefed on risk 
and method statements prior to commencing 
a task. 
X
Have people carrying out jobs which they 
are competent to complete.   X
Improve competence in all levels of 
supervision and management. X
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M
is
c 
Improve people competence. X
Consolidation of the various competence 
certification schemes. X
Clear accountability and competence of 
those accountable people. X
Good Management. X
Having competent people involved 
(Designers & Contractors). X
Thinking, challenging, employ competent 
people. X
Solid experience on project management. X
Stricter controls. X X
Improve funding to HSE, more enforcement 
action required to ensure compliance with 
current Regulation. 
X
Legislation to be made clearer although not 
in a prescriptive way as people won't think. X
Enforcement of regulations!! X
Strengthening of CDM Regulations. X
Clear direct supervision at ground level 
upwards. X
Ensuring good management. X
Reduce paperwork on site to allow more 
time for adequate supervision of the works. X
Sensible programming and good site 
management with relevant experience. X
Statutory maintenance plans of site plants . X
A Principal Contractor 100% responsible 
needs to be appointed. X
Do not be complacent. X
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7.5.4 Comparison of control factors to reduce catastrophic events 
A comparison of the data gathered from the ranking of the 17 prescribed control factors (Table 

7.5) and the free text replies shown in tables 7.6 and 7.7 is shown in Table 7.8. 

This leads to ten summary themes, namely: 

1. People 
2. Interfaces, teamwork and coordination 
3. Hazard and risk management 
4. Design and preconstruction planning 
5. Checking and review 
6. Change management 
7. Project management, procurement and resources 
8. Site management and supervision 
9. Information and communication 
10. Legislation and codes 
People 
Having good people (i.e. competent, motivated people) involved and available was the first 
ranked control factor to reduce or prevent catastrophic events, rated considerably more important 
than the other factors.
‘Having engineers in charge of design and construction activities not technicians or accountants’
‘Competence remains the main criteria to ensure people have the option of making the right 
choice’. 
‘Improve competence in all levels of supervision and management’. 
‘Have people carrying out jobs which they are competent to complete’. 
The need for leadership was stressed and skills such as making good quality subjective decisions 
rather than just blindly applying the rules were identified. 
‘Good safety leadership, ensuring every employee is not only aware of hazards and risks but 
looking for them and avoiding them, a proper chain of responsibility where managers are 
watching their staff’. 
The length of time that a person has worked in the industry (see Section 5) did not seem to have a 
large impact on how individuals viewed factors influencing catastrophic events, although an 
analysis was conducted and general differences assessed. The 11-20 year experience group rated 
the risks highest (average answer of 2.039) while the 6-10 year group rated them the lowest 
(2.215) 
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Table 7.8 Controls to reduce catastrophic events – comparison of prescribed option ranking and open responses 
Effectiveness of controls – prescribed 
options - ranked (Table 7.4) 
What can be done – open response (Table 7.6) 
Above all else, what can be done – open 
response     (Table 7.7) 
People 
Having good people involved and available 
(1st tier) 
Competence and experience of all involved is essential and currently lacking 
People need to take responsibility 
Subjective decisions may still be necessary 
Leadership (7) 
Accountable 'designated' persons (11) 
Competence (9) 
Interfaces, teamwork & coordination 
Managed interfaces, communication and 
cooperation (2nd tier) 
Accidents have multiple causes
We need better teamwork, coordination and communication 
We need to address complications with supply chain – sub & sub-
subcontracting and interfaces 
Collaboration / coordination (9) 
Hazard & risk management 
Thinking deeply individually and as a team 
about hazards (2nd tier) 
Considering risks consciously (3rd tier) 
We need to be better at recognising the hazards in the first place  
We need to deal with unusual hazards 
We should eliminate the hazard wherever possible 
We should beware complacency – ‘the way we have always done it’ 
We must beware of just ‘ticking the boxes’ 
We still need to manage the residual risk 
We should beware missing the ‘big picture’ by concentrating only on 
‘everyday’ risk management 
Think 'worse case' (7) 
Overview essential (3) 
Safety risk management (29) 
Design and pre-construction planning 
Applying CDM 2007 principles for risk 
management (8th tier) 
Some designers don’t do as much as is needed Planning (22) Design (27) 
Checking of detail on site (2nd tier) 
Checking of concepts (6th tier) 
Checking of calculation (6th tier) 
Independent review and checking of 
design within the team (7th tier) 
Independent certification (9th tier) 
Checking and review 
We need to check that things are actually done – Review & Monitoring 
Checking / detail (4) 
Independent review (3) 
Independent site inspections (1) 
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Effectiveness of controls – prescribed 
options - ranked (Table 7.4) 
What can be done – open response (Table 7.6) 
Above all else, what can be done – open 
response     (Table 7.7) 
Change management 
Good change management (4th tier) Removing one hazard may create others and things will change Manage change (4) 
Project management, procurement, resources 
Adequate resource (2nd tier) 
Sensible programmes, well-managed     
(4th tier) 
We need to face the challenges from other project priorities Resources – Time (20) Resources – Money (9) 
Site management and supervision 
Sensible programmes, well-managed      
(4th tier) 
We still need good supervision Supervision / site control (8) Site management systems (6) 
Information and communication 
Managed interfaces, communication and 
cooperation (2nd tier) 
Good management of information (4th tier) 
Adequate access to knowledge (especially 
More advice is needed 
We need better teamwork, coordination and communication 
Communication (7) 
Feedback / learning (3) 
records) (4th tier) 
Legislation and codes 
Our legislative framework (10th tier) 
Using engineering judgement and compliance with existing codes and advice 
is important 
Regulation / HSE / Campaigns (9) 
Miscellaneous 
Following good practice for normal 
situations (5th tier) 
Not specifically identified Not specifically identified
Miscellaneous (Not in pre-chosen list) We need clients to fulfil their role effectively Client issues & procurement (19) 
Miscellaneous (Not in pre-chosen list) Small projects have some special challenges Not specifically identified 
Miscellaneous (Not in pre-chosen list) Not specifically identified 
Culture (10) 
Training (8) 
Miscellaneous (Not in pre-chosen list) Not specifically identified Education / universities (5) 
126 

  
            
          
        
 
             
              
 
             
          
            
        
 
  
 
        
            
       
 
         
            
         
 
    
 
            
           
              
                 
 
   
 
   
  
   
   
  
    
 
   
    
    
   
    
   
  
 
                
         
            
             
                
     
 
 
     
There were subtle differences amongst the lowest represented groups.  When the job type factor 
was analysed, interestingly, clients (1.997) and operatives (1.957) viewed the risks as most severe 
while the insurance sector (2.217) viewed it as least severe. 
While the differences were relatively small, more experience seems to result in more respect for 
the controls in place to reduce risk with the 20+ group scoring the controls highest (1.757).  
Once again analysing for the job type factor yielded some interesting results as the insurance 
respondents scored the controls as least effective (1.857). Operatives scored the controls as most 
effective (1.510). These two results take on more significance with the knowledge that the other 
groups all scored the controls between 1.723 and 1.796. 
Interfaces, teamwork and coordination 
Many projects are complex, requiring effective teamwork, careful management and coordination 
of the interfaces between organisations and cooperation between all parties.  The culture of sub 
and sub-subcontracting must be understood and the challenges addressed. 
‘Mandatory site co-ordination, checking and tool box talks involving the construction 
specialists in conjunction with the designers to ensure the operatives fully understand the 
risks and control measures that must be implemented’
Hazard and risk management 
Many of the respondents’ comments can be summarised as effective safety risk management - 
the promotion of a culture of systematic hazard recognition and risk management.  The 
application of a risk hierarchy of eliminate first was evident.  But there was also a particular 
emphasis on the need for an overview and to consider what is the worst thing that could happen. 
The online survey asked 
respondents several question 
related to the general 
consideration of risk 
throughout the industry, and 
whether they knew of 
organisations that seek to 
actively raise awareness of risk 
management issues.   
Respondents were first asked: 
“Do the risks of major 
accidents get considered by a 
formal hazard elimination and 
risk reduction process?”
Response options were always, 
sometimes or never.   
Figure 7.2 shows that of the 299 active responses, very few considered that the risk of major 
accidents was never considered, with most claiming sometimes (68%) or always (29%) 
When further asked whether “people actually try to eliminate hazards?” around three quarters of 
the sample (216) considered that people did; and an overwhelming majority (279 of 299) 
suggested that when construction involves a major risk such as a risk to lots of people, that extra 
precautions should be taken.   
Figure 7.2. Formal hazard elimination and risk reduction 
process 
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‘There should always be a systematic and formalised assessment and management of risk 
on construction projects’ 
‘Awareness of risks by open and frequent discussion. Don't ever think processes or 
legislation will prevent them’ 
Design and preconstruction planning 
Surprisingly, applying CDM 2007 principles for risk management was only ranked 15th, however, 
there were 27 mentions of design and 22 of planning actions identified as priorities for controls to 
reduce catastrophic events. Surprisingly, applying CDM 2007 principles for risk management 
was only ranked 15th, however, there were 27 mentions of design and 22 of planning actions 
identified as priorities for controls to reduce catastrophic events.  Checking of designs and design 
reviews were also identified.  Design included temporary as well as permanent works. 
‘Design competence is crucial in every aspect, and being able to interpret designs is of 
equal importance. Value engineering often is the root cause of failures where designs are 
not re-evaluated, simple altered, and construction needs to pay more attention’ 
Design out risk. On large projects, consider the Temporary Works Co-ordinator role as 
stand-alone rather than as a tack-on to other significant duties’ 
Good, thought through design having eliminated risk - combined with a detailed conceptual 
plan of how the structure will be constructed. Once this has been produced, a fair contractor 
appointment process that ensures sufficient funding has been built into’. 
Checking and review 
Checking and review activities were included in several of the prescribed optional controls in the 
on-line survey. Full reviews as well as more limited scope checks were deemed essential, both 
those by in-house teams as well as those by independent inspectors.  The lack of independent 
reviewing seemed to be a particular point of concern for many respondents. 
Change management 
Part of the complexity of construction projects is because things are often changing, sometimes 
due to circumstances beyond the control of all the project stakeholders and sometimes caused by 
brief changes, design adjustments or incorrect work done on site.  Effective management of 
change was seen as essential, because, as details and methods change so do the hazards. 
‘Behaviours in project teams should change so that all proposed changes to a design for 
temporary works are properly checked and approved’. 
‘Clarity and agreement on how we manage changes to the work, and when the rules do not 
fit- ie the gap between work as imagined and work as performed’. 
Project management, procurement and resources 
The need for adequate resources, such as time and money were frequently cited as essential 
components in reducing major hazards. It was felt that project teams need to face the challenges 
of conflicting project priorities. 
‘Realistic timescales both at design stage and post contract award’. 
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‘Jobs should be slowed down as the rush of programmes and deadlines cause more 
problems and accidents than anything else’ 
‘More attention should be given to ensuring a realistic and therefore safer time window for 
all contractors working on a construction site’ 
‘Having competent, well resourced and managed staff that have the time to undertake the 
task they are being asked to do’. 
Site management and supervision 
Even if all the previous controls are in place, respondents argued that good site management and 
supervision was still required.  There was also considerable overlap here with the checking 
theme. 
‘Close supervision and genuine communication between supervisors/workers about the real 
risks involved and their consequences’. 
‘Clear direct supervision at ground level upwards’. 
Information and communication 
The on-line survey showed that communication was key to improving the effectiveness of 
controls.  But it was also emphasised that the information that was communicated and its 
management were also crucial.  Respondents argued that more advice was needed; access to the 
knowledge should be improved and we should ensure that we learn from our mistakes through 
feedback from real incidents and near misses1. 
‘Industry wide Lessons Learnt detailing previous incidents so we can all learn from them and 
avoid it happening on our projects’ 
This aspect was picked up in additional questions regarding SCOSS2 and CROSS3. Respondents 
were asked: “Are you aware of the work of SCOSS (Standing Committee on Structural Safety)?” 
and “Are you aware of the work of CROSS (Confidential Reporting on Structural Safety)?” 
(Figure 7.3).   
It was notable that a high proportion of respondents had no knowledge of either SCOSS (54%) or 
CROSS (62%) with only a small proportion having a detailed knowledge of either organisation.    
1 ‘Near miss’ should in the context of this report perhaps be ‘near hit’ or ‘near accident’.
2 SCOSS - the Standing Committee on Structural Safety - is an independent body established in 1976.  It is supported by the 
Institution of Civil Engineers, the Institution of Structural Engineers and the Health and Safety Executive to maintain a 
continuing review of building and civil engineering matters affecting the safety of structures. 
3. CROSS (Confidential Reporting on Structural Safety), a more formal system to obtain additional data on trends in failures 
(and potential failures) was launched in 2005.  In a similar vein to SCOSS, CROSS aims to improve structural safety and 
reduce failures by using confidential reports to highlight lessons that have been learnt, to generate feedback and to influence 
change
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Incident reporting is a central 
strategy for improving safety 
in the construction industry.
Incident reporting schemes are 
socio-technical systems and 
every such scheme is different 
in implementation and use. 
SCOSS and CROSS use 
reports on the concerns of 
engineers and others industry 
professionals for the benefit of 
the public and practitioners in 
the construction industry.
Figure 7.3. Recognition of the work of SCOSS and CROSS 
The lack of incident reporting systems, particularly the lack of definition regarding the scope and 
nature, is a major barrier to extrapolating meaningful data at a national level.  Without the 
recognition provided by reporting systems such as CROSS (see Glossary), hazard potentials can 
be overlooked. 
Legislation and codes 
The legislative framework was ranked as least important as a control factor.  However, generally, 
the need to be aware of and work to the appropriate codes and requirements was raised and there 
were a number of mentions of the role of the HSE.
‘Improve funding to HSE, more enforcement action required to ensure compliance with current 
Regulation’ 
‘Legislation to be made clearer although not in a prescriptive way as people won't think’. 
7.6 SUMMARY 
The Industry Survey was successful in attracting approximately 700 respondents. Although 350 
completions give an active response rate of 50%, which is reasonable, there are concerns about 
the groups with low response (client, insurance sector and operatives).  However the sample were 
well qualified in experience with a majority (55%) having more than 21 years experience in the 
industry.
In considering the results, it should be noted that role and length of experience were not of major 
significance; hence, results are mainly presented for the totality of respondents, although some 
differences are highlighted. 
The most significant factor in major hazard events was the failure to recognize hazardous 
scenarios and influencing events. Other important factors included: lack of site control, 
interface problems between the various parties, lack of checking and competent reviewing and a 
lack of designers’ involvement on site. 
Most of the factors considered were seen as having a significant impact, although there was 
somewhat less concern about: over-reliance on codes; underfunding; vandalism or malicious act; 
over-reliance on software analysis which cannot be easily verified – and legislative framework.  
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Client and operative response gave a higher average level of concern and insurance lower than 
average, but the size of sample for these groups is too small to rely on this result. 
The most effective control in reducing catastrophic events was having good people involved and 
available. Other significant controls were: deeply thinking as an individual and as a team about 
hazards; managed interfaces, communication and cooperation; adequate resources; and checking 
of detail on site.  Most of the controls considered were seen as having a significant part to play, 
although ‘legislative framework’ was seen as less effective than other controls. 
Although few respondents (3%) considered that the risk of major accidents was never considered, 
a high proportion (68%) said that they are only sometimes considered.  However, 72% of 
respondents said that people do try to eliminate hazards.   There was overwhelming support 
(93%) for the proposition that, where construction involves a major risk such as risk to lots of 
people, extra precautions should be taken.  
Whilst learning from incidents and the need for better communication was identified, it was 
notable that a high proportion of respondents had no knowledge of either SCOSS or CROSS and 
their work in collating and making such lessons available. 
The respondents’ view on causal factors for catastrophic events can be grouped as 
§ Client and procurement issues 
§ Overall management issues 
§ Design issues (permanent and temporary works) 
§ Checking and review issues 
§ Site management and worker issues 
Key control factors to prevent or reduce catastrophic events can be grouped under the following 
headings: 
§ People 
§ Interfaces, teamwork & coordination 
§ Hazard & risk management 
§ Design & pre-construction planning 
§ Checking and review 
§ Project management, procurement and resources 
§ Site management and supervision 
§ Information and communication 
§ Legislation and codes 
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8. 
8.1 
8.2 
Case Study Analysis
INTRODUCTION 
This section introduces the analysis of 62 case studies. It explores potential and actual 
catastrophic incidents using a case study method and examines the impact, key causative factors 
and control failures. The research instrument was based around 67 structured questions (two 
open-ended) which were completed in relation to each case study event.   
The analysis focused on critical factors, controls (regulated and management process), additional 
features (such as whether the work was innovative/complexity/unusual) and how these variables 
may have influenced the major hazard events or catastrophes encountered.  Typically this 
involved the analysis of the actions of individuals, the system of actions and communication 
interfaces between groups of people.  The individual cases studied were selected based on the 
availability of access to the levels of information to conduct a thorough assessment of particular 
incidents; particularly focusing on issues that were fundamental to risk and hazard understanding.   
This section presents the descriptive statistical findings along with more detailed content analysis 
of the 62 case studies.  The data forms a phase of the inquiry and considers the evidence gleaned 
from: a review of recent HSE reports; accounts of HSE investigators; firsthand accounts from 
project teams; and media archives. It complements the online survey (section 7) which evidenced 
individual perceptions of the construction industry, factors, controls and risk management in 
relation to major hazard events.   
CASE STUDY KEY POINTS 
Key points from the statistical data gathered from case studies were: 
The top five causative factors of major hazard events and catastrophes by rank order: 
§ Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios 
§ Lack of site control 
§ Shared ignorance 
§ Competence of Principal Contractors 
§ Communication and interface problems 
The top five control failures which were the most significant were:
§ Deeply thinking as an individual and as a team about hazards 
§ Having good people involved and available 
§ Managed interfaces, communication and cooperation 
§ Adequate resources 
§ Checking of detail on site 
Key emerging Issues by way of content analysis were: 
Major Hazard Potentials and Catastrophic events – The potential for major hazards and 
catastrophic events warrants conscious consideration as part of the safety risk management 
process. 
Multiple Causality– case studies point substantially to a multi-cause model, whereby several 
failures in the construction process contribute either directly or indirectly to the event.  Major 
accidents potential is increased within practice areas that are highly process dependent and reliant 
on numerous individuals and organisations (eg scaffolding, see below). As such this increased the 
propensity for error at any point in the process.  Conversely, inherently hazardous activities such 
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as tunnelling are less disparate; there are fewer interactions between organisations so there are 
fewer opportunities for multiple causes. 
Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios – There is a fundamental failure to recognise potential 
for a catastrophic event, due to the lack of competence of personnel (education, training and 
experience). This may be due to the lack of understanding that conjoint events (fairly minor 
triggers) may lead to major hazardous events (multiple causality) coupled with the low 
probabilities. There are implications at all levels of the industry (top down) from client, designers, 
Principal Contractors, Main Contractors, subcontractors and site personnel. Where there is 
ignorance about risk this is often shared throughout the project (shared ignorance).  
Lack of site control (reviewing and checking) – Risk could have been mitigated for if 
competent reviewing and checking procedures had been in place. The absence of specific 
regulations (in the construction industry) specifically drawing attention to the need to address the 
threat of catastrophic events influences a culture where there is a fundamental lack of checking 
and review procedures that could encourage the recognition and acceptance of hazardous 
scenarios.  
Complexity Communication and Interface – Where hazards had been identified prior to 
catastrophes, they were often not communicated to other disciplines or organisations within the 
projects. Construction projects cannot be considered as simple sequential processes and the case 
study projects featured complex processes operating in highly parallel systems. In recognising 
complexity, it is vital that effective communication and interfaces between disciplines are 
managed well.   
People Process Product Factors – The case studies indicate that no single focus on people, 
process or product will guarantee the identification and management of major hazards. Where 
events were seen as attributable to defective products, an underlying link was found in the 
management or processing of checking procedures and the action of people associated with 
various tasks. Having good people involved and available, having good processes for checking 
detail on site and checking the quality and use of products has the potential to eliminate major 
hazard risks. 
8.3 INTERROGATION OF CASE STUDIES 
Data were collected from several sources including: HSE reports, independent accident reviews, 
first hand individual accounts of incidents, accounts from HSE investigations; and media 
accounts from selected industry publications. The information was detailed using a case study 
interrogation document, which used a series of 67 structured questions to examine each case 
study in detail (Appendix 8.1). The questioning process assessed the general project details, the 
hazard event and underlying causes, technical issues and the effectiveness of regulation and 
control. A series of open ended questions were also used to capture any unique features of the 
incident. 
The broad range of questions included: 
§ Project details 
o Brief description of the project
§ What happened?
o Brief description events 
§ Is the actual technical reason for the problem known?
o Brief description technical reasons 
§ Are key underlying reasons known? 
o Brief description underlying reasons leading to the event 
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§ What impact did the triggers have to make this a potential or actual ‘major hazard’ 
scenario? 
§ What were the key causative factors?
§ What controls should have operated but didn’t? 
§ How much did any of the following failures influence the event?
o	 Client deficiencies; failure of the integrated design process; failure of the 
team; hazards and risks; failure to have experienced personnel; failure of 
site team; and late design changes 
§ What impact did the following have on the event?
o	 People, process and products 
8.4 CASE STUDIES BY PRACTICE AREAS AND GROUPS 
Of an initial outline of 120 incidents, enquiries were made for 87 case studies, of which 
meaningful scrutiny was given to 62.  These case studies were then grouped into five broad 
practice areas for further analysis (structural collapse of permanent structures; collapse of 
temporary works; cranes, mobile plant & equipment; sub-terrain activities; and fire).  Table 8.1 
shows the number of cases by practice area and group. 
Due to the disproportion of case study categories, no statistical significance could be assumed 
across the case study practice areas.  However, a simple measure of central tendency 
(mean/average) was calculated by assigning numerical values to “High”, “Medium”, “Low”, or 
“Zero” responses awarded to each question field in order to generate raw score data (High=3; 
Medium=2; Low=1; Zero=0 respectively).
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Table 8.1: Featured case studies and group frequencies 
Case Study Groups by Practice Area
Number of cases [N:62] 
By Area 
(n) 
Group Total 
(n) 
Structural collapse of permanent structures 14 
Bridges 3 
Buildings 4 
Structural collapse during demolition (including
refurbishment) 
7 
Collapse of temporary works 16 
Formwork, falsework, launch gantries, shoring, propping 6 
Scaffolding 10 
Cranes, mobile plant and equipment 9 
Tower cranes 7 
Free-standing cranes, piling rigs and other plant inc large 
MEWPs 
2 
Associated sub-terrain activities 16 
Tunnelling and groundwork’s 10 
Disruption of underground services 3 
Excavations and earthworks 3 
Fire 8 
8.4.1 Major Hazard Events by Practice Area and Group 
A calculation was made of all interrogation questions to determine the distribution and 
significance of events by practice area and group.  Table 8.2 shows the rank order by category 
and gives the raw score values for the number of causal factors1. It was identified that scaffolding
(n:10) had the greatest number of causal factors in relation to catastrophic events (ranking 
highest) with tower cranes having the lowest causative contributors. Interestingly, a comparison 
of scaffolding (rank 1) and tunnelling and groundwork (rank 10) which were practice areas with 
an equal number of case study assessments (10), revealed a significant difference in the amount 
of factors contributing to their relative events.  The greater number of factors does not equate to 
1 Questions were scored along a Likert scale (a psychometric scale) which is the most widely used scale in survey research. 
When responding to a Likert question item, respondents state their level of agreement to the specified statements (Appendix 
E).  In the calculations responses were awarded: High=3; Medium=2; Low=1; and Zero=0.  The score is the sum of responses 
divided by the number of respondents. 
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equate to the practice area being more hazardous, but suggests that the underlying causality was 
more complex.   
Table 8.2: Outline of case study groups, frequency, score and average values 
Case Study Category [N:62]
Causal 
Factors 
Total 
Score
Causal 
Factors 
Average 
Rank by 
number of 
causal 
factors 
Scaffolding 10 833 83 1 
Disruption of underground services 3 246 82 2 
Excavation 3 237 79 3 
Bridges 3 199 66 4 
Buildings 4 236 59 5 
Demolition 7 409 58 6 
Formwork/Falsework 6 340 57 7 
Fire 8 356 45= 8= 
Free standing cranes & equipment 2 90 45= 8= 
Tunnelling and groundworks 10 365 37 10 
Tower cranes 7 254 36 11 
Several cases involving scaffolding attributed problems to new scaffold systems.  The cases 
showed that, notwithstanding the advancements attained in scaffold fabrication, the control over 
scaffold execution using conventional tube-and-fitting techniques is highly process dependent 
and reliant on numerous individuals. As such this increased the propensity for error at any point 
in the process.  Conversely, hazardous activities such as groundwork and tunnelling reflected a 
greater emphasis on the task (i.e. the actual construction) as a major hazard. Sub-terrain activity 
was more prone to influence from the environment (adjacent buildings and infrastructure) and 
hazards arising from the environment (ground and or weather conditions).  Evidence from the 
case studies points to the activities themselves being hazardous, inducing varying degrees of 
ground movement, which caused damage to temporary work structures and/or equipment. An 
essential element to minimise possible detrimental effects in these cases was the ability to predict 
the ground settlement profile; as opposed to cases of scaffold activity which relied heavily on 
abilities to control and manage human processes; and communicate the controls to the different 
discipline groups. 
Examples outlining the complex array of the underlying causes of some incidents include: 
Case study example of Scaffold Collapse - During building work two sections of a scaffold 
loading bay tower approximately 20 meters in height collapsed. The loading bay tower collapsed 
as a pallet of building blocks weighing one tonne was loaded onto it.  The scaffold was a 3 bay 
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20metre high with a loading bay tower.  There was no design for the loading bay tower and the 
scaffold system was not fit for purpose.  The scaffolding was then overloaded.  There was 
insufficient plan bracing and the outer bay was carrying approximately 10 tons of concrete blocks 
immediately prior to the collapse.  The structure had been severely overloaded although a number 
of factors contributed to the final collapse.  The primary factors were failure to appreciate that 
such a structure would require to be designed; a failure to provide information on the safe loading 
for this structure; and, a failure to control the loading of material onto the structure. 
Case study exemplifying Tunnelling & Groundwork - An extension was being made to a city 
Metro system where the construction was in clay marl which the drawing indicated was “with 
sand lenses”. Above this level to the road was waterlogged gravel with a high level water-table.  
The tunnel construction was by the NATM method using spray concrete, with the tunnel diameter 
of 7m. An additional permanent lining would be put in place inside the NATM construction. The 
contract drawing clearly showed two things – (a) that the clay marl through which the tunnel was 
to be constructed did contain “Sand Lenses”, and (b) the contract drawing required a minimum of 
1.5m of this clay above the top of the construction profile.   
Miners onsite realised that the face being excavated was becoming increasingly unstable and it 
reached a point at which they had to leave the site. A collapse occurred at the ground level and a 
bus sank below the groundwater. One worker and three passengers were drowned.  
A technical committee found that the primary cause of the instability and subsequent collapse 
was the transfer of water above the construction works into the face of the tunnel construction.  
This was attributed to: 
§ Lack of risk management – no response when sand/water started to rush in - freezing 
would have been expensive of course…. 
§ Designed with low cover; contractor possibly took on the risk without talking about it.   
§ No good risk assessment by both designer and contractor. Must have been incompetent 
people involved to take the risks they did.   
Although case studies involving tower crane incidents had a wide range of identified causes, 
these incidents (tower cranes n: 7) ranked lowest of the identified groups in terms of the variety 
of linked causal factors contributing to the individual hazard event.  This suggests that each 
individual case studied had a limited number of causal factors.  
When considered at the grouped level (as Table 8.1), collapses to temporary works had the most 
causative factors along with sub-terrain activities as a whole. The areas of practice which fell 
under the structural collapse of permanent works were ranked third; with cranes and fire ranked 
lowest out of the groups.  Some outline findings are discussed below although the group and 
practice areas are investigated further later in this section in relation to the individual 
interrogation questions:
8.4.2 Structural collapse of permanent structures 
o	 Bridges: Interface problems were a significant factor in bridge failures and added to 
problems caused by lack of competent review (see Glossary). Thinking deeply as 
individual and as a team as well as better interface management would make significant 
improvements to the construction process.
o	 Buildings: Lack of robustness and failure to recognise root causes caused most 
problems here while better review of design would contribute towards safety on site.
o	 Structural collapse during demolition: Heightened danger led to increased 
recognition of the fact that the task itself was hazardous. Ignorance, error and failure to 
recognise hazardous scenarios and influencing factors caused most problems in this 
group.
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8.4.3 Collapse of temporary works 
o	 Formwork, falsework, bridge launching gantries, shoring, propping etc: Lack of 
site control and conscious risk taking seemed to be problems here.  While there was 
recognition of the dangerous nature of the task by those involved, it was found that 
independent review and checking of design within the team, certification of design and 
construction by an official organisation and better communication and cooperation 
would all have provided a more effective degree of control.  
o	 Scaffolding: Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios was the greatest risk here and 
played a part in all incidents involving all case study events. Ignorance, error and a 
lack of competent reviewing also played a significant role.  Failing to follow good 
practice was an important control failure in this category. Considering risks 
consciously, applying the CDM 2007 regulations and having the good people involved 
were sufficient controls.
8.4.4 Cranes, mobile plant and equipment 
o	 Tower cranes: Here there was recognition of a higher level of skill needed to properly 
execute the task. It was also important to consider the CDM 2007 regulations in more 
detail and ensure that the equipment is thoroughly examined by a competent person.
o	 Free-standing cranes, piling rigs and other plant, including large MEWPs: Here it 
was important that good practice and the CDM 2007 regulations were followed as 
closely as possible.  
8.4.5 Sub-terrain activities 
o	 Excavations and earthworks: The case studies revealed that the checking of 
calculations was of primary importance in reducing the risk of operations in this area.
o	 Tunnelling and groundwork: Interestingly, there was a certain level of risk that 
seemed ‘acceptable’ or, at least, did not seem to be able to be remedied as most causal 
factors were given a low rating.  The controls in place were likewise generally seen to 
be effective as few were seen as being able to have made a significant difference to the 
level of risk. This implies that the industry has a challenging risk profile; this 
conclusion requires further debate. 
8.4.6 Fire 
o	 Fire: Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios was the primary risk leading to fire 
incidents while underlying lack of robustness also caused problems.  Considering risks 
consciously would have the biggest impact on risk, while correct application of CDM 
2007 could have contributed significantly to safety.  
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8.5 	 WHAT MADE THE CASE STUDIES ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL
‘CATASTROPHIC EVENTS’ 
The individual cases were assessed to determine the impact of the events and how these 
contributed to making the incident a potential or actual ‘catastrophic event’ – i.e.  Why did 
interviewees think that these incidents were ‘catastrophic’? Table 8.3 shows the average score1 
for the 62 case studies; and Figure 8.1 shows the percentage of case studies to which each impact 
was attributed.   
The majority of case studies were seen to be catastrophic when the event involved multiple 
workers on site or the general public. It was also determined that when an event involved a 
potential impact on important infrastructure the incident would be elevated to ‘major hazard’ 
status.  These two factors scored significantly higher than the incidents that were considered to 
involve activities which are recognised as particularly hazardous such as demolition (ranked 3rd) 
and where cases were deemed to require higher levels of skills (ranked 4th). In 15% of cases it 
was seen that the impact of the event was due in particular to the job challenges.  Particular 
construction challenges due to difficult access, soil conditions or weather were considered to be 
of least impact when determining whether hazards were major or not; although in case studies 
involving tunnelling and groundwork these challenges were seen to be more apparent.  This is 
unsurprising as factors related to geotechnical conditions often cause of significant time and cost 
overruns on both large and small scale construction projects.  
Table 8.3: Average scores measuring impact of events 
H M L Z Score Average score
Clearly might affect a public road, railway, crowds of 
people etc 49 8 2 3 165 2.66 
Put at risk important infrastructure or working 
facilities 32 8 9 13 121 1.95 
Involved activities which are recognised as 
particularly hazardous (such as demolition) 30 3 12 15 108 1.74 
Clearly required higher levels of skill than normal 16 14 11 21 87 1.40 
Faced particular challenges such as difficult 
access/soils/water/weather 9 5 5 43 42 0.68 
1 Questions were scored along a Likert scale (a psychometric scale) which is the most widely used scale in survey research. 
When responding to a Likert question item, respondents specify their level of agreement to the specified statements (Appendix 
E).  In the calculations responses were awarded: High=3; Medium=2; Low=1; and Zero=0.  The score is the sum of responses 
divided by the number of respondents. 
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8.6 FACTORS AFFECTING CATASTROPHIC EVENTS IN CONSTRUCTION 
Case studies were assessed to determine the key causative factors of each event.  Table 8.4 and 
Figure 8.2 show the key scores1 from the case studies and the relative percentages attributed to 
the range of causal factors identified.   
Table 8.4 shows the rank order of factors.  Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios and 
influencing factors stands out as a major influence. In 85% of cases this factor was scored 
high as a contributor (Figure 8.2).   
1 Questions were scored along a Likert scale (a psychometric scale) which is the most widely used scale in survey research. 
When responding to a Likert question item, respondents specify their level of agreement to the specified statements (Appendix 
E).  In the calculations responses were awarded: High=3; Medium=2; Low=1; and Zero=0.  The score is the sum of responses 
divided by the number of respondents. 
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Table 8.4: Causative factors in case study events 
What were the key causative factors? H M L Z Score Averagevalue
Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios and influencing factors 156 6 1 6 163 2.63 
Ignorance, incompetence 114 20 6 8 140 2.26 
Lack of checking and of competent reviewing 117 6 0 20 123 1.98 
Underlying lack of robustness 99 12 3 20 114 1.84 
Error (by people who are competent) 90 22 1 20 113 1.82 
Lack of site control 84 18 5 20 107 1.73 
Interface problems 69 22 1 26 92 1.48 
Poor team-working 66 22 4 25 92 1.48 
Lack of experience 51 32 2 27 85 1.37 
Design process not effective, not coordinated 63 8 0 36 71 1.15 
Drawings not clear, hazards not apparent or highlighted 51 14 4 34 69 1.11 
People working in boxes, no-one clearly responsible for 
providing design overview 42 18 3 36 63 1.02 
Conscious risk-taking 30 10 12 35 52 0.84 
Ad hoc on-site changes to planned build procedures 45 0 3 44 48 0.77 
Design didn’t consider/explain how construction could be done 30 16 1 43 47 0.76 
Poor management of late changes in build procedures 33 8 2 44 43 0.69 
Over-complex procurement with unclear responsibilities 12 12 3 49 27 0.44 
Inappropriate maintenance and/or modification of a structure 9 8 6 49 23 0.37 
Poor management of late design changes 21 0 2 53 23 0.37 
Unreasonable time pressures 6 8 4 52 18 0.29 
Underfunding 12 4 1 55 17 0.27 
Criminality 6 6 0 57 12 0.19 
Over-reliance on codes 6 4 1 57 11 0.18 
Over-reliance on software analysis which cannot be easily verified 9 0 1 58 10 0.16 
Vandalism or malicious act 6 0 0 60 6 0.10 
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Figure 8.2: Responses to causative factor questions
8.6.1 Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios 
In 90% of case studies, failure to recognise hazardous scenarios was identified as a causative 
factor, 84% of which were considered to be of high significance to the event.  This featured most 
prominently in cases involving: cranes (both mobile and static); excavation; demolition; 
formwork and falsework; scaffolding; fire; and disruption of underground services.   
Case studies exemplifying failure to recognise a hazardous situation - This was evidenced in 
an excavation at street level for access to break down piles and install shutters for pile cap 
construction. As part of the process, cables were diverted (offset) in an open excavation by 
manually displacing them a specified distance out of the way from the proposed pile structure.  
The offset distance should have been based on the location of the pile cap but instead was based 
on the pile position.  Hence in the excavation for the pile cap there was insufficient work space.  
The cables were further forced back to allow working space. An explosion of the cables occurred 
which killed one of the workers in the excavation and could have killed more workers or members 
of the public.   
Moving services, particularly electricity cables, is common practice.  However, nobody on site 
recognised that the cable was already stretched to near breaking point and would not stretch 
further.
8.6.2 Ignorance / incompetence 
In almost 90% of cases ignorance and/or incompetence was identified as a causative factor ranked 
as of high significance in 60% of cases.  This was most significant amongst cases involving 
excavation, although it also featured highly amongst demolition, falsework, formwork and 
bridges.   
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Example of ‘ignorance and incompetence’
In terms of ignorance and incompetence, a particular case study example details where joiners 

were given responsibility for demolition work and had received no proper training.   

In addition to this, the case study identified: 

§ Poor weather conditions
§ No proper planning or design for the demolition work 
§ Lack of full supervision
§ Worker was not issued with full or proper instruction
§ No proper exclusion area which would contain material
As an outcome of this, a worker later walked into the cordoned-off demolition zone thinking this 
was part of the worksite and further believing that exclusions were for members of the public. As 
a consequence a worker was badly injured with possible permanent disabilities.   
Specifically, one of the emerging issues that emanates from the case studies is that of shared 
ignorance or ignorance shared among co-workers or between disciplines.  This shared ignorance 
may result from their misinterpretations of data specific to the project, changing work roles or 
inability to integrate different sets of on the job information into the specific task.  The ability to 
recognise the mistakes made by individuals and rectify them seems to flow through several of the 
cases studied. 
Case study exemplifying ‘shared ignorance’
This was evidenced in a case where a prohibition notice was served during a gas mains renewal 
works when HSE inspectors noted that there was a lack of adequate support during excavation 
works. It was adjudged that there were clear potential risks to road users and multi injury 
potential as plastic trench sheets were used with only two adjustable props to support the 
excavation mid span.  On investigation there was found to be:
§ No client or design level checks
§ No clear design process in place by the contractors  
§ Supervisors failed to provide suitable guidance to operators
§ Supervisors and site engineers failed to monitor and control the works
§ Lack of experienced engineers
The evidence drawn from several examples in the case studies suggests that when an individual or 
project stakeholder (designer, engineer etc.) is unaware of the ignorance they tend not to 
recognise the liabilities associated with the acquisition of knowledge as the failure evolves.  On 
one particular project the work was relatively routine and was not beyond the capabilities of 
competent professionals; however the issues of shared incompetence were raised as there was a 
marked failure to recognise obvious signs.  Both shared knowledge and shared ignorance (at 
individual, site and project levels) are representations of what exists and does not exist from past 
experiences (i.e. in shared memory).
8.6.3 Lack of checking and of competent reviewing 
The depth of the implementation of comprehensive reviews and checking procedures (process) 
was examined in the case studies with a view to making determinations of how these factors may 
have contributed to events. In the case studies, checking and reviewing covered a wide scope and 
related to: regulations, technical standards and specifications; design documents for construction 
drawings; structural safety; and safety in the public interest.  68% of all cases featured lack of 
checking and of competent reviewing as contributing to the range of causative factors.  These 
range of factors were extremely prominent in cases involving bridges, excavation, scaffolding and 
disruption of underground services; however they were also high in cases involving demolition, 
building, formwork and falsework, tower cranes and free standing cranes. In cases involving 
tunnelling, failures of checking and reviewing rarely featured and rarer still in cases involving 
fire. 
143

   
             
         
           
       
 
         
            
             
            
          
 
                
               
                  
              
            
  
 
                
                 
          
  
 
    
 
             
             
             
             
              
               
     
 
           
         
             
            
   
 
                
            
          
  
 
                
            
        
 
           
 
             
    
 
 
From this the research could assert that, by group, collapse of temporary works ranked highest of 
cases where lack of checking and of competent reviewing contributed to events.  Associated sub-
terrain activities was ranked 2nd and structural collapses of permanent structures was ranked 3rd; 
cranes and mobile equipment 4th; and fire 5th.
Case study exemplifying lack of checking and of competent reviewing
A case study example described events during the construction of a multi auditoria leisure 
complex.  The event involved the collapse of a false ceiling which was not adequately secured, 
causing 200 square metres of ceiling (which held the lights and the fire preventing sprinkler 
system) to collapse in one of the auditoria.
The heavy ceiling was suspended by drop rods fixed to a U section channel system attached to the 
underside of a composite steel deck and in-situ concrete slab.  The design was for each rod to be 
connected to a nut with a washer over a pre-formed hole in bottom of the channel. In practice the 
washers were too small; one (or more) pulled through its hole, initiating a progressive collapse of 
the whole ceiling. The design was considered “unworkable” which resulted in late design changes 
which were unauthorised. 
No one was inside the complex and so there were no injuries although the theatre had the capacity 
to hold 500 people; and the incident happened only days before the complex was due to open to 
the public.  During subsequent investigations there was no evidence of inspection or supervision 
of the installation. 
8.6.4 Underlying Lack of Robustness 
Robustness used in a structural context has a defined meaning.  BS EN 1991-1-7 provides one 
definition of robustness as “the ability of a structure to withstand events like fire, explosions, 
impact or the consequences of human error without being damaged to an extent disproportionate 
to the original cause”. In the case study examples “robustness” was indeed generally related to 
robustness as a property of structural systems (stability of structures) that may lead to physical 
failures. In 68% of cases, underlying lack of robustness was featured as a causative factor to the 
event, of which 53% where highly significant.   
However, it appears that many interviewees typically understood a broader interpretation of the 
term, especially where they were not from an engineering background.  Further examinations 
uncovered that interviewees used the term robustness to relate to the strength of different 
regulatory mechanisms and further still to the robustness of procedures, as a framework for 
management or planning process. 
A lack of structural robustness was most prominent in the group of tower crane cases although it 
also featured highly in cases relating to formwork and falsework, scaffolding and disruption of 
underground services.  Taken from case studies, examples of robustness as a measure of stability 
were given as: 
“All practicable steps had not been taken to prevent danger of collapse of the excavation and the 
excavation was not sufficiently supported to prevent danger and suitable steps had not been taken 
to prevent persons or vehicles falling into the excavation.” 
“Position of diverted cable not questioned or challenged – contractor self assurance.” 
“Several failures and under calculations made, which meant that the scaffold system was not tied 
adequately to the adjacent building.” 
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Conversely, in the following case study involving a luffing jib tower crane, robustness related to a 
system or process was raised: 
Example of a robustness issue
Cranes were being used in the construction of the building.  The cranes were tied to the building 
structure and were being extended, by climbing, as the structure increased in height. 
As the last tower section was being climbed into the tower of one of the cranes, the climbing 
frame collapsed with the crane top and three members of the erection team were killed as a result 
of the 120m fall. Debris from the crane was spread over a wide area although there were few 
members of the public in the vicinity. 
Although in this case study a definitive cause of the failure was not established, various potential 
contributory factors were found including: inadequate planning and not following manufacturer’s 
instructions.  The lack of robustness in question was given as “lack of effective planning; lack of 
adequate assessment at product design stage”.  These are issues that could be managed on the 
project if effective design and management processes are in place.   
8.6.5 Communication and Interface 
Assessed through the interrogation questions, 50% of all case studies featured interface problems
and managed interfaces, communication and cooperation between project stakeholders (client, 
designers, principle contractors, CDM-Coordinators, contractors, sub-contractors and workers) as 
a main contributor to case study events.  However on reviewing the qualitative commentary from 
the open-ended section of the interrogation sheets, the majority of cases had an aspect of interface
and communication which could be cited as an influencing factor.  The design and construction 
process needs to be integrated with several internal processes; it is also dependent on many 
external stakeholders and their specific activities and demands. In this environment, with short 
lead times and parallel processes, it is obvious that construction is a highly complex process. It is 
equally clear that the process is frequently an uncertain process.  Furthermore, the current trend 
towards outsourcing and subcontracting makes this process more complex in terms of design 
coordination and the construction process itself. Interfaces between the differing organisations 
and groups of stakeholders are crucial to this process.  The case studies uncovered several 
incidents where a communication and/or interface problem was cited amongst factors.   
It is widely accepted that the majority of cost associated with a project is determined during the 
early phases of the design process.  However, during these early phases, the designer may have 
limited knowledge regarding problems that will be encountered during the construction phase.  
Thus, the goal is to learn as much as possible about the evolving project as early as possible in the 
design process, as changes are least expensive during this stage. 
The basic decisions concerning stakeholders, requirements, functions and product concepts are 
made during the early phases of the development process.  Thus, a huge amount of information 
about the evolving project should be generated and must be shared, structured and communicated.  
It is important to share information between stakeholders about their requirements.  However, it is 
only beneficial if the information is used effectively: within the case studies this was not found to 
be a straightforward task.  The many challenges that were encountered involved getting people 
from different backgrounds and disciplines to produce and share a common view of the project 
and the varying risks and hazards. Interpretation of sometimes imprecise information was found 
to be a challenge for the design team, as too was the understanding of the clients’ true 
requirements and the particular in-situ challenges encountered by Principal Contractors. In 
addition, the requirements from different stakeholders were sometimes in conflict.  These 
requirements need to be negotiated and product concepts balanced in order to eliminate or 
mitigate any risks.   
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Case study example of Communication and Interface Problems
One particular case involved the partial collapse of a rubble retaining wall due to nearby 
excavation work.  During the excavation there was a plan to create a "toe" (that was to be 
installed) however the structural engineers decided the wall was being undermined in places 
because the foundations were not as good as first imagined.  There was a cracking on the road 
side which was of concern to the client and engineer, so they had started discussions by telephone 
regarding shoring of this part of the excavation.   
No sufficient risk assessment or method statement had been formulated. Information was not 
properly communicated to the relevant parties.  The interviewee stressed that the above should be 
undertaken under the direction of a suitably qualified structural engineer. 
The foundations of the wall were explored and they were deemed good enough not to sheet pile 
but, on uncovering the wall, it was discovered that the wall was undermined in areas and the plan 
to put in the toe was put in place.  The client representative and Principal Contractor had been in 
discussions about putting in shoring to this section because of concerns over the cracking on the 
roadside.  However, the site manager and contracts manager for the groundworks’ subcontractors 
were unaware of any talk of supports being required.. 
In this particular case, there was a marked failure by the Principal Contractor to communicate 
with the site manager and the contracts manager. 
In order to develop a well-balanced strategy, it is necessary to consider not only the client, but 
also all the other stakeholders throughout the project life cycle. In all reported cases, a holistic 
view was needed in order to manage all criteria, considering as many perspectives and interests as 
possible.  A common understanding for stakeholders must be developed, together with the 
requirements, functions and sub-systems of the project. In this particular case, these were found to 
be lacking. This had implications on subsequent decision making processes.  The interfaces 
between the client, designer and other groups were not clearly managed in order to balance the 
varied interests and the related functions.   
8.6.6 A Note on ‘Criminality’
It is interesting to note that through the case study investigations the issue of criminality and an 
associated item concerned with vandalism or malicious acts did not feature highly among 
responses, being ranked 22nd and 25th respectively.  However, on closer inspection, in half of the 
case studies there is mention of prosecution (by HSE), and in several cases where there is no 
explicit mention of an actual prosecution, it would be reasonable to assume that there would be 
implications for legal recourse (particularly where there had been a fatality). The HSE enforces 
health and safety legislation for most industry sectors in Great Britain and prosecutes both 
companies and individuals for breaches of health and safety law. Breaches of legislation on 
construction sites are legally enforceable and thus by definition can be considered to involve 
criminality. In this particular study the assumptions (when devising the interrogation instrument) 
was that criminality would be associated with conscious illegal activity such as arson, which 
accounts for the low ranking as there were few cases of illegality under this definition. 
8.7 CONTROL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CASE STUDY EVENTS 
The complexity and diversity of construction projects requires control systems to support 
management and workers within their roles and to increase the efficiency of decisions made at the 
expense of hazards affecting people (workers and the general public) and the environment.  The 
failure of any construction related controls was examined within the case studies by posing the 
interrogation question: “What controls should have operated but didn’t?” Table 8.5 and Figure 
8.3 display the descriptive statistical data gathered.    
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While score values1 did not determine that any of the featured controls failures was significantly 
high, thinking deeply individually and as a team about hazards, considering risks consciously, 
having good people involved and available (knowledgeable, trained, etc), following good practice 
for normal situations, applying CDM 2007 principles for risk management; and managed 
interfaces, communication and cooperation, featured prominently amongst this series of 
interrogations.   
Considering risk consciously had the highest overall percentage of 83% compared to thinking 
deeply individually and as a team about hazards which had 81%, the latter had 72% scoring as a 
“High” failure compared to the former which had 62%.    
Lowest amongst these interrogations were: adequate resources; management of late changes in 
build procedures; management of late design changes; and our legislative framework. 
8.7.1 Thinking Deeply as a Team 
There are many physical, organisational and interpersonal interfaces on most construction 
projects, requiring teams of individuals to combine and integrate their input.  Therefore it is 
important that mechanisms for effective communication between disciplines and teams are 
established so that risks and hazards can be indentified and addressed in a suitably ‘joined up’ 
manner. 
Thinking deeply and as a team about hazards was a prominent control failure in 71% of all cases, 
with 61% being at a high level.  Amongst this series of interrogations, areas that featured 
prominently were: bridges; demolition; excavation; and fire, with all cases within the group given 
a “High” in terms of control failures.  
Case study exemplifying failure to ‘Think Deeply as a Team’
Reports into the collapse of a bridge attributed the failure to two causes; the structural design by 
designers and an unusual method of erection by the contractors. On the day of the collapse there 
was a difference in camber of 11.4cm between two half girders at middle of the span which 
needed to be joined. It was proposed that the higher one be weighted down with 10 concrete 
blocks, each 8 tonnes, which were located on site.  The weight of these blocks caused the flange 
to buckle, which was a sign of structural failure.  The longitudinal joining of the half girders was 
partially complete when orders came through to remove the buckle. As the bolts were removed 
the bridge collapsed. 
There was no sudden onslaught of natural forces, no unexpected failure of new or untested 
material.  The reasons for the collapse were identified in the failures of the teams who designed 
and built the bridge which was considered to be of a new and highly sophisticated design.  The 
various companies who supplied the materials used were not shown to be in any way at fault.  
However, among those engaged in the design and construction there were mistakes, 
miscalculations, errors of judgement, failures in communication and general inefficiency. It was 
adjudged that to a greater or lesser extent, the designers and the contractors, engaged in the work 
were all at fault.
1 Questions were scored along a Likert scale (a psychometric scale) which is the most widely used scale in survey research. 
When responding to a Likert question item, respondents specify their level of agreement to the specified statements (Appendix 
E).  In the calculations responses were awarded: High=3; Medium=2; Low=1; and Zero=0.  The score is the sum of responses 
divided by the number of respondents. 
147

   
          
           
          
     
         
       
       
     
    
     
      
     
          
   
   
       
   
         
  
       
     
     
  
Table 8.5: Controls failures contributing to catastrophic events 
What controls should have operated but didn’t? H M L Z Score Averagevalue
Thinking deeply individually and as a team about hazards 135 8 1 12 144 2.32 
Considering risks consciously 114 16 5 10 135 2.18 
Having good people involved and available (knowledgeable, 
trained, etc) 108 24 0 14 132 2.13 
Following good practice for normal situations 117 8 2 16 127 2.05 
Applying CDM 2007 principles for risk management 114 6 3 17 123 1.98 
Managed interfaces, communication and cooperation 90 24 0 20 114 1.84 
Checking of concepts 57 20 4 29 81 1.31 
Checking of detail on site 69 8 3 32 80 1.29 
Adequate access to knowledge (esp.  records) 54 16 7 29 77 1.24 
Good management of information 54 16 4 32 74 1.19 
Independent review and checking of design within the team 57 12 3 34 72 1.16 
Checking of calculation 57 6 2 38 65 1.05 
Sensible programmes, well-managed 45 10 2 39 57 0.92 
Independent certification of design and construction by an 
official body 33 16 5 37 54 0.87 
Prevention of ad hoc on-site changes to planned build 
procedures 33 2 4 46 39 0.63 
Adequate resource 24 4 7 45 35 0.56 
Management of late changes in build procedures 24 6 4 47 34 0.55 
Management of late design changes 15 4 5 50 24 0.39 
Our legislative framework (if so, why?) 9 4 8 49 21 0.34 
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Figure 8.3: Failure of control systems contributing to catastrophic events 
8.7.2 Considering Risk Consciously 
The case studies highlighted that success on construction projects was enhanced when all 
involved on a projects were aware of the risks which existed and acted accordingly. Where 
individuals and organisations had planned for major hazards, the likelihood was that hazards 
would be eliminated or the risks mitigated.   
The research identifies that major hazard events are often considered to be a low probability even 
though the inevitable consequences are high.  On many of the case studies, risks were not 
mitigated in advance even when there were clear risk indicators.  82% of cases identified 
considering risk consciously as an issue.  Fire, excavation and disruption of underground services
featured prominently in these interrogations although demolition, scaffold, and 
formwork/falsework featured moderately.
Case study exemplifying Considering Risk Consciously – This comprised the construction of 
five new blocks of timber framed apartments and retail units but also refurbishment to existing 
buildings. A fire originated on two of the newly constructed buildings but spread to the 
refurbishment areas, completely destroying all new blocks and damaging all surrounding 
buildings.  Despite previous well publicised incidents involving timber framed buildings, the 
work programme appears to have ignored the high fire hazard. It is suspected that the fire was 
caused by the careless disposal of smoking materials in an area of highly flammable waste 
materials. Although this was considered to be the fault of operatives on site and their failure to 
consider the risk of fire, there were several flaws established in the overall consideration of risk 
by designers, Principal Contractor and other contractors.    
The risk of fire development (rapid spread) was not considered consciously as the designs should 
have incorporated a degree of fire containment by compartmentation.  Verbatim comments 
emphasised the following flaws: 
“Lack of compartmentation between completed stairwells and flammability of construction 

materials.” 

“Risk Assessment was in place - however, it proved to be neither suitable nor sufficient” 

“Lack of appreciation of the vulnerability of the building at that stage of construction and 

lack of control of ignition sources” 

This incident appears to highlight the need for recognition of the major hazards and proactive 
management in order to encourage risk reduction.   
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In the majority of these cases it was reported that individuals on construction projects only 
considered risks consciously when explicitly made aware of hazards.  These case studies also 
suggest that hazard identification and reduction occur far more often than hazard elimination; 
which involves informal engineering judgement where there are no specific instructions issued at 
the design stage. In this respect risk assessment becomes more of a formal “tick box exercise” 
although many individuals do not have the explicit competence to make informal risk assessments 
or to drive preventative measures forward.  
8.7.3 Having good people involved and available (knowledgeable, trained, etc.) 
In 78% of cases it was considered that having good people involved on the project and available 
at the time of construction was an important control for avoiding incidents.  This concerned the 
presence on site of knowledgeable, fully qualified, trained and competent individuals who could 
recognise and act upon any hazards (and their attendant risks) involved in the various construction 
practices.  The range of issues was considered most prominent in cases involving demolition,
scaffolding, excavation, and tower cranes. The most prominent issues amongst this range of cases 
were, lack of effective planning, including contingency planning, lack of qualified personnel on-
site, having inexperienced people involved and training of personnel to follow manufacturer’s 
instruction. 
These issues were found at a moderate level where cases involved formwork and falsework, free 
standing cranes, building work and tunnelling and groundwork; although they were indentified 
much less frequently in cases involving fire, disruption of underground services and bridges. 
Case study exemplifying having good people involved and available (knowledgeable, trained, 
etc) - During the construction of a school, two tower cranes had been erected on site.  A crew of 
three from the tower crane supplier were carrying out work on one of the tower cranes in 
preparation for dismantling, which was due to start on the following day. The erection supervisor 
had called in sick; however the contractor had no outlined contingency planning for sickness.  
Two experienced erectors were working on the front jib of the crane removing the trolley rope 
whilst a third untrained man was loosening the tower bolts.  This was achieved by slewing the 
counterweight of the crane over one side of the tower to compress the joint and make it easier to 
loosen the bolts.  Unfortunately the third man, instead of just reducing the preload in the bolts, 
undid the bolts until just two or three bolt threads were engaged with the nuts.  When the 
counterweight was slewed through 180º all the movement was taken by the remaining bolts.  
These failed through overload and the crane collapsed, striking the jib of the remaining tower 
crane. The two men on the front jib were killed, whilst the third man in the tower was injured.  
Fortunately the crane collapsed at a time when most of the site personnel were taking their 
morning tea break so there were no more casualties.   
There was also a lack of understanding by the third man (due to inexperience) and he had been 
ineffectively briefed as to the risks involved. In this particular case the main causes of the incident 
were considered to be a lack of contingency planning (having good people involved and 
available); and inadequate planning, inadequate training and supervision.  This case study 
suggests causal factors including the erection supervisor being off sick and the remainder of 
erection team left to get on with the job 
Examples in the case studies point to annual leave, sickness or leaving the site early.
Contingency plans should have existed to minimise the damage when problems do occur. A 
contingency plan can be formulated by consciously considering the hazards and their attendant 
risks which might have a negative impact on a construction project.  Scheduled annual leave or 
sickness of key personnel on-site primarily has the potential to impact construction operations 
either directly or indirectly and, as a result, influence the levels of risk. To compound this, 
resources may be further stretched as the absence may necessitate other personnel being called 
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away from their duties in order to provide cover.  The indirect impact is that the wider project is 
affected, resulting in reduced services or withdrawal of services for one or more periods 
throughout the project.  None of the case study examples appeared to have detailed contingency 
plans to maintain levels of qualified, trained and experienced personnel even when hazardous 
implications were scheduled to commence.   
8.8 	 ADDITIONAL FEATURES CONTRIBUTING TO CATASTROPHIC 
EVENTS 
Emerging features from case study events were examined using five closed questions (yes or no) 

which included: “Was there an SME 1issue here?”; “Does the event involve a chain of small 

things happening?”; “Does the event involve an innovative design or activity?”; “Does the event 

involve complexity?”; and “Does the event involve something unusual?”.   

While there were no immediate patterns discernable within case groups, the data as a whole 

yielded some interesting results (Figure 8.4): 

•	 59% of the time the event involved a chain of small things happening. 
•	 38% of events involved SMEs. 
•	 25% involved something unusual. 
•	 22% of events involved complexity. 
•	 6% of events involved an innovative design or process.  (This low score could be due to 
the higher level of planning involved in trying cutting edge techniques). 
Figure 8.4: Closed question to determine additional case study features 
Each practice area was assessed against the outlined additional features. Table 8.6 shows the 
frequency count for each feature; and Figure 8.4 shows these data expressed as a column chart.   
1 SME: Small or Medium Sized Enterprise 
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Table 8.6: Frequency counts for "Additional Feature" items 
Case Study 
Groups by Practice Area SME Chain Innovation Complexity Unusual
Structural 
collapse of 
permanent 
structures 
Bridges 0 2 1 2 1 
Buildings 3 1 0 2 1 
Structural Collapse 
During Demolition
(including
refurbishment) 
4 5 0 1 1 
Collapse Of 
Temporary 
Works 
Formwork, false work, 
launch gantries, shoring, 
propping 
3 5 1 2 2 
Scaffolding etc 10 9 1 1 4 
Cranes 
Tower cranes 0 3 0 0 0 
Free-standing cranes, 
piling rigs and other 
plant inc large MEWPs 
0 1 0 0 0 
Associated Sub-
terrain 
activities
Tunnelling and 
groundwork 
1 4 1 4 4 
Disruption of 
underground services 
1 0 0 0 2 
Excavations and 
earthworks
1 2 0 0 1 
Fire Fire 0 4 0 0 0 
8.8.1 Chain of small things causing the catastrophic event 
In official investigations, examination of the technical details of what failures occurred may tend 
to look for an overriding and singular root cause. The root cause may be equipment failure or the 
design and construction decisions that turned out to be inadequate.  However the case studies 
point substantially to a multi-cause model, whereby several failures in the construction process 
contribute either directly or indirectly to the event. Almost 60% of cases considered that the 
catastrophic event was caused by a series of smaller events and there was evidence in the 
remaining cases of a number of different failures that could be seen as contributory.
Case study example examining chain of small things
The case study event involved the collapse of a 30 metre scaffold system which was adjacent to 
an office block development.  The development was in a prominent city centre location and 
caused considerable disruption to a busy city centre.  The major cause of the event was put down 
to a failure to construct in accordance with design although this was found only to be a superficial 
fault.  The access scaffolding collapsed perpendicular to the building construction, leading to one 
fatality and several major injuries.  The initial failure caused the remainder of the access 
scaffolding to collapse causing collapse of the hoist tower and access platform. The initial 
collapse was the coincidence of several factors, including: use of non-standard equipment; 
overloading; and poor design of temporary structure.  Overloading had rendered the structure 
unstable.   
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The scaffold had not been adequately tied to the building structure and lacked a proper footing 
which subsequently compromised strength and stability.  This was compounded by the temporary 
removal of adjustment ties and deflection of the scaffold columns from the main structure by a 
“jacking out” procedure (as the scaffold had collapsed towards the main building).  Overloading 
was due to the loading of building blocks onto three separate lifts. There was a lack of 
compliance with the design drawings.  The specialist scaffolding subcontractor had not ensured 
that the design of the access scaffold (tie, height and pattern) had adhered to the recommended 
calculations (no completion or handover certificate). Under strict compliance, overloading would 
not have occurred if the main contractor had ensured that only two scaffold lifts be worked at any 
one time.  A further catalogue of failures included: 
§ Safety critical temporary works were not checked
§ Subcontractor did not ensure compliance with design specification 
§ Management sourced and purchased a new (different) scaffold system 
§ There were no adequate or detailed designs for the coupling of the system 
§ Inadequate software used to design system 
§ Lack of training by personnel on the new system 
§ Suppliers did not inspect the design 
§ Inexperienced site personnel (including graduate design engineer, site engineer; and 

inexperienced operatives) 

§ There were inadequate sole plates to scaffold standard split 
§ First line ties were at inadequate heights 
§ Inadequate tie positions 
§ The scaffold structure had bowed towards building and had then become further 

compromised by a jacking out procedure 

§ There was an un-braced loading tower 
§ Goods hoists were not properly tied to building 
§ There were too many lifts in consecutive operations (3) and there were excessive loads on 
the lifts 
§ There were no specific instructions for late design changes
It could be suggested that the main failure was in the procurement process, and design of the 
temporary works, however the incident could have been prevented if there were adequate 
checking procedures (design specification, software used in the design, the actual placement of 
ties to the scaffold structure, the number of lifts and overload specifications etc). It is important 
then to distinguish between direct causal failures and additional indirect failures. 
All the checking failures affected the safety of workers and the public.  The system required a 
higher level of competence than was displayed by engineers and the lack of knowledge of codes 
of practice relating to this equipment was a characteristic feature. As well as design of temporary 
works, procurement process and checking procedures, the case highlights the need for effective 
training systems where there is a new or innovative design or teams are working with new 
equipment.  The case also highlights the need for cooperation between parties on site. In this 
example there was little interface between permanent and temporary design operations.  
Relatively inexperienced graduate design and site engineers were left to bear responsibility for 
much of the work but there was no team or network to provide support, additional knowledge and 
experience despite knowledge of their inexperience, demonstrating a lack of corporate 
competence.  
In common with other case studies, opportunities to eliminate hazards and improve safety were 
missed at all levels.  The causes of failures were human error, including inadequate design checks, 
errors in design drawings, and poor communication. Although there were adequate product 
specifications and processes “Several contributing factors at various hierarchic levels” produced 
a causal chain involving lack of personal and corporate competence.    
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8.8.2 Small to Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), see Glossary, form a significant portion of the 
construction industry (and thus SMEs are of significant importance to the successful operation of 
the construction sector). As a result, it is inevitable that SMEs were involved in a significant 
portion of the case studies.  However, the research reported that SMEs were only seen to be 
explicitly mentioned as a factor in 38% of catastrophic events.  However, it was unclear whether 
respondents interpreted SMEs specifically as organisations of a certain size or more generically as 
sub- or sub-subcontractors. 
The main impact of SMEs were presented further down the supply chain (mainly sub- contractors 
and sub, sub-contractors etc.); where recommended processes had been by-passed; procedures had 
not been strictly adhered to; or where the smaller company had assumed or been given a large 
amount of project responsibility without having the necessary financial, managerial or technical 
resources to manage the associated risk.  This was particularly true of case study groups falling 
into the category of collapse of temporary works where thirteen such cases were found.   
Figure 8.5: Column Chart displaying frequency counts for additional features 
In particular, scaffolding was prominent with ten interrogated case studies, where all cases were 
deemed to have been influenced by an SME involvement.   
Although with far less magnitude, this was also true in case studies involving structural collapse 
of permanent structures where building and demolition was most prominent although there were 
no cases amongst the practice area of bridges. Issues were experienced on refurbishment or 
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maintenance of buildings, particularly where there were few onsite employees at any one time 
despite the possible complexity the work.   
8.8.3 Complexity and Innovation
Individually as assessment items, neither complexity nor innovation featured prominently 
amongst case studies. In only 20% of cases events were considered to have been affected by 
complexity. The very low occurrence of innovation issues (6%) was somewhat surprising, in that 
the research team expected this to be higher, but see Glossary for discussion. It may be that there 
was very little innovation involved with these projects, but it is more likely that designs and 
procedures that are considered to be innovative tend to attract more management effort and closer 
scrutiny throughout the project process; hence the risks are better managed (but not always).
However, most of the case studies point to complex interactions between the engineering 
disciplines and the complex nature of the construction process itself. The cases included physical 
interfaces between materials (i.e. steel, concrete, timber etc.) and social interfaces between 
management, design and construction.  The construction process is never associated with 
simplicity and, as the majority of construction projects are unique and individual, there will 
always be a degree of innovation involved. In practice however, much of the risk associated with 
complexity or innovation can be mitigated by the repetitive nature of construction activity and the 
incremental way in which innovations in technology or process can be refined and incorporated 
within standard practice, albeit at the risk of complacency.   
The rate of change in many aspects of design and construction has been very dramatic and may 
add issues of complexity into the delivery of designs. However, from the interrogation of case 
studies, as a general rule, any ‘game-changing’ innovations had been successfully integrated into 
the design and construction process.   
Complexity of the catastrophe itself could be linked to the views expressed that most of the events 
involved a chain of smaller events (see previous section). Also, an element of complexity seems 
to be linked to unusual or unforeseen events (see following section).  However, from the case 
studies two aspects of complexity emerged: person-focused complexity (complexity of human 
interaction) and complexity of the management process. 
8.8.4 Person-focused complexity (complexity of human interaction) 
Based on the size and scope of the case study projects, the large number of individual 
organisations involved at various stages caused some complexity. While the roles and 
responsibilities of some organisations or individuals were found to overlap, many tasks were 
interrelated and interdependent.  All featured projects required the involvement of various 
individuals, although on smaller scale projects (e.g. refurbishment or demolition) some 
individuals were engaged to perform multiple roles. In the rare event that a project is completely 
designed, developed, and managed by a single organisation, complexity of people issues should 
be vastly reduced.  However none of the case studies evidenced this and in all events complexity 
associated with interacting parties was found to be an underlying feature.   
8.8.5 Management of process complexity 
Generally, construction project management has a tendency to view the project as an ordered, 
simple and predictable process that may be divided into independently executed phases, activities, 
work packages, assignments and contracts.  The project is also seen as a mainly sequential, 
assembly-like, linear process which can be planned in a degree of detail through an adequate 
effort and executed in accordance with the plans. As a consequence, project management seeks to 
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impose a logical plan but the case studies demonstrated that this aim was often undermined by the 
complexity involved in the projects. .
Case study exemplifying Complexity of Management Process
A cofferdam method was used during excavation work necessary for the construction of a long 
culvert.  This effectively meant driving metal sheet piles into the ground to form a giant 
“shoebox,” allowing the interior to be excavated safely. The contractor decided to secure one end 
of the cofferdam with sandbag bunds to prevent flooding when the tide came in.  Subsequently the 
bund collapsed and two workmen almost drowned as they were trapped in the culvert when water 
flowed in.  The contractor admitted that they had failed to ensure the health and safety of 
employees who were constructing a culvert as the bunds were not built to the method statement 
specification. Issues included: 
• Insufficient management of hazards 
• Workers not briefed
• Not working to method statement
• Inadequate emergency procedures 
• Inadequate access/egress 
As a result of management staffing issues through holidays, sickness and change in staff, workers 
did not build the sandbag bunds as per the design on the method statement.  There was a failure to 
communicate sufficient method statement and emergency procedures to staff.
Construction projects cannot be considered as simple sequential processes and the case study 
projects featured complex processes operating in highly parallel systems.   The majority of project 
activities featured were not independents and were executed in sequences or even simultaneously 
without any effect on the overall results.  While it was often reported that the individual decision 
making (i.e. chosen methods of conducting activity) led to events, it was uncovered that there was 
no formal process description provided at higher management levels by the Principal Contractors.  
Coupled to this was the industry practice of not interfering across contractual boundaries with the 
way work was to be carried out. In this respect, trade contractors may have their own, different 
way of executing the job which was found not to be managed at higher levels nor communicated 
across the project. It was identified that often initial plans and schedules presented an idealised 
linear picture of what should take place, but not of what was actually taking place.  This links 
closely to interface issues raised earlier in this section. 
8.8.6 Unusual and unforeseen events 
22% of projects identified unusual aspects as playing a part in the catastrophic events.  Most of 
these were in tunnelling/ groundwork and scaffolding /formwork /falsework. These areas tend to 
be more likely to be affected by environmental issues (e.g. weather or ground conditions) which 
could be considered as unusual from time to time. 
Risk management has been an important tool to control safety-related risks.  However, while 
safety practices and preparations for limited emergencies were found to be common activities, in 
contrast, the vital task of planning for an unforeseen crisis was usually poorly handled.  For the 
majority of cases, construction activities were (to some degree) covered by some form of planning 
process.  For the most part (larger scale projects) the fundamental demand that safety is 
considered from first principles was evidenced. In many cases there was a suggestion that safety 
management and assessment tasks had been carried out and were defined as part of a formalised 
safety management plan.  However responsibilities within the organisation for the execution of 
the plan, the composition and responsibilities for safety review and audit were not clearly 
established: 
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Case Study exemplifying unusual and unforeseen events
The launching of a major new bridge over a railway line went well until it was time to lower 
the bridge onto its bearings. It was realised that the launched end was out of position and 
needed to be pulled across. This work was carried out by the site team, who had ‘done this 
sort of thing before’ and got on with the work with minimal documentation and review by 
others.  
Unfortunately they used temporary bearings which became unstable. The temporary 
bearings failed and the bridge dropped a short distance onto the abutments, shedding some 
concrete planks and a large volume of pooled rainwater onto the railway line. After several 
hours of disruption, the railway line returned to use. The decision had initially been made to 
attach the planks, but this decision was subsequently reversed. The temporary bearings 
failed because they were on a slope, two layers of PTFE were used and the resulting forces 
caused the bearings to be ejected; this issue might well have been spotted by an independent 
reviewer.
In the above example, the programme was influenced by unforeseen events and the response 
which ensued fundamentally influenced the safety management process.  Such influences in other 
case studies ranged from poor weather conditions (such as high winds) to unidentified historical 
features influencing events on site.   
Case Study exemplifying unusual and unforeseen events
One of the case studies referred to the construction of a tunnel under a built-up area.  During 
the project a large crater opened up. It was later suggested that an old well had collapsed 
underground after the tunnel had been constructed.  Local people said that the presence of 
wells had been known, although the project team had not discovered evidence of any wells 
while going through historical records. It was argued that the volume of the crater far 
exceeded the volume of any normal well although there were later suspicions that three 
wells may have historically existed around the area of the site.   
While it is impossible to plan for every unforeseen eventuality, managing processes in relation to 
risk and checking of site detail can minimise the negative effects of such events although this was 
not managed amongst the case studies which were examined.   
8.9 PEOPLE PRODUCT PROCESS 
From the questions concerning people, product and process, great importance was placed on the 
people (44%) and the process (44%) (See figure 8.6) while less emphasis was placed on specific 
product failures (12%).  However the discrete nature of the 3P’s as individually attributable to 
events is less than clear cut and the case studies show that the key to limiting risks on construction 
projects is to manage and maintain the proper relationships among people, process, and product.  
This requires the risk management process to control and coordinate routines and subroutines 
related to people and their use of products in parallel. 
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Figure 8.6: Pie chart displaying case study percentage for People, Process, Product 
Case study exemplifying People-Process-Product - During the construction of a building, a 
cantilevered section fell off during the erection which was immediately attributed to the failure of 
the temporary props (product). However, forensic examination of the case found that the threaded 
shore adaptors from the supplier were under-strength. It later emerged that the manufacture of the 
product had been subcontracted (process) but had not been checked by the main supply contractor 
despite earlier queries. When defects were realised, a recall process was not followed through. 
Fundamentally, the props should not have been in use although this was not identified.  But again 
site managers (people) and internal systems (processes) failed to follow through.  Defective props 
had been sprayed red. However, the main contractor, as a matter of procedure, sprayed their 
equipment red (process). Site checks on the products were insufficient (process) although the 
temporary works designers did not tell site personnel about the use of ‘special’ props (people).  
Therefore, in this case, what appeared to be a ‘product’ issue, actually turned out to be a complex 
interrelationship between a number of ‘people’, ‘process’ and ‘product’ failures. 
The case studies indicate that no single focus on people, product or process will guarantee 
success. In all cases where events were seen as attributable to defective products, an underlying 
link was found in the management or processing of checking procedures and the action of people 
associated with various tasks.  With respect to ‘people’ issues there was found to be a lack of 
constant or close application or effort or diligence towards risk possibly because “risk can too 
easily be accepted as a consequence of the construction process”.   
8.10 SUMMARY 
The underlying causes and other significant factors contributing to catastrophic event scenarios on 
62 case studies have been assessed using a structured interrogation approach.  The findings of 
descriptive statistical tests and content analysis have been presented to form the basis of further 
discussions.  There is an argument that major hazards should be considered in their own right and 
demand separate and considered attention due to their high consequence and impact.  The 
majority of case studies were seen to involve major hazards and catastrophic events particularly 
when the event involved multiple workers on site, the general public and/or disruption to services 
or adjacent infrastructure.  Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios and influencing factors stood 
out as a major influencing factor along with ignorance, incompetence and lack of checking and 
competent reviewing. Significantly, scaffolding has been highlighted as an area of practice where 
more causative factors have been seen to contribute to events although this did not always 
determine the nature or a higher level of impact.  
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The case studies also showed that there were several controls that could have been initiated to 
reduce risk; in particular, thinking deeply individually and as a team about hazards, considering 
risks consciously, having good people involved and available (knowledgeable, trained, etc.), 
following good practice for normal situations.  In all practice areas multiple causalities featured as 
contributing to events, although this was far less common amongst tower crane incidents.   
While people, process and products might be considered as separate issues, where defective 
products were encountered the management or processing of checking procedures and the action 
of people were directly linked as a triad.  Throughout the case studies the management of 
processes emerged as a significant consideration, particularly in respect of interfaces between 
disciplines and communication.   
The case studies highlight the complex processes that operate within multiple interacting systems.  
There is a paradox between the need for highly advanced technical machinery and the need for 
physical human resource.  The result of this unique predicament is that preferences, choices of 
machinery and technology must be balanced against human behaviour which may be 
unpredictable. In addition the industry is becoming more complex and multifaceted particularly 
procurement processes and the subsequent interface problems this creates between the various 
construction disciplines.  Many management (process) decisions are difficult because they are 
multi-faceted, involve large uncertainty and have important consequences such as impact on 
quality of outputs, safety of individuals and on allocation of limited resources.   
However, while the case study findings add clarity to the understanding of catastrophic events, 
and provide the basis for further industry consultation, they should not be considered 
independently. The case study findings are consolidated with data gathered from the on-line 
survey and considered along with related literature and information gathered from the industry 
consultation exercises in the following section.  
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9. Consultation 
9.1 CONSULTATION ACTIVITY
9.1.1 Introduction 
This component of the research consisted of meetings with individual industrial contacts to 
obtain detailed, and confidential, information about individual and institutional experiences of 
major hazards and catastrophic events in construction. A wide range of individuals were 
consulted throughout the research including members of the Project Steering Group. It is 
therefore worth acknowledging that the views presented in this section of the report are the 
views of the consultees and that they do not necessarily represent the views of the authors of this 
report or the HSE. 
This consultation consisted of 98 individual interviews, discussions and conversations conducted 
by the research team between October 2009 and April 2010. People in the following areas were 
consulted:
§ The HSE 
§ Building Control Profession 
§ Construction work: UK Contractors Group, Specialist Engineering Contractors' Group, 
Construction Products Association
§ Consultants: Construction Industry Council, Royal Institution of British Architects, 
Institution of Civil Engineers, Association of Project Safety, Institution of Structural 
Engineers, Designers Initiative on Health and Safety, Consultants Health and Safety 
Forum, Royal Academy of Engineers 
§ Tunnelling: British Tunnelling Society 
§ Piling: Federation of Piling Specialists 
§ Scaffolding:, National Access and Scaffolding Confederation
§ Fire: Association of Chief Fire Officers, Institute of Fire Engineers, Fire Protection 
Association, Building Research Establishment 
§ Insurance: the Association of British Insurers, Construction Industry Risk Engineering 
Group 
§ Temporary works designers 
§ Timber: UK Timber Frame Association 
§ Groundworkers 
§ Network Rail, Highways Agency, TfL, LUL, BT, RSSB, ODA
§ Achieving Excellence 
§ SCOSS (Standing Committee on Structural Safety) and CROSS (Confidential Reporting 
on Structural Safety).  
In addition, three formal events were held, as follows:
§ Two CIRIA CPN (Construction Productivity Network) events during January 2010, in 
London and Manchester 
§ A workshop in London during April 2010 
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9.1.2 Events 
The two CPN events were run to the same format; three presentations followed by discussion. 
The presentations were as follows:
§ Dr Allan Mann of Jacobs examining a series of failures and emphasizing the need for 
constant vigilance if tragedies are to be avoided 
§ John Hodgson of Balfour Beatty explaining how a late change to jacking procedures 
caused problems during erection of a bridge in London 
§ Dr Charles Bradley of DBA Risk Management outlining the way safety risks are 
managed in the petrochemical industry, under the COMAH legislation 
During the discussions a lack of confidence became apparent in some people about how to 
manage safety risks (a number of these concerns were reiterated during the on-line industry 
survey). 
The follow-up workshop meeting was designed to test particular issues. Delegates used 
electronic voting buttons to record their opinions in a confidential manner. The majority of the 
delegates were senior safety managers in large companies. The votes that were recorded during 
the workshop lead to the following views:
§ There was strong support for the proposition that catastrophic event thinking is relevant 
to the construction industry 
§ Confidence in risk management skills tends to be reduced further down the construction 
supply chain, with extremely low confidence in the skill of small subcontractors 
§ Confidence in the safety risk management skills of designers was also poor 
§ It was considered that the education in safety risk management provided (both at 
universities and at other educational establishments offering HND, BTec and NVQs)
should be improved 
§ There were no strong views about whether or not people are well-trained by the time they 
have responsibility for safety risk management; no-one strongly agreed that people were 
well-trained 
§ There was a wide range of views about whether our safety risk management systems 
work well or not, in a general sense and when catastrophic events were considered, there 
was no strong support and considerable disquiet about whether they work well 
§ The question of whether designers had taken on board the concept of hazard elimination 
was polled and there was a strong bias against, with no-one strongly agreeing that they 
have understood and applied the concept 
§ We also asked whether, as an industry, our reporting and learning from events works well 
– being fast and effective - people thought not and the restraint of legal concerns and 
processes was mentioned 
§ On the question of whether modern procurement typically strips away too much 
independent comment at site, there was a range of views, with a third of delegates 
expressing concern 
§ There was strong support from the proposition that subcontractor safety depends on the 
efforts of the Principal Contractor 
§ When asked what the key was to ensuring a successful project, choosing from a selection 
of possible issues, there was overwhelming support for the need for a client to appoint a 
competent team and using a procuring process which facilitates effective communication 
and cooperation 
§ The delegates were asked to choose from a selection of possible features contributing to 
catastrophic events – over half chose ‘a chain of small things happening’ with some 
support for ‘lack of resources by SME’, ‘complexity’, and ‘unusual work or events on 
site’ and little support for ‘innovative design or activity’ 
§ The delegates were asked to choose from a selection of possible features contributing to 
the performance of subcontractors, and again ‘effective communication with the 
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Principal Contractor’ was strongly supported, with some support for ’good experience, 
training and education’, for ‘effective scheduling, control and management’ and 
‘competent reviewing and checking’ – but little support for ‘good design processes and 
activities’
§ The delegates were asked to choose from a selection of possible triggers of major hazards 
in construction and ‘failure in the design process’ and ‘individual operatives and failings 
in their supervision’ were each strongly supported’, with clients not carrying out their 
CDM duties’, ‘failings in products’ and ‘failings in the legislative framework’ each 
receiving little or no support.  
Although the replies from the last four questions were not entirely consistent, the messages were 
clear and it has to be borne in mind that whereas all the choices available might be relevant, only 
one option could be selected by each delegate.  
There was then a period of discussion and the following points were noted:
§ There was agreement that the more competent people who had sight of a situation, the 
more likely it was that one of them could notice a fatal flaw 
§ There was concern that the underlying causes of events were not being uncovered and 
there was also concern that the industry is failing to learn from experience due to 
concerns about liability and protracted legal action.  
9.2 INDUSTRY SECTOR EXPERIENCE OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 
9.2.1 Introduction 
The sampling of experience which has been undertaken through consultation and case studies is 
not comprehensive because there is no complete, authoritative database of events. However, 
during the research advice was received on the issues in various aspects of construction which is 
recorded here for information and discussion.  
9.2.2 Failure of permanent structures 
It was considered that permanent works may fail due to either: 
§ inherent deficiencies (which might anyway be evidenced later, in service) or due to 
§ conditions which exist as a transitional phase during construction, but not subsequently, 
and which affect their strength or stability
Because of the wide variety of types of structure, there is little commonality – but the failures are 
generally due to a known weakness which has not been recognised or adequately addressed, on a 
particular project.  
Once new phenomena are recognised, appropriate precautions are normally written into design 
codes and/or industry guidance, but some complex situations (such as those involving complex 
ground conditions or fatigue of moving parts etc) will always remain to be dealt with as they 
arise. 
Indication was found of a generally good standard of performance, possibly because most 
structures are currently designed by or under the supervision of chartered engineers and the 
techniques used for construction are generally repetitive and well understood.  
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However, the level of risk is deemed to be high and growing concerns were aired by the 
consultees about: 
§ the move towards design of parts without overall control by a named person 
§ use of computers divorcing designers from a real understanding of structural action
§ complexity of modern design codes 
§ lack of full design of some temporary works structures
Failure of bridges during construction is thankfully also rare, but where it had occurred it was 
considered that there were particular mistakes made which were not spotted by those involved. 
The need for independent review appears particularly strong here as does the need for strong 
management of risk when there are late changes of plan or unexpected behaviour is noted.   
9.2.3 Collapse during demolition 
Demolition was considered by the consultees to be inherently dangerous. Although most planned 
demolition is carried out in a safe manner there are nonetheless many unplanned collapses, 
particularly during partial demolition for refurbishment and adaptation. Because the collapses are 
unplanned, workers (and in some cases other people) in or next to a building when it collapses 
may be killed or injured.  
It was perceived by the consultees that many of these events tend to involve smaller, 
inexperienced clients operating on the fringes of competence and legality, with some of the 
clients are also acting as designers and/or contractors.  
9.2.4	 Temporary works – general comments 
Various aspects of temporary works were considered and they form a disparate group. However, 
similarities were found and are grouped here as follows:
§ Temporary works such as formwork, falsework, launching gantries, shoring and propping 
§ Temporary works for excavations and groundworks 
§ Temporary works – scaffolding 
§ Construction plant and equipment including tower cranes, free-standing cranes, piling 
rigs and MEWPS (mobile elevated working platforms) 
The last category (construction plant and equipment) is not normally considered to be temporary 
works per se but there are interfaces with the construction which require design consideration 
(such as temporary foundations, hardstandings, tie-backs, construction sequencing etc) which 
need to dealt with as part of temporary works.
9.2.5	 Failure of temporary works, formwork, falsework, launching gantries, 

shoring, and propping

After the failure of a complete bridge falsework system (which buckled and collapsed during 
concreting) at Loddon in 1972, the Bragg Report recommended improvements in practice and a 
new British Standard for falsework (BS5975) was later prepared. During consultation, concern 
was expressed that the high standards required are not necessarily being met, due to financial 
constraints. In particular, the appointment of a Temporary Works Coordinator with time to 
manage all aspects of temporary works and to visit site sufficiently frequently appears (from 
comments made during consultation) to be difficult, particularly on smaller projects.  
It was felt that there is scope for major hazard events involving temporary works in many 
projects and the planning, design and execution of these works involves skills which many 
engineers do not have. There are specialists in this area; traditionally in the UK they have not 
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cooperated in developing their knowledge and skills but there is currently an initiative to 
promote improved standards, called the Temporary Works Forum. The intent of this Forum is to 
offer authoritative advice and guidance on all aspects of temporary works.  
9.2.6 Failure of tower cranes
Tower cranes are a vital element in the construction process. During consultation it was said that 
there are around 1500 cranes in the UK and at any time around 1000 are in use. Whilst some 
major contractors own their own tower cranes, the majority are hired by contractors from tower 
crane hire companies. 
Tower cranes are often in use on construction sites in urban areas and, although rare, any 
collapse of the crane could well result in death or serious injury to members of the public outside 
the boundaries of the site as well as personnel working inside the site. The collapse of tower 
cranes also presents a risk to adjacent railways and roads. A number of tower crane collapses 
have occurred in the UK in the last ten years, resulting in eight fatalities, one being a member of 
the public. Fortunately the UK has not experienced incidents such as the tower crane collapse in 
Zibo City, China, in 2008, where a tower crane collapsed onto a kindergarten and 5 children 
were killed. This is not to say that a similar event could not happen in the UK. 
Since the collapse of a tower crane at Canary Wharf in May 2000 the industry, including the 
Plant Safety Group of the Strategic Forum for Construction, in conjunction with the Health and 
Safety Executive, has analysed the causes of these incidents and produced a significant body of 
best practice guidance on the erection, maintenance and use of tower cranes and established 
training course and qualifications for tower crane erection, maintenance and operating personnel. 
This has included a full revision and expansion of BS 7121-5, Code of practice for the safe use 
of cranes – Tower cranes. HSE have also carried out an ongoing programme of visits to 
suppliers and users of tower cranes to ensure that best practice guidance is being adopted and 
implemented. 
9.2.7 Failure of free-standing cranes, piling rigs, MEWPs etc 
Use of free-standing equipment is in many respects similar to tower cranes, but there is much 
greater scope for failure due to local ground conditions or hidden/weak structures or due to 
operator error, due to the mobile nature of the operations.  
Again similarly there was a view from the consultees that the lack of a catastrophic event in the 
UK in recent years was almost certainly simply a matter of luck. 
There have been many accidents and ‘product’ (ie the plant) may often be wholly or partly to 
blame. Recent tower crane collapses in particular have caused concern. It is certain that 
manufacturers do try to design out hazards once they have been demonstrated by an event, but it 
is not clear to what extent the problems are actively anticipated and designed out before an 
incident. Certainly the work of crane erectors requires a high level of skill and application, which 
when it falls short can have devastating consequences, as events have demonstrated. 
There have also been failures due to operation outside the limits set by manufacturers and also 
due to loss of support arising from a defective working surface or weak covers to underground 
services. Planning of the work to ensure that these issues are properly dealt with is a crucial 
activity and working outside the processes developed for safe work, for example in response to 
an unexpected problem, has to be carefully managed. 
164 

 
   
 
               
  
           
             
    
             
             
         
           
           
        
           
         
 
              
             
 
               
               
               
              
             
     
 
        
 
             
              
           
 
           
             
           
   
 
              
         
 
              
                
     
 
             
              
            
 
 
9.2.8 Failure of scaffolding 
Scaffolding collapses into a street were considered to be the prime concern – triggered by for 
example:
§ Wind loading, particularly where a scaffold is inadequately tied back to an existing 
structure 
§ Overloading with material, either during erection of facades etc or during striking of part 
of a scaffold
§ Vehicle impact; there appear to be minimal standards laid down that require physical 
impact protection or traffic calming etc and the scaffold design rarely appears to exhibit 
sufficient redundancy so that columns can be removed without collapse.   
The HSE has advised that scaffolding collapses which could have catastrophic consequences 
happen regularly and often involve smaller companies working with little control from the 
Principal Contractor. The leading industry body, the National Access and Scaffolding 
Confederation (NASC) has prepared solid guidance but the consultees believed that the problem 
is probably generally with those companies who do not engage.  
There are of course also occasions when there is simply a mistake, which could perhaps have 
been (and often is) spotted by a visit to site of a competent person. 
There appears to be scope for tightening up procedures and practice to reduce these risks; lack of 
a catastrophic event in the UK in recent years is simply a matter of luck. As scaffolding 
companies will invariably work under the control of a PC (Principal Contractor) or – for smaller 
projects – Main Contractor, it appears that if the PC takes care that the scaffolding company is 
competent and aware of the regulations and relevant NASC guidance and operates in a 
competent manner, risks will inevitably be reduced. 
9.2.9 Failure of tunnels and groundworks 
Tunnelling was considered as being inherently dangerous because of the nature of the activities, 
the variability of the ground and issues arising from working in a confined space which may 
become dangerous in various ways. Groundworks are likewise inherently dangerous, for similar 
reasons.  
Whilst knowledge and equipment is constantly improving, it is apparent from consultation (and 
case studies) that high quality risk management is essential at all times. The tunnelling industry 
in particular has sought to improve communication and activity by fostering closer working 
between designers and contractors.  
The most notable catastrophic event in the UK in recent years was the Heathrow collapse, where 
massive economic loss was fortunately not accompanied by loss of life.  
Those involved in tunnelling and deeper excavations are in general expert in what they do. They 
are invariably aware of the risks which need to be managed, but the hazards are ever present and 
have to be taken very seriously.  
There have nevertheless been many tunnelling incidents which caused or could have caused a 
catastrophe. There was a view from the consultees that some of these incidents were due to 
obvious mistakes, particularly where the risks inherent in the NATM tunnelling method were not 
rigorously managed.  
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The UK tunnelling industry appears to work on the issues continuously and insurers take an 
interest due to the high claims involved and a joint guide has been prepared1. 
The management of risk once an activity starts to deviate from the expected has been discussed 
in the literature2 and the need for Ownership Leadership and Partnership identified (Martin 
Thurgood, private correspondence). The case studies support the need for rigorous study of 
potential catastrophic events, independent review (see Glossary), contingency planning, training, 
avoidance of excessive commercial pressure etc. However, anecdotally procurement still tends 
often to focus upon risk shedding and lowest apparent cost.  
The use of the Observational Method to manage risk in tunnelling and groundworks (as 
mentioned in 2.9 above) is a technique in which risks are closely managed on a continuous basis 
in support of the design and construction strategy (as opposed to being a simple monitoring 
process, albeit with ‘stop’ limits). Remedial actions are prepared for and then put into play as 
soon as they are required. The role of the client is central to this.  
Compared to the problems of deep excavation, there was a view that temporary works for 
general excavations and groundworks should pose little difficulty, but unusual situations arise 
and there is often commercial pressure to leave excavated faced unsupported if they ‘appear’ 
safe. The consultees felt that potentially catastrophic scenarios can also be posed, as some case 
studies showed, by issues such as undermining adjacent foundations, if there is inadequate 
communication, planning and control of the work.
9.2.10 Fire 
Fire risks need to be considered in two ways: risk of a fire starting and what happens if a fire 

does start.  

Safety risk assessment for fires will need to include consideration of: 

§ Use of flammable material 
§ Potential sources of ignition 
§ Risks of rapid fire spread and loss of control 
§ Compartmentation 
§ Ease of escape 
§ Ease of fire fighting (access, reach etc) 
§ Risk to adjacent properties and their inhabitants 

Fires during construction mainly start from:

§ Vandalism or careless smoking etc 
§ Hot work getting out of control 
§ Electrical fault 

Once a fire has started the issues are:

§ Detection 
§ Fire fighting (workers)
§ Escape of workers and others (alarms, escape routes protection)
§ Reduction of intensity of fire (choice of materials, fire load, 
stores/rubbish/waste/housekeeping, fire suppression etc) 
§ Reduction of area of fire
§ Effect upon adjacent properties 
§ Release of poisonous gases and particles 
§ Fire fighting (Fire Brigade) 
§ Rapid access to reliable information for the fire brigade about hazards, particularly 
storage of gas cylinders.  
1 The joint code of practice for risk management of tunnel works in the UK, 2003, Pub. The British Tunnelling Society 
2 The report after Heathrow, Safety in New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) tunnels, 1996, HSE 
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Under CDM 2007 (together with, in some aspects of construction, the Regulatory Reform (Fire 
Safety) Order 2005 or ‘RRO’) these matters should be considered by the Principal Contractor in 
a Risk Assessment which needs to continuously updated and used as a management tool on site. 
There was concern from consultees that this is not being done well on some sites.  
Fires during construction have in recent decades caused some loss of life and property but in 
recent years fires on new-build sites using timber frames have experienced a greater level of 
economic loss and the size and severity of the fires have alerted the industry to the risk of 
multiple loss of life of fire-fighters, workers and/or others in the building (particularly where 
there is phased handover) or in adjacent buildings. The consultees felt that dormant sites appear 
to be particularly at risk but all sites are at some risk, particularly when unattended.   
Designers should (under CDM 2007) be considering hazards such as fire, during construction 
and in-use and during maintenance, adaptation, refurbishment and demolition. Bearing in mind 
the risks during new-build construction referred to above and the risks of fire-spread through 
breaches in fire protection arising from error or later damage, it is surprising that designers have 
not (generally) taken steps to eliminate the hazard or to reduce the risks considerably. An 
appropriate response in some circumstances might be to choose a different form of construction, 
taking everything into account. 
The insurance industry has become increasingly concerned about construction-phase losses in 
structures using timber framing. Losses during construction can be major because 
compartmentation may not yet have been installed and fire fighting systems may be lacking. The 
causes of fires appear to mainly involve arson, accidents during hot work or smoking. 
Arrangements for fire service contact with new projects appear to vary and it has been suggested 
that it should be an explicit requirement that projects with timber frame construction should be 
notified to the Fire and Rescue Service.  
The response of the contracting and specialist supplier parts of the industry to this catastrophic 
event risk – which can hardly be a surprise – appears to have been slow. However, the industry 
has now prepared guidance1 and the HSE is also updating existing guidance2. There is debate 
about the adequacy of the response as a whole, so far, in the light of fires still being experienced. 
In particular, designers, specifiers and CDM-coordinators may have been insufficiently involved 
in managing this safety risk, although the APS (Association for Project Safety) have recently 
issued guidance3 discussing the issues.  
This is an example of an issue which needed to be actively and rapidly addressed.  
9.2.11 Damage to existing underground services 
The New Roads & Street Works Act 1991 replaced the Public Utility Street Works Act 
(PUSWA) 1950 and came into force on 1 January 1993. Its purpose was to put the duty on Street 
Authorities in an attempt to co-ordinate all works in the highway and for all those wanting to 
carry out road work to co-operate in this process. The main objectives of the co-ordination are 
to: 
o	 ensure safety
o	 minimise inconvenience to people using the highway, with a specific reference to people 
with a disability
o	 protect the structure of the highway and apparatus in it 
1 16 Steps to Fire Safety on Timber Frame Construction Sites prepared by the UK Timber Frame Association (UKTFA) 2008 
2 Guidance on fire safety on construction sites, HSG 168. 
3 Article in Practice Note 2/10, APS, April 2010 
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Access to information about existing services (in streets or elsewhere) on a given piece of land 
appears not to be a seamless exercise, necessitating approaches to large numbers of bodies. 
Once information is available, there are many issues, including:
§ information is often not accurate 
§ surveying errors 
§ services installed incorrectly, at varying depth, have spurs which protrude, have their 
marking omitted etc
§ use of plastic pipe without a trace-wire system
The consultation exercise suggests that these issues are well understood by the construction 
industry, particularly where electricity is concerned, although the potential consequences of 
disrupting a major pipeline are not necessarily so well understood.  
This is an area of risk which appeared to have received scant attention and which involved a 
wide range of poorly documented risks on a day-to-day basis, such as: 
§ Cutting into or otherwise disturbing electric cables  
§ Disrupting pipes, some of which carry combustible gases or liquids, often under high 
pressure 
§ Disrupting fibre-optic cables carrying enormous volumes of data traffic 
§ Penetrating or damaging tunnels, including metro tunnels and service tunnels.  
The problems arose through a series of difficulties:
§ Not making the correct enquiries about underground services, as there is no central 
record and a vital enquiry may be omitted
§ Services not being accurately mapped 
§ Services not being declared, for security reasons 
§ Difficulty in locating services (for example plastic pipes)
§ Poor working practices 
§ Inadequate response to the unexpected, often due to time/money pressures 
The UK Contractors Group is known to be active in developing solutions.  
It appeared that this is a construction industry issue where an acceleration of activity is 
required to find solutions, with industry-wide participation. 
9. 3 Summary 
The consultation revealed many issues of concern as discussed above. The key message received 
was that the potential for catastrophic events is (as a concept) appreciated and that there are 
many ways that the industry could improve its safety risk management performance.  
The key issue of competence and the need to build cooperation and communication to overcome 
the complexities of the industry were appreciated. Safety risk management skills clearly need to 
be built up through education and training and in-company procedures will often need to be 
improved, based on experience gained so far.
The importance of the role of the Principal Contractor (or for smaller projects of the Main 
Contractor) was appreciated.  
It was suggested that the chances of failing to get designs right, for the permanent condition and 
for the temporary condition during erection, would be decreased if a named person was 
responsible and the role of independent review (see Glossary ‘checking and review’) was also 
supported.  
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There was concern that the industry does not always learn from and respond quickly to problems 
experienced. Much of the work undertaken in response to issues of concern was carried out by a 
large number of organisations and it appeared that their central role might be susceptible to 
better recognised and managed to encourage speedier response to events, involving a wider 
range of stakeholders.  
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10 	 Summary of key issues from the literature review; on-line survey; 
case studies and industry consultation
Sections 6-9 were reviewed by the research team to establish the key learning points from the 
literature review; on-line survey; case studies and industry consultation.  Most issues were found 
across all the data sets thus increasing the confidence in the findings.  The main points are: 
- Catastrophic events are different and complex 
- Reducing major hazard risks must be addressed at society, industry, project and site 
levels 
- People, process and product all play their part, both in causing and preventing 
catastrophic events 
- Competent people are the key to success 
- Risk identification, assessment and management is essential 
- Projects are complex with many interfaces that must be managed effectively
- Gaining and communicating knowledge throughout the team and across industry is 
crucial 
There are practical things that can be done: 

- Eliminate risk wherever possible and as early as possible 

- Don’t let time and cost pressures deflect effort 

- Expect change and deal with it 

- “Check, check and check again” 

10.1	 CATASTROPHIC EVENTS ARE DIFFERENT AND COMPLEX 
Whilst there are causal links between catastrophic events and more minor accidents the potential 
for major hazards and catastrophic events warrants separate appraisal to general risk management 
and health and safety. The simple question: ‘what is the worst thing that could happen?’ asked to 
the right people at the right time with the right resources to take action, would make a significant 
difference in preventing or reducing catastrophic events. 
The case studies point to a multi-cause model, whereby several failures in the construction 
process contribute either directly or indirectly to the event.  Major accident potential is increased 
within practice areas that are highly process dependent (such as scaffolding) and reliant on 
numerous individuals and organisations.  As such this increased the propensity for error at 
various points in the process.  Conversely, some practice areas are less process driven and reliant 
on the expertise of one group of specialist contractors. Although these activities may be 
inherently hazardous there are often fewer interactions between organisations and fewer 
opportunities for multiple causes.
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10.2	 REDUCING MAJOR HAZARD RISKS MUST BE ADDRESSED AT 
SOCIETY, INDUSTRY, PROJECT AND SITE LEVELS 
Reducing major hazard risks must be addressed at the industry and society in general as well as 
at project and site levels.  This can be illustrated by adapting the James Reason ‘plates’ model, 
shown here representing the actions of industry and society; project team; and site team to try to 
prevent adverse events – in this case catastrophes.  The holes in the plates are errors, omissions 
or defects.  Where the holes line up, an accident can occur. 
Project (including design and planning) 
Site (management & supervision) 
Industry & Society 
Legislation, including CDM (2007) lays all the necessary foundations for the control of 
catastrophic events but industry’s understanding and implementation is lacking.  Failings in 
education, training and the industry’s lack of a safety culture typified by a superficial 
appreciation of safety considerations from designers, managers and workers both on and off sites.  
Industry and society must address the legislative, educational, training and cultural issues; project 
teams must address procurement, design, resources and organisational challenges; and the site 
team must ensure good quality, competent people and processes along with effective supervision.  
In reality the simple model above can be represented with considerably more plates with action 
by the client, the designers, the checker-reviewers, the construction planners and managers and 
the supervisors and workers.  Whatever the number or description of the plates, the key concept 
is that they can never be completely without holes, although the owner of each plate can make a 
difference and reduce the chance of an adverse event by working to close the holes in their own 
plate. 
10.3	 PEOPLE, PROCESS AND PRODUCT ALL PLAY THEIR PART, BOTH IN 
CAUSING AND PREVENTING CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 
The case studies indicate that no single focus on people, product or process will guarantee the 
prevention of major hazards. However, lessons gleaned from other hazardous industries suggest 
that catastrophic events were primarily due to failures within systems of organisation. Products 
seemed to have a smaller influence than people or processes. In most cases, where events were 
seen as attributable to defective products, an underlying link was found in the management or 
processing of checking procedures and the action of people associated with various tasks.  
Causal factors from the case studies and on-line survey include site management and worker 
issues, lack of site control and failure to recognise hazardous scenarios. Having good people 
involved and available, having good processes for checking detail on site and checking the 
quality and use of products has the potential to eliminate major hazard risks. 
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10.4
10.5
10.6
This can be mapped onto Reason’s plates by considering the holes in the plates, which have the 
potential to allow accidents to occur, to be defects or deficiencies in people or process or 
products. 
Poor design communication 
(Process & People) 
Faulty equipment (Product) 
Disinterested 
client rep (People) 
Incompetent manager 
(People) 
Inadequate method 
statement (Process) 
COMPETENT PEOPLE ARE THE KEY TO SUCCESS 
Notwithstanding the people, process, product interaction, the on-line survey showed that having 
good people involved and available was the most effective control for prevent catastrophic 
events.  The survey also stressed the need for competence for all stakeholders – the right people 
in the right place with the right time and resources to do the job that is required. 
The need for particular designated persons was emphasised, particularly in the area of temporary 
works. According to the HSE,  the causes of many past failures of temporary works were 
foreseeable and could have been prevented by proper consideration when planning 
RISK IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT IS 
ESSENTIAL 
Many cases demonstrated a fundamental failure to recognise hazardous scenarios.  Failure to 
recognise hazardous scenarios was often attributed to the lack of competence of personnel 
(education, training and experience).  Hazard and risk management was seen as a necessary core 
competency. This may be due to the lack of perception that conjoined events (fairly minor 
triggers) may well lead to major hazardous events (multiple causality) coupled with the low 
probabilities associated with construction major hazards.   
There are implications at all levels of the industry from client, designers, principal contractors, 
subcontractors and site personnel.  Where there is ignorance about risk this is often shared 
throughout projects (shared ignorance).  Thinking deeply, individually and as a team, was a 
highly ranked control factor in the on-line survey. Contemporary direction has arguably become 
focused on the packaging and presentation of construction site health and safety management, 
rather than the fundamental methods and processes of risk management. 
PROJECTS ARE COMPLEX WITH MANY INTERFACES THAT MUST 
BE MANAGED EFFECTIVELY 
Construction projects cannot be considered as simple sequential processes and the case study 
projects featured complex processes operating in highly parallel systems.  There are multiple 
interfaces, physical, organisational and interpersonal. In recognising complexity, it is vital that 
effective communication and interfaces between disciplines are managed well.  Client and 
procurement issues need to be addressed. 
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The interfaces between permanent and temporary works and between temporary works and plant 
or equipment were considered to be particularly problematic. 
10.7	 GAINING AND COMMUNICATING KNOWLEDGE THROUGHOUT THE 
TEAM AND ACROSS INDUSTRY IS CRUCIAL
Many project teams failed to recognise major hazards.   However, even when they were 
identified, they were often not communicated to other disciplines or organisations within the 
projects.   
The benefit of learning from past failures or ‘near misses’1 was raised by many respondents – 
some guidance exists but it is not well used.  Lessons learned should be widely disseminated 
throughout the industry to enhance shared understanding on risk and hazards (e.g. by 
organisations such as CROSS and SCOSS) – these could bypass confidentiality constraints and 
concerns over litigation. 
10.8	 ELIMINATE HAZARD WHEREVER POSSIBLE AND AS EARLY AS 
POSSIBLE 
As well as becoming better at recognising the hazards in the first place teams need to be able to 
deal with unusual hazards.  Whenever possible, hazards should be eliminated, especially during 
the design (both permanent and temporary works) and pre-construction phases. It was 
acknowledged that, at times this was difficult but that this must still be the primary aim – there 
was considerable feeling that this was not being done well at the moment.  Several on-line 
respondents argued that using engineering judgement and compliance with existing codes and 
advice is important, but it was noted that more advice is needed and consequently some 
subjective decisions may still be necessary. In any case, this is in line with the SFARP2 
approach in the UK. 
In assessing and managing the risk care must be taken not to just ‘tick the boxes’ whilst missing 
the ‘big picture’ by concentrating only on ‘everyday’ risk management.  Care has to be taken to 
avoid complacency and not to say that an approach can be taken just because it is ‘the way we 
have always done it’. 
10.9	 DON’T LET TIME AND COST PRESSURES DEFLECT EFFORT 
The mitigation of risk must often consider complex and competing operational, legal, political 
and economic demands impacting on decision makers.  Teams need to face the challenges from 
project priorities such as time, cost, quality and aesthetics as well as the risks from major 
hazards.  
Small projects and small organisations appear to have some special challenges.  Project teams 
need to address complications with the supply chain and procurement methods, particularly 
dealing with sub and sub-subcontracting and interfaces. 
10.10	 EXPECT CHANGE AND DEAL WITH IT 
Part of the complexity of construction projects is because things are often changing, sometimes 
due to circumstances beyond the control of all the project stakeholders and sometimes caused by 
brief changes, design adjustments or incorrect work done on site.  Effective management of 
change was seen as essential, because, as details and methods change, so do the hazards and new 
1 ‘Near miss’ should in the context of this report perhaps be ‘near hit’ or ‘near accident’. 
2 SFARP – So Far As is Reasonably Practicable – see Glossary 
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hazards can arise from the solutions to the old hazards.  Given the speed at which the industry is 
subject to change (technology, process and procedure), stakeholders must review practice in the 
context of future safety challenges. 
10.11 “CHECK, CHECK AND CHECK AGAIN” 
Full reviews as well as more limited checks were deemed essential, both those by in-house teams 
as well as those by independent inspectors.  The reviews and checks were seen as essential 
throughout the project process – in design as well as construction.  The lack of independent 
reviewing was a particular point of concern for many respondents. 
The absence of specific regulations to address the threat of catastrophic events influences a 
culture where there is a fundamental lack of checking and review procedures that could 
encourage the recognition of hazardous scenarios. 
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APPENDICES:
A	 Glossary 
A.1 ALARP (As low as reasonably practicable) 
The HSE guidance [http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm] explains that 
“ALARP” is short for “as low as reasonably practicable”. Also “SFAIRP” [or SFARP] is short 
for “so far as is reasonably practicable”. The two terms mean essentially the same thing and at 
their core is the concept of “reasonably practicable”; this involves weighing a risk against the 
trouble, time and money needed to control it. Thus, ALARP describes the level to which we 
expect to see workplace risks controlled. With major hazards and catastrophic events in is to be 
expected that reasonable practical would be very considerable to reduce the risk to a very low 
level.
See also ‘R2P2’ (Reducing risks, protecting people) which discusses levels of risk. 
A.2 Catastrophic event
Catastrophic events are events that are beyond the ordinary or routine and are (in the UK) 
characterised by being of low probability but high consequence. In this report the phrase 
‘Major Hazard’ is also used to categorise such events.
Examples of catastrophic events would be:
§ Structural collapse of permanent structure 
§ Collapse of temporary works
§ Collapse of plant such as cranes
§ Major Fire 
§ Tunnel collapse 
§ Disruption of underground services. 
Catastrophic events would be those having the following potential consequences:
§ Potential for multiple deaths and serious injuries in a single incident and/or
§ Serious disruption of infrastructure (eg road, rail ) and/or services (eg power, 
telecoms) 
In addition, such events may well have the following features:
§ Ability to damage or even destroy organisations commercially, either directly or 
through loss of reputation 
§ Creation of public demand for action, possibly leading to demand for a public 
enquiry and/or changes to relevant legislation.
A.3 CDM 2007
CDM 2007 is shorthand for the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007. 
These regulations apply to all construction work (as defined in the Regulation) in Great Britain.  
A.4 Check, audit and review 
There are many types and combinations of checking, auditing and reviewing. Depending on the 
situation, they may be in-house, in-house but involving a separate team, by others appointed by 
the team or by others independently appointed by an outside body such as the client or a 
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statutory body. The prefix ‘independent’ is used when there is a strong element of 
independence from the core team.   
Checking of safety critical calculations or processes should always be carried out in conjunction 
with an element of review by a suitably experienced independent person because either (a) the 
checking has not included review of what is being done or (b) it is often what has not been 
calculated or the manner of making the calculation which matters, not the mathematics per se.  
The terms ‘audit’ and ‘review’ have similar meanings but with a more ‘aggressive’ implication 
when an ‘audit’ is carried out.  
Reviewing is the preferred term for an informed examination of concept as well as detail. It will 
normally include the provision of helpful comments and may be part of a continuous process to 
give added confidence in a progressive, timely manner which avoids disrupting the project and 
ultimately improves the chance of delivery in a reliable, predictable manner. 
The term ‘peer review’ has been used for the type of review where concepts are examined and 
challenged at an early stage by mature, experienced people, looking at the big picture and 
avoiding assumptions or the following of published advice or codes without a clear 
understanding of the engineering principles involved.   
For more on this issue please refer to the SCOSS Topic paper (REF: SC/09/035) about 
‘Independent reviewing through peer assist’ 
(http://www.scoss.org.uk/publications/rtf/SC09.035%20­
%20WEB%20IR%20Draft%20form%20of%20Agreement%20Jan%202009.pdf) 

A.5 COMAH 
COMAH is shorthand for ‘The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999’ which 
aim to ensure that businesses (a) take all necessary measures to prevent major accidents 
involving dangerous substances and (b) limit the consequences to people and the environment 
of any major accidents which do occur.  
The COMAH Regulations apply mainly to the chemical and petrochemical industries, fuel 
storage and distribution. They may also affect businesses that store fuels (including gas), have 
large warehouses or distribution facilities (or) manufacture and store explosives.  
A.6 Complexity 
Construction work is usually complex in organisation, technology and methodology.  
Organisational complexity is evidenced by the number of interfaces which exist on most 
projects and the fact that almost invariably (a) each project is different and (b) the companies 
and people involved are different and there is considerable complexity in any construction 
project.  
Technical complexity is evidenced by the number of different materials and elements 
assembled, some made off-site but many made (or completed) on-site, then assembled into a 
whole.  
Methodological complexity is evidenced by the complex work methods employed, using a 
range of on-site plant and equipment and involving the delivery, storage, transport and lifting 
required for the assembly of the many separate parts.   
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A.7 CROSS (Confidential Reporting On Structural Safety) 
CROSS was established by SCOSS in 2005 to improve structural safety and reduce failures by 
using confidential reports to highlight lessons that have been learnt, to generate feedback and to 
influence change. CROSS uses reports on the concerns of engineers and others for the benefit 
of the public and practitioners in the construction industry. No concern is too small to be 
reported and nothing is too large. Key features of the scheme are to: 
• be non-judgmental 
• promote a positive attitude to learning from experience 
• be seen by all sides of industry as impartial 
• analyse and evaluate reports 
• provide advice and guidance in Newsletters 
• give feedback to industry and regulators 
• provide complete confidentiality for reporters 
The website (www.cross-structural-safety.org) contains many useful features and is designed 
to simplify registration and reporting as well as having a database of reports. This contains all 
the CROSS reports that have been published together with extracts from SCOSS publications. 
A.8 Dynamic risk assessment 
Dynamic risk assessment is “the continuous assessment of risk in the rapidly changing 
circumstances of an operational incident, in order to implement the control measures necessary 
to ensure an acceptable level of safety” (HM Fire Service Inspectorate, 1998).   
The term is also used in construction to describe the practice of making ad-hoc adjustment of 
the method statement as required on site, in response to changing circumstances.   
A.9 ‘ERIC’ methodology 
ERIC is a simple method of explaining the risk hierarchy: 
§ Elimination of hazards
§ Reduction of levels of risk
§ Information is provided to those who need it
§ Control of residual risk
In reality, often it is only those involved prior to construction (eg designers and preconstruction 
planners) that can eliminate hazards and it is usually the contractors that control the residual 
risk.  
Consideration of potential catastrophic events in ERIC
For catastrophic events, the process of hazard identification and subsequent safety risk 
management is identical but when high severity potentially catastrophic risks are noted further 
thinking needs to be done (often in a workshop of stakeholders, ensuring that people with expert 
knowledge of the work involved and its risks) to deal with the identification of potential 
hazardous events, the hazards involved and the options for hazard elimination and risk 
reduction. This will involve thinking through the logic of how events might unfold (e.g. by 
Fault Tree Analysis) and what can reasonably and proportionately be done.  
The risks must be reduced ‘as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP or SFARP). All decisions 
are liable to include commercial issues of time and money, but these must be balanced against 
the potential impacts of a catastrophic event.  
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A.10 Innovation
The word ‘innovation’ means different things to different people. In safety risk management the 
primary concern is to identify and manage risk – so any innovation which increases risk is of 
concern.  
Most construction is to some degree ‘innovative’ because teams/roles/relationships are always 
different and have to cope with varied projects/designs as well. No two projects are identical 
(see also ‘complexity’). ‘Blue skies’ innovation in which something is being done for the first 
time is extremely unusual in construction; it will merit a high level of management of risk 
throughout, as new hazards and/or risks may become evident as the work proceeds.  
Doing things ‘in an innovative way’ is more common. Quite often the novelty will be more in 
the experience of those involved (others having done the same thing elsewhere) but the risks are 
similar to ‘blue skies’ innovation unless someone who has had prior experience is involved as 
an advisor or independent reviewer.  
‘Safety-driven innovation’ is an emerging concept of innovation which may drive safety due to 
the added level of thinking and attention which accompanies the innovative work. See further 
mention in 4.4 of this report. Innovation was identified as playing a role in only 4 of the 62 case 
study events – but two of these were large catastrophic events involving major loss of life in 
one case and infrastructure in the other case. This demonstrates that new and novel techniques, 
of whatever nature, should be handled very carefully using competent, properly resourced 
safety risk management processes.  
A.11 Interfaces
The construction industry operates with a myriad of physical, organisational and interpersonal 
interfaces, each of which presents opportunities for mis-communication and mis-understanding 
which may affect safety risk management. Types of interface can be ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ and 
typically include:
Organisational & interpersonal (‘soft’ interfaces) 
§ Client/contractor 
§ Contractor/supply-chain 
§ Designer/constructor 
§ Project phases, sites and disciplines 
§ Manager/team

Physical (‘hard’ interfaces) 

§ Tower crane/base structure 
§ Piling rig/piling platform 
§ Cladding panel/support structure 
A.12 Latent defects
Latent defects are defects in a design or in construction which do not manifest themselves 
during the construction phase (or in the post-construction defects-rectification period). A 
structure may be fatally flawed and collapse in-service due to a latent defect. A structure may 
contain a latent defect which only becomes apparent during later construction work such as a 
modification or during demolition.  
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A.13 Major hazard 
A major hazard is one which, either alone or in conjunction with other hazards, could give rise 
to a catastrophic event (or a ‘top event’ – see Glossary). When hazards are being identified at 
the start of the safety risk management process, potential ‘catastrophic events’ need to be 
identified specifically (see ‘Consideration of potential catastrophic events in ERIC above) and 
analysed to gain a full understanding of the contribution which particular hazards play. 
A.14 Peer review 
Peer review is a generic term that is used to describe a process of self-regulation by a profession 
or a process of evaluation involving qualified individuals with the related field. Peer review 
methods are employed to maintain standards, improve performance, and provide credibility. 
See also check audit and review above.  
A.15 R2P2 - ‘Reducing Risk, Protecting People’
The HSE report ‘Reducing Risk, Protecting People’ (www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.pdf)
examines how decisions might reasonably be made about high risk scenarios, based on 
statistical assessment of outcomes and the acceptability of certain levels of risk. The concept of 
tolerability and tolerability limits lies at the centre of R2P2, being applied to particular ‘risks’. 
The scenarios which occur on construction are however so many and varied that the 
underpinning statistical data for each individual ‘risk’ is unlikely to be available.  
A.16 Risk Management 
Risk management encompasses all the activities directed towards the management of risk, in 
whatever context it is being considered, so as to achieve a safe system of work. Management of 
safety risks (see ‘Safety risk management’ will always need to be considered. 
A.17 Robustness 
Robustness in construction is the quality of being able to withstand in a proportionate manner 
the forces and environment which are experienced. There is also a definition in BS EN 1991-1­
7 as “the ability of a structure to withstand events like fire, explosions, impact or the 
consequences of human error without being damaged to an extent disproportionate to the 
original cause”. 
Note: robustness can also refer to (for example) robust processes and the definition given above 
does not preclude the importance of other such aspects of robustness. 
A.18 Safety Risk Management
Safety risk management is the management activity and process whereby: 
§ hazards are identified 
§ hazards are eliminated if reasonably practicable, taking all relevant factors into account 
§ the level of risk due to remaining hazards is reduced as far as is reasonably practicable 
§ information is provided to those who need it
§ residual risk is controlled 
This can be summarised by the ERIC approach. Designers and constructors should 
communicate as much as possible and ideally work as an integrated team. All interfaces should 
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receive special attention, involving (for design activity, including temporary works - see below) 
designers and the CDM Co-ordinator and (for site activity) the Principal Contractor or, for 
smaller projects, the main contractor.  
A.19 SCOSS (Standing Committee on Structural Safety) 
SCOSS has been in existence for some 34 years. Its remit is to identify trends or practices 
which might lead to a concern in respect of structural safety. It is supported by the Institution 
of Civil Engineers, the Institution of Structural Engineers and the Health and Safety Executive. 
The SCOSS Committee is a group of experienced construction industry people who keep an eye 
on contemporary practice and identify issues that should be of concern. Information is 
published on these topics and every two years a full report is published which is widely 
circulated and provides authoritative guidance to the industry and to government. These reports 
and details of the topics considered may be seen on its website at www.scoss.org.uk
A.20 SFARP or SFAiRP (So Far As is Reasonably Practical)
This term is applied in CDM 2007 when discussing management of risk. There is continuing 
debate about what SFARP means. If a potential catastrophic event (hazard) is identified which 
cannot reasonably be eliminated, its level of risk should be reduced by design as low as is 
reasonably practicable, in a proportionate manner. (See ALARP in Glossary). This is a sensible 
SFARP response to the identification of a potential catastrophic event, where the proportionate 
response is to reduce risk ALARP.  
For catastrophic events, the level of risk should be reduced be to a very low level indeed. The 
construction industry has insufficient data or experience to make numerical assessments and 
each project and site in any event presents a unique series of challenges. Therefore, assessment 
of levels of risk for potentially catastrophic events in construction needs to be carried out with 
an appreciation that risk levels for such events must be very low; and this may well lead to 
additional precautions being taken beyond those commonly thought to be adequate in the 
industry.
A.21 ‘SME’ (Small and medium enterprise) 
There are many formal definitions of an SME, varying across a wide spectrum of ‘size’. Much 
construction work is carried out by small, informal groups of individuals, families and friends 
who hire themselves out wherever there is work to be had.  There are also many small 
operations taking on only small contracts such as house extensions.  
A.22 Systemic failure 
A failure may be described as ‘systemic’ if it is not related specifically to an event, but is 
instead related to the manner in which an organisation, or project, is managed and organised. If 
a systemic failure is experienced but is not identified and acted upon there is a chance of the 
same or similar failure, occurring again even if the people and circumstances associated with 
the original fault are not the same.  
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A.23 Temporary Works 
Anything required during construction to achieve the final structure. This includes:
§ Items such as formwork and falsework needed to form and support the building or 
structure 
§ Consideration of the permanent structure in its intermediate (temporary) states and 
its modification as necessary
§ Additional works to achieve the final building or structure, which may be removed 
or left in place 
§ Work at interfaces with construction plant and equipment.  
A.24 Top Event
Top Event is a term used largely within nuclear and petro-chemical industries and is a 
component part of a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) process. It refers to events which are of major 
impact, catastrophic to the business or organization and needing special attention. However, 
because of the low level of recognition in the built environment sector and the possible 
connotation that ‘top’ means ‘all OK, best in class!’ i.e. positive rather than negative, the term 
has not been adopted for this report.  
Nevertheless, the term may gain credence in the construction industry, in particular because the 
types of risk involved require consideration ‘at the top’ i.e. board level and should be ‘top of the 
agenda’ for directors and senior managers.   
The term ‘Top Event’ is also explored in the literature review (Section 6.2.2 of this report).  
A.25 Triangulation 
The use of triangulation was characterised by Burgess (1984) as a way of implanting 
methodological rigour to research through the use of cross checking and cross referencing 
utilising multiple methods, data sources, theories and investigators. The four types of 
triangulation that Burgess (1984:145) identifies are;
§ Data triangulation includes data collected over time, space and by different people or 
organisations. 
§ Investigator triangulation involves the use of more than one researcher. 
§ Theory triangulation requires the use of competing theories; and 
§ Methodological triangulation incorporating the combination of different but appropriate 
research methods. 
Reference: Burgess R.G., (1984), In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research, London, 
Routledge
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B Proposals for further work
B1 Industry engagement 
The research involved a considerable amount of contact with various industry stakeholders, but 
further investigation of particular issues may be beneficial. Ideas for further engagement are as 
follows:
§ Exploring some of the issues which have arisen at industry events, using the voting 
button facility 
§ Seeking further engagement with clients, insurers and operatives 
§ Examining the processes used within a range of companies to control the risk of 
catastrophic events occurring (NB it is understood that SCOSS are working on this 
already) 
§ Exploring what might be appropriate leading performance indicators for use within 
companies 
§ Map the special interest groups which operate within the industries and consider how 
their effectiveness of their activities might be enhanced. 
B2 Safety risk assessment
A range of activities may contribute to a long-term improvement in competence, including: 
§ Knowledge mapping and learning planning
§ Preparation of industry guidance on the identification of major hazards and the 
management of residual risks 
§ Promotion of the potential benefits of independent review 
§ Study of the risk profile in the tunnelling industry, with particular respect to the NATM 
method.  
B3 Contractual models and their impact 
The research did not seek to investigate the relative impacts of different contractual models on 
the frequency of catastrophic events. It would be informative for industry stakeholders to work 
together to understand the pros and cons of the various types of contract in this respect, and the 
measures which might be put in place to reduce the levels of risk.  
It was suggested that the degree of independent review of work on site has reduced (see 4.8) and 
this particular concern could be researched.  
182
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
       
           
 
          
     
               
      
          
         
      
          
       
      
       
      
     
          
        
        
       
         
           
            
         
             
             
          
           
         
 
             
      
             
      
         
             
     
          
          
         
      
                  
       
       
      
      
        
        
C On-line survey questions
 
Questions No of 
responses
Experience
1. What is your main source of experience?  397 
2. How many years experience do you have in the construction industry?  396 
Factors
3. How much do you think the following factors affect Catastrophic Events? 
a. Underlying lack of "robustness" 306 
b. Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios and influencing factors 320 
c. Ignorance, incompetence 319 
d. Error (by people who are competent) 322 
e. Lack of checking and of competent reviewing 318 
 f. Over-reliance on codes 316 
g. Interface problems between the various parties 322 
h. Lack of experience 319 
i. Poor team-working 324 
j. Lack of site control 320 
k. Conscious risk-taking 319 
l. Underfunding 315 
m. Inappropriate maintenance and/or modification of a structure 317 
n. Lack of proper change control 318 
o. Vandalism or malicious act 315 
p. Unreasonable time pressures 320 
q. Design process not effective, not coordinated 320 
r. Designers working in boxes; no-one responsible for providing overview 318 
s. Drawings not clear, significant risks not apparent or highlighted 318 
t. Over-complex procurement with unclear responsibilities 318 
u. Over-reliance on software analysis which cannot be easily verified 319 
v. Design which didn't consider/explain how construction could be done 320 
w. Lack of involvement on site by designers 319 
4. Which of the above factors do you personally think are the most important?                                         
Please name the 3 most important (eg a, j, v) 
307 
Controls
5. How effective do you think the following things are in controlling Catastrophic Events? 
a. Our legislative framework 296 
b. Independent review and checking of design within the team 299 
c. Independent certification 294 
d. Following good practice for normal situations 300 
e. Thinking deeply individually and as a team about hazards 299 
 f. Considering risks consciously 301 
g. Applying CDM 2007 principles for risk management 298 
h. Having good people involved and available 301 
i. Managed interfaces, communication and cooperation 301 
j. Adequate resource 302 
k. Adequate access to knowledge (especially records) 300 
l. Sensible programmes, well-managed 301 
m. Good management of information 301 
n. Checking of concepts 297 
o. Checking of calculation 299 
p. Checking of detail on site 301 
q. Good change management 300 
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290 
Risks
7. Do the risks of major accidents get considered by a formal hazard elimination and risk reduction 
process?  
299 
8. In your experience, do people actually try to eliminate hazards?  300 
Please add any comments you may have 137 
9. When construction involves a major risk such as a risk to lots of people, should extra precautions 
be taken?  
299 
Please add any comments you may have 106 
10. Are you aware of the work of SCOSS (Standing Committee on Structural Safety)?  291 
11. Are you aware of the work of CROSS (Confidential Reporting on Structural Safety)?  300 
12. Have you any experience of working on a project where things have gone (or have threatened to 
go) seriously wrong, harming a lot of people?  
298 
13. If so, please give brief details, in confidence and/or anonymised 100 
14. Would you be prepared to discuss this (in strict confidence)? 231 
15. What do you think that (above all else) should be done to prevent catastrophes in construction? 233 
Contact details
16. Would you like to be contacted to contribute further to our research?  293 
17. Would you like to be informed about the results of our research?  296 
: Name 211 
: Organisation 195 
: E-Mail address 214 
: Telephone number 176 
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D. On-line survey responses in graphical form
QUESTION 3. How much do you think the following things affect Major 
Hazards? 
a. Underlying lack of "robustness" 
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QUESTION 3 continued... How much do you think the following things affect 
Catastrophic Events? 
g. Interface problems betw  een the various parties h. Lack of experience 
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QUESTION 3 continued... How much do you think the following things affect 
Catastrophic Events? 
m. Inappropriate maintenance and/or modif ication of a 	 n. Lack of proper change control
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QUESTION 3 continued... How much do you think the following things affect 
Catastrophic Events? 
t. Over-complex procurement w  ith unclear 
responsibilities 
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QUESTION 5. How effective do you think the following things are in 
controlling Catastrophic Events? 
a. Our legislative framew  ork 
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QUESTION 5 continued... How effective do you think the following things are in 
controlling Catastrophic Events? 
g. Applying CDM2007 principles for risk management 
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QUESTION 5 continued... How effective do you think the following things are in 
controlling Catastrophic Events? 
m. Good management of information 
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Question 7: 
Do the risks of major accidents get 
considered in a formal hazard elimination 
and risk reduction process? 
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E. Case study questions
Case Study – Project Reference
Project details: Brief description
What happened? Brief description 
Is the actual technical reason for the problem known? Brief description 
Are key underlying reasons known? Brief description 
Sources of information (documents, people spoken to):
Impact
What impact did the triggers have to make this a potential or actual ‘major 
hazard’ scenario? 
Questions
1. 	 Clearly might affect a public road, railway, crowds of people etc 
2. 	 Put at risk important infrastructure or working facilities 
3. 	 Involved activities which are recognised as particularly hazardous (such as 
demolition) 
4. 	 Clearly required higher levels of skill than normal 
5. 	 Faced particular challenges such as difficult access/soils/water/weather 
Causative Factor
What were the key causative factors? 
Questions 
6. 	 Underlying lack of robustness
7. 	 Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios and influencing factors
8. 	 Ignorance, incompetence
9. 	 Error (by people who are competent)
10. Lack of checking and of competent reviewing 
11. Criminality 
12. Over-reliance on codes 
13. Interface problems 
14. Lack of experience 
15. Poor team-working 
16. Lack of site control 
17. Conscious risk-taking 
18. Underfunding
19. Inappropriate maintenance and/or modification of a structure 
20. Poor management of late design changes 
21. Poor management of late changes in build procedures
22. Ad hoc on-site changes to planned build procedures
23. Vandalism or malicious act 
24. Unreasonable time pressures 
25. Design process not effective, not coordinated 
26. People working in boxes, no-one clearly responsible for providing design 
overview 
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27. Drawings not clear, hazards not apparent or highlighted
28. Over-complex procurement with unclear responsibilities 
29. Over-reliance on software analysis which cannot be easily verified
30. Design which didn’t consider/explain how construction could be done 
31. Other factors (please specify): Open Ended Question
Controls
What controls should have operated but didn’t? 
Questions
32. Our legislative framework (if so, why?)
33. Independent review and checking of design within the team
34. Independent certification of design and construction by an official body 
35. Following good practice for normal situations
36. Thinking deeply individually and as a team about hazards
37. Considering risks consciously
38. Applying CDM 2007 principles for risk management
39. Having good people involved and available (knowledgeable, trained, 
experienced, motivated, caring, assiduous) 
40. Managed interfaces, communication and cooperation 
41. Adequate resource 
42. Adequate access to knowledge (ESP.  records) 
43. Sensible programmes, well-managed 
44. Good management of information 
45. Checking of concepts 
46. Checking of calculation 
47. Checking of detail on site 
48. Management of late design changes 
49. Management of late changes in build procedures
50. Prevention of ad hoc on-site changes to planned build procedures 
51. Other factors (please specify) : Open Ended Question
Open Ended Question:
52. What additional controls would have made a real difference?
Additional Features – (Yes/No Response) 
Questions
53. Was there an SME issue here?
54. Does the event involve a chain of small things happening?
55. Does the event involve an innovative design or activity?
56. Does the event involve complexity?
57. Does the event involve something unusual? 
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Conceptual Analysis - Column of Risk1: How much did any of the following 
failures influence the event? 
Questions*
58. Foundation: Client failing to appoint a competent team and use procurement 
process that facilitated communication and cooperation?
59. Block 1: Lack of an integrated design process (including temporary works) with 
appropriate reviewing and checking throughout? 
60. Block 2: Failure of the team (designers and contractors) to assess Risks and spot 
the potential Hazard (eliminating, reducing, informing and planning)? 
61. Block 3: Failure to put in place Controls and the site team not provided with 
information and training
62. Block 4: Failure to have Experienced personnel on site at all times with 
appropriate cover when needed
63. Block 5: Failure of the Site Team to be well organised and briefed; and the 
Operatives are not well supervised
64. Block 6: Failures in the Late Design Change process (or no special measures 
applied) 
What impact did the following have on the event? 
Questions
65. People: All individuals involved in safety critical implications of the work.
66. Process: All support systems including procurement, design, management, 
supervision, checking and reviewing.
67. Products: All tools, material, plant as generally deemed fit for purpose.  Does not 
include specification (or choice) by people of the products used.
1 ‘Column of risk’ is a concept (which was not subsequently pursued) in which the key elements affecting 
construction risk are identified and examined.  
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APPENDIX F – CASE STUDY PEN PORTRAITS 
The case studies have been anonymised and are presented to illustrate the complex 
issues associated with major construction hazards that lead to catastrophic events. Care 
has been taken to ensure that the case studies are presented without reference to any 
individuals or private organisations (with the exception of reference to any generic 
statutory bodies such as fire or police services). This is to protect the identity of all 
contributors and organisations in line with the confidentiality policy adopted throughout 
the duration of the research.
The information below and in Table 10.1 is provided to assist the reader in examining the case 
study summaries provided in this section of the report: 
Project Detail: Outline of the particular construction work/project that was being 
carried out
Major Hazard Event: Overview of what actually happened
Consequence: Summary of what happened to make this a major hazard event (for 
instance):
•	 Low probability: high consequence 
•	 Potential for multiple deaths and serious injuries affecting workers and members 
of the public (MOPs) on and/or offsite in a single incident 
•	 Serious disruption of infrastructure and services 
•	 Potential to damage or even destroy organisations commercially; and 
• Political implications – public enquiries, demands for new legislation 
Potential Causative Factors: List of potential (and actual) causative/contributing 
factors. 
Case No: Individual case study number 
The Project reference: Internal categorisation code used to identify case study (by case 
study group and practice area as given in Table10.1) 
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Table 30.1: Index of Categorisation Codes 
Case Study Groups by Practice Area Code 
Structural collapse of permanent structures SC 
Bridges SC1 
Buildings SC2 
Structural collapse during demolition (including refurbishment) SC3 
Collapse of temporary works CTW 
Formwork, falsework, launch gantries, shoring, propping CTW1 
Scaffolding etc CTW2 
Cranes, mobile plant and equipment C&MPE 
Tower cranes C&MPE1 
Free-standing cranes, piling rigs and other plant inc large MEWPs C&MPE2 
Associated sub-terrain activities AST 
Tunnelling and groundworks AST1 
Disruption of underground services AST2 
Excavations and earthworks AST3 
Fire F 
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Case Study Summaries 
Project Detail Demolition of two storey Building Case No. 01 
Categorisation Code SC3 
Major Hazard Event Outer skin of building peeled away and landed on a person. Material spilled onto the road 
Consequence Demolition work fell on a person causing disability.
Material spilled onto the roadway, risking disruption to infrastructure 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Possible weather conditions 
• No proper demolition plan 
• Lack of thorough risk assessment 
• No proper exclusion area
• Lack of training, instruction and experience of the workers 
• Poor and transient supervision 
Project Detail Refurbishment and adaptation of an existing building Case No. 02 
Categorisation Code SC3 
Major Hazard Event Major collapse to façade and one third of the building 
Consequence Disruption to local infrastructure and risk to people located in the building 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Inexperienced contractor appointed by the client and no CDMC 
• No formal drawing for the works 
• No competent reviewing 
• Cost cutting approach by client 
• Professionals were not informed of changes to the scope of work 
• Limited number of props were used ie unsafe temporary works 
Project Detail Demolition of a car park Case No. 03 
Categorisation Code CTW1 
Major Hazard Event Cantilevered section fell off during erection – failure of the temporary props 
Consequence Failure of props could have caused major fatalities and disruption of project 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Props should not have been in use.  
• Recall process not followed through.
• Defective props had been sprayed red and the props which failed were sprayed but contractor spray 
their equipment red as standard
• Site checks on products insufficient.  
• Temp works designers didn’t tell site about use of ‘special’ props.
Project Detail Construction of two new large blocks of mixed use in city Case No. 04 
centre Categorisation Code C&MPE2 
Major Hazard Event Mobile elevating work platforms (MEWP) was manoeuvred with boom elevated; ran over a cover 
which was buried by a working platform of crushed stone.
Consequence Toppled over next to a location where a bus had just departed. Operator survived, badly injured 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Working over unknown hatch covers.
• Site surveys before didn’t find/mark what was there;  
• No plan for managing/protecting.  
• Inadequate information to operatives,
• Parked next to services manhole box which was collapsing.
• Company procedure didn’t deal with vehicle movements.
• A persistent failure around the site
• Inadequate surveys and lack of provision of information on site 
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Project Detail Bridge launched over a railway line Case No. 05 
Categorisation Code SC1 
Major Hazard Event PTFE-faced packs dislodged and bridge construction dropped
Consequence Debris was scattered over outlying areas causing disruption to transport system and presenting a major 
hazard to public and nearby building infrastructure 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Late changes to work plan without any review by others beyond the site team doing the work 
• Principal Contractor failed to manage this risk 
Project Detail Construction of a tunnel under a built-up city area Case No. 06 
Categorisation Code AST1 
Major Hazard Event Large crater opened up adjacent to houses 
Consequence Risk to the public, transport and local infrastructure 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Inadequate site research
• Unusual ground conditions
• Residual risk not considered adequately 
Project Detail Erection of steel roof over sports stadium Case No. 07 
Categorisation Code SC2 
Major Hazard Event Partial collapse of a rafter occurred during the welding work to join the rafter to its end supporting 
member 
Consequence Possibility of fatalities and injury to site personnel (many hundreds on site)
Major project disruption and added cost as workforce walked off the site. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Human error 
• Operative cut out a temporary stiffener supporting a major member 
Project Detail Construction of steel box-girder bridge Case No. 08 
Categorisation Code SC1 
Major Hazard Event Collapse of major sections of the bridge during erection
Consequence Major fatalities and worker injury, disruption to project  
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Major on-site problems 
• Lack of professionalism 
• Failure to assess risk 
• Fundamental project and engineering errors 
• Poor communication 
• Poor management of late changes 
• Poor communication between professions 
Project Detail Construction for a new major highway involving deep Case No. 09 
excavation (next to an existing highway) Categorisation Code AST3 
Major Hazard Event The excavation collapsed due to failure of the earth pressure propping 
Consequence Major fatalities and worker injury, disruption to project, disruption to major highway 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Failure of the propping system due to under-estimation of loads
• poor detailing of connections
• Poor risk management throughout the design process and site execution,
• Poor monitoring and failure to notice/act upon warning signs
• No effective independent review and checking by experienced people 
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Project Detail Construction of cantilever-launched concrete box-girder 
bridge
Case No. 10 
Categorisation Code SC1 
Major Hazard Event Bridge construction collapsed during launch 
Consequence Collapse of bridge, multiple deaths 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Failure of box during launch due to inability to support the bearing loads at the slide bearings
• Failure to ensure robust details and accuracy of positioning of slide pads.
• Lack of competent review
• Poor team working 
• Lack of site control 
• Poor management of late design changes 
Project Detail Major building demolition Case No. 11 
Categorisation Code SC3 
Major Hazard Event Removal of props from a projecting piece of slab caused the slab to fall 
Consequence Risk of injury and fatalities to workers 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Manner in which structure worked wasn’t understood;  
• There was a change of procedure, a piece which was part of a suspended slab was left and later it 
was assumed it would cantilever. It should have been seen that it wasn’t a cantilever by the 
adjacent soffit (beam and pot flooring span at 90 degrees)
• Engineer didn’t communicate with site (but plan was changed and he didn’t know)
• Risk should have been investigated 
• Variations to planned procedures 
Project Detail Bridge construction Case No. 12 
Categorisation Code C&MPE2 
Major Hazard Event Inadequate bearing provided by the piling pad caused the piling rig to overturn 
Consequence Disruptions to a public road, railway, risk of injury to general public
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Inadequate bearing provided by the piling pad
• An obstruction had been found, which was removed by excavator and the hole backfilled, 
probably in an uncontrolled manner, before the piling mat was restored.  
• Lack of site management  
• Variations to planned procedures 
Project Detail Erection of telecommunications mast Case No. 13 
Categorisation Code SC1 
Major Hazard Event Mast collapsed 
Consequence Possibility of worker injury or fatalities 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Defective design 
• Lack of experience and incompetence of designers 
• Client lack of knowledge lead to the appointment of inexperienced designers 
Project Detail Refurbishment of a large office block for open-plan space Case No. 14 
Categorisation Code SC3 
Major Hazard Event Structural collapse of top floor
Consequence • Operative seriously injured and passers-by nearly killed/injured 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Inadequate propping and loss of lateral stability as walls were removed
• Developer didn’t plan properly
• No temporary works or structural engineer for this part of the works; architect involved but 
didn’t ensure structural engineer was involved 
• Inadequate propping
• No CDM activity for this part of the works 
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Project Detail Construction of a new sewer Case No. 15 
Categorisation Code AST1 
Major Hazard Event Void opened up in the road over the line of tunnelling 
Consequence 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Unusual ground conditions, probably loss of fines during unexpected water ingress
• Very difficult ground conditions.
• Inadequate response to water ingress
Project Detail Hotel construction Case No. 16 
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event Scaffold used for façade construction collapsed 
Consequence One scaffolder died, two were injured. Prosecution of companies involved (PC and façade 
subcontractor). Scaffold subcontractor subsequently went out of business. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Scaffold members failed, almost certainly by buckling of posts 
• Scaffold was not designed properly and also was overloaded.
• Missing bracing.
• Inspections were not regularly undertaken 
• Low amount of tieing, increased slenderness.
• Loading tower was to be removed, so extra pallets of tiles were taken up; 
• Tower parts were also taken onto the scaffold; corner fell 
Project Detail Sewer construction project Case No. 17 
Categorisation Code AST1 
Major Hazard Event A length of tunnel collapsed, created significant surface depression.
Consequence Potential for injuries and fatalities. Disruption to project lead to economic loss by contractors and 
project sponsors 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Minor leak led to water leakage and ground disruption. 
• This effected the strength of the tunnel structure.
• Geological data did not give clear and full information about sand characteristics or the thickness 
of the peat.  
• Contractors did not have a procedure for addressing complex ground conditions 
• Inadequacy in investigation and hence planning and preparation for potential events
Project Detail Refurbishment of a city centre building façade Case No. 18 
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event During high winds a suspended platform came loose and smashed into the building causing building 
materials to disintegrate and fall onto street below
Consequence Hazard of injury and fatalities to workers and the general public. Transport disruption
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The platform had not been tied at roof or ground level in the windy weather, as specified by the 
manufacturer. 
• Contractor did not carry out adequate safety checks 
• Failure to recognise the implications of the hazard 
• The system had been incorrectly operated, 
• The platform system had been modified and hence made less safe 
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Project Detail Construction of a new car park  Case No. 19 
Categorisation Code AST2 
Major Hazard Event A nearby high-pressure gas main was almost penetrated during some excavation work 
Consequence There was major risk of damage to local infrastructure as well as the potential for major injuries and 
fatalities 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The car park construction was in the vicinity of a gas pipeline 
• Final stages of the project were unduly rushed and driven by the client 
• The risks were not adequately identified 
• Clients ignored initial warnings 
• Various parties did not interact adequately 
• Inherent dangers were not appreciated
• Pressures to ignore warnings were increased by late design changes and their subsequent 
requirements 
• Hazards were known but were not adequately considered on the design drawings 
• Contractors lacked experience 
• Contractor was not familiar with the hazards 
Project Detail Relatively small development for owner involving a new-
build shop with flats over 
Case No. 20 
Categorisation Code SC3 
Major Hazard Event Building and adjacent scaffold were undermined by subsequent excavation work leading to the 
possibility of building collapse 
Consequence Potential for major disruption to local infrastructure, injuries and fatalities. There were prosecutions 
and fines as a consequence of this event 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Inexperienced contractor was employed on the project 
• Contractor also provided drawings (beyond scope of experience) 
• Constructor commissioned a safety consultant who prepared an Health and Safety plan, which 
identified danger of undermining the ex. footings – but contractor didn’t read them.
• Building control inspector didn’t have much impact – although he did draw PC’s attention to the 
potential problem 
• Excavation started for the footings – undermined adjacent footings by 1.5m along 2/3 of the wall 
• Footings were excavated too deep and trial holes not completed as specified. 
• No-one formally engaged as temporary works designer 
• Lack of sub-contractor supervision
Project Detail Construction of a metro tunnel through variable ground Case No. 21
Categorisation AST1
Major Hazard Event Collapse while constructing switch tunnel, inrush of soft materials and water. Hole was under a 
building, which was badly damaged.
Consequence Major damage to building and implications on local infrastructure.   
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• An old well under the building 
• Risk of tunnels not adequately addressed; wide tunnel could not support conditions at the foot of 
a tunnel 
• Risks from tunnels not taken seriously enough 
• Lack of knowledge and experience of this type of project by all parties involved 
• Failure to consider above ground infrastructure 
• Failure to consult building owner 
• Lack of investigation of potential hazards 
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Project Detail Construction of a 12-storey office building in a major city Case No. 22 
centre Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event During stormy weather, scaffold partially collapsed leaving substantial sections of the scaffold left 
hanging precariously over the adjacent roads and railway line.
Consequence Potential damage/disruption to local building and transport infrastructure 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Unusual weather conditions 
• Insufficient drawings were made. Numerous under calculations led to a very poorly specified 
and erected scaffold system 
• Scaffold system was not tied adequately to the adjacent building given the height (12 storey)of 
the scaffold and subsequent high winds.   
• A large number of unbalanced ties were observed.
• Overloading of the anchors causing the scaffold system to fail followed by the failure of the tie 
as a whole.
• Expansion plugs had not been fully driven home by installers. 
• There were three lifts of sheeted scaffold (6 metres height) above the highest level of scaffold 
ties which were not attached to the building in any way.
Project Detail 
Strengthening work to a bridge that included the installation of 
new gantry runway beams and the removal of one of the 
original runway beams.   
Case No. 23 
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event A gust of wind moved the gantry along the runway beams, against the slope, and the trolleys at one 
end came off the beams causing the gantry platform to swing violently to a vertical position throwing 
the workmen to their deaths.
Consequence Four workers died 
Potential Causative • High gust of wind 
Factors • Risks were not adequately considered 
• The climatic limitations on the use of the gantries under high wind speeds and directions (and 
their limitations) were not properly understood and adequately monitored 
• Lack of suitable equipment; lack of safety and risk assessment procedure; lack of competent 
personnel 
• Adequate end stops should have been provided at all open end of runway beams that were 
capable of safely stopping the gantry in all foreseeable circumstances 
• Inadequate system was used to prevent uncontrolled movement 
• All safety critical features of the gantry had not been designed to fail to safety where possible 
• Preference was not given to secondary or back-up safety systems to provide a suitable degree of 
redundancy rather than relying solely on the over-engineering of components 
Project Detail A two-storey workshop building was being erected between, Case No. 24 
and adjacent to, the railway line, railway station and a 
supermarket car park  
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event 52 metre length of the scaffold toppled over across the adjacent railway line 
Consequence Damage to railway infrastructure and disruption of transport services 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• High winds and vibration from oncoming trains caused the scaffold to collapse 
• The choice of a freestanding scaffold system was inadequate 
• No adequate safety calculations were made to ensure the safety of working personnel
• The addition of debris netting to a height of 9 metres made it almost inevitable that the scaffold 
would topple over at some stage under unremarkable wind conditions. 
• There was no complete and specific calculation for the non-standard configuration to justify the 
tie arrangements and scaffold layout given. 
• Specific calculations had not been carried out to ascertain the measures required to ensure 
adequate strength and stability of the freestanding scaffold 
• The scaffold system with ledger bracing  did not comply with the standard set of system 
configurations given in BS EN 12810: 2003 
• The scaffold system lacked strength and stability 
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Project Detail Work in the excavation close to the lower borough rubble Case No. 25 
retaining wall Categorisation Code SC2 
Major Hazard Event Partial collapse of the rubble wall led to cracking at the road side 
Consequence The incident involved situations where people might be working in an excavation where they were 
liable to be buried by a collapse, and people may fall into the excavation 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Lack of adequate calculations 
• Structural engineers decided the wall was being undermined in places because the foundations 
were not as good as they first thought. 
• Cracking on the road side which was of concern to the client and engineer although the 
Information was not properly communicated to the relevant parties (site manager and contract 
manager).
• Work should have been undertaken under the direction of a suitably qualified structural engineer. 
• Sufficient steps were not undertaken to prevent persons or vehicles falling into the excavation.
• No sufficient risk assessment or method statement had been formulated. All practicable steps 
had not been taken to prevent danger of collapse of the excavation and the excavation was not 
sufficiently supported to prevent danger 
Project Detail Preparatory works for redevelopment of an underground Case No. 26 
station Categorisation Code AST2 
Major Hazard Event There was an explosion when the mains electricity cables were stretched to breaking point 
Consequence One of the workforce in the excavation was killed 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Incorrect setting out for initial cable diversion.
• Poor site controls and contractor self certification.
• No safety barrier between the operative and the electricity cable 
• Position of diverted cable not questioned or challenged – contractor self assurance 
• Moving services, particularly electricity cables, is common practice. Cable was already stretched 
to near breaking point
• No safe system of work in place 
• No independent checking of setting out or work practice 
• Site staff either incorrectly instructed on cable diversion or the diversion was never checked 
Project Detail During motor way work the incident involved a site Case No. 27 
investigation that meant drilling over an underground tunnel. Categorisation Code AST2 
Major Hazard Event The casing or the shell from the borehole rig protruded into the underground tunnel, ripping through 
the offside of a moving underground train.   
Consequence Could have derailed train and caused significant injuries to driver and passengers. Nobody was 
injured although the incident caused major disruption to the transport services 
Potential Causative • Critically important information about the works was not passed on to appropriate parties 
Factors • No one questioned the basis for the borehole grid coordinates even though some would have 
been aware of the potential for an incorrect grid coordinate system being used in error 
• On site checking of the borehole location only confirmed the initial setting out.
• Appropriate personnel were not in attendance during important discussions 
• Risks should have been identified in the contract specification or at least the design consultants 
or site investigation contractor should have been alerted to the possibilities 
• Drilling onto cast iron and /or into a void at depth should have resulted in the work being stopped 
• Drawings may not have shown borehole positions relative to underground tunnel 
• Design for the site investigation process was not effective and  not coordinated 
• Lack of communication between two different transport agencies 
• Errors by all members and all levels of the drilling crew team 
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Project Detail A metro station construction between piled walls some 15m Case No. 28 
deep on a new metro line under a main highway Categorisation Code AST1 
Major Hazard Event It was an explosion due to a fractured gas main which took place under a temporary road deck 
beneath which was the construction of a station on a metro line 
Consequence This one incident caused the deaths of more than 100 persons including 50 children 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• There was a lack of gas detection equipment 
• There was a failure to consider this type of risk 
• The source of the gas was in an adjacent construction area next to the covered over station 
construction 
• A fracture caused a “80mm” hole in the gas main and the local people had smelled the gas and 
had called out the local gas company 
• A blast seared through the 340m length of the underground station construction
• A drain 1.4m away from the broken gas main provided a conduit for the gas between the open 
site and the covered-over metro construction 
• There were various sources of ignition particularly any hot work being done under the deck 
Project Detail Construction of a NATM tunnel under a major international Case No. 29 
airport Categorisation Code AST1 
Major Hazard Event 3 tunnels collapsed 
Consequence Massive project disruption, delay and cost 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Poor standards of construction  
• Poor monitoring of the work by the designer
• Extremely poor management/engineering by design and construction parties on site and poor 
communication between them 
• Different management cultures between interfacing organisations 
• Poor monitoring of the movements not being interpreted properly.
• No proper system for emergency repairs.
• Hazards were not appreciated 
• Contractor had a lack of direct and relevant experience 
• Ad-hoc site repairs were carried out without proper planning and without any independent 
review 
Project Detail Extension was being made to a metro system using an NATM 
system 
Case No. 30 
Categorisation Code AST1 
Major Hazard Event Major collapse at the ground level occurred 
Consequence Workers and members of the public were killed as a result of tunnel construction work 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The primary cause of the face instability (and this the whole collapse) was the transfer of water 
above the construction works into the face of the tunnel construction. 
• Failure to recognise ground compositions effectively 
• Above this level to the road was waterlogged gravel with a high level water-table 
• The face being excavated became increasingly unstable 
• Questionable risk control methods 
• Lack of risk management – no response when sand/water rushed in
• Inadequate clay cover, no assessment of reduced cover and ignoring of risk of hydraulic 
connection 
• Designed with low cover; contractor possibly took on the risk without talking about it 
• Lack of good risk assessment by both designer and contractor 
• Lack of experienced and competent people involved
• Risk taking practices 
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Project Detail Modification of an existing double-track rail tunnel in which Case No. 31 
the invert was being lowered to permit bigger freight wagons 
to pass.  
Categorisation Code AST1 
Major Hazard Event Tunnel collapsed
Consequence Workers killed 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Effect of modification on tunnel not properly evaluated
• A complete failure by client group to assess structural risk  
• Failure to consider a warning from experienced persons involved  
• Failure of contractor to assess the risks 
• Clear thinking about structural behaviour 
• Making assumptions 
• Failure to act on concerns 
Project Detail Construction of an undersea rail tunnel, twin-bore with cross Case No. 32 
passages, using TBMs.  Categorisation Code AST1 
Major Hazard Event Modification was undertaken with the anti-flooding door open, water rushed in and flooded both 
tunnels
Consequence Massive project delay and extra costs 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Failure to maintain watertight security in TBM 
• Lack of knowledge and control at the workface
• Lack of competent supervision by management
• Lack of proper work procedure with risk assessment
• Ignorance and incompetence at management level 
• Work process not considered thoroughly 
• Interface problems between designers and contractors 
• Lack of an overall and careful consideration of risks for that work process and a more careful 
consideration of that work before starting. 
Project Detail Demolition work to tower block flats adjacent to retail park Case No. 33 
development Categorisation Code SC3 
Major Hazard Event An exclusion zone had to be put in place for the safety of town centre users as the demolition work 
was considered unsafe by the HSE. The contractor had not closed off the area and residents and 
public were set to continue using the area. However there was a major risk of collapse of the former 
tower block onto a shopping centre precinct. The HSE showed particular concern about the stability 
of the structure which was supported on six columns and a slender wall spanning from the ground 
floor to the underside of the second floor. 
Consequence The area had a high volume of retailers and the general public. Risk to workers and to the public with 
possible catastrophic consequences 
Potential Causative • The potential hazard arose some years ago with the removal of a stairwell pre-dating 1965/66 
Factors • Underlying hazard only recognised through HSE intervention. 
• There was a certain degree of pressure for the contractor to complete the work discretely and not 
to restrict access to the area
• The structure was considered to be particularly weak in the North and South direction. 
• Inadequate planning of 1960’s hybrid / system of built flats with the all important stair and lift 
core demolished in advance of the accommodation ‘wings’
• The stair core and lift shafts had been removed   
• The prop and tie of the 1st floor had been removed leaving the wall spanning in excess of 16’0” 
• Demolition work hadn’t taken into account the danger to the public 
• Historical drawings had not been checked adequately 
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Project Detail Refurbishment of city centre building, Case No. 34 
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event There was an intervention by an HSE civil engineer following sight of a 30m high tube and fitting 
scaffold. The extension was later found to be un-braced. Further un-braced and inadequately 
restrained scaffold standards. were also found 
Consequence The temporary works required urgent modification to ensure its structural safety and to remove 
serious risk of structural collapse. Located in a busy city centre street with direct impacts upon worker 
safety and the general public. Direct potential for temporary work collapse and possible effects on the 
permanent structure. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• There was a miscalculation in the design of the temporary works leading to a short supply of 
scaffold materials 
• The main contractor did not check and adequately question the plans of the sub-contractor 
• Inappropriate supply of scaffold fixings and parts 
• Once it was recognised that fixings were not fit for purpose, adequate time was not allowed for 
the appropriate fixings to be supplied 
• The design process for temporary works was not effective and not coordinated properly 
• Competent engineers did not react to the situation once faults were identified 
• Some suggestion of collusion between contractors due to the obvious nature of the hazard 
Project Detail Refurbishment and expansion of a city centre building Case No. 35 
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event The collapse was due to overloading with scaffold components and defective construction of the 
system 
Consequence Major city centre route with potential for mass casualties and/or fatalities. Major disruption to the city 
centre area (business and transport activities) 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
§ Defective construction of the scaffold systems 
§ Lack of relevant checking of the system and failure to follow supply specifications 
§ The scaffold was overloaded
§ Failure to recognise hazardous scenarios and influencing factors 
§ Major errors at all levels of the project development 
§ Poor team working 
§ Failure to consider residual risks 
§ Managed interfaces, communication and cooperation between contracting parties 
Project Detail Major redevelopment of a city centre building Case No. 36 
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event Collapse of 30 metre scaffold system. The access scaffolding collapsed perpendicular to the building 
construction
Consequence One fatality and several major injuries. Major disruption to city centre area 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Use of non-standard equipment 
• Lack of training of site personnel to the new scaffold system 
• Poor design of temporary structure
• Failure to follow supply contractors specifications 
• Inappropriate use of software to facilitate the design process 
• Lack of appropriate temp works design; hoist supplier; and main contractor 
• Overloading had rendered the structure unstable.
• The scaffold had not been adequately tied to the building structure 
• Lack of proper footing which subsequently compromised strength and stability 
• Temporary removal of adjustment ties and deflection of the scaffold columns from the main 
structure by a “jacking out” procedure
• Overloading of building blocks onto 3 separate lifts 
• A graduate design engineer was left to bear responsibility for much of the work
• The specialist scaffolding sub-contractor had not ensured that the design of the access scaffold 
(tie, height and pattern) had adhered to the recommended calculations (Completion or Handover 
certificate).  Under strict compliance, overloading would not have occurred if the main contractor 
had ensured that only two scaffold lifts were operating at any one time 
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Project Detail City centre building development Case No. 37 
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event Partial collapse of scaffold system 
Consequence Risk to residents of the tower block, workers and the public in the possible event of a scaffold system 
collapse 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The scaffold supplier had recently been changed.  The contractors failed to use a familiar system 
• Sub-contractor should have trained individuals to be competent with the system. Failure to 
provide adequate training on the new scaffold system 
• Inadequate design of scaffold system resulted in movement of the scaffold away from the 
building development 
• There was excessive distance between ring bolt and transom.
• The scaffold was not tied to the building in accordance with drawings.
• Failure to check information provided by suppliers - Ties were not staggered in accordance with 
technical information provided by the supply contractor 
• The stability of the scaffold was significantly compromised.
• At roof level the scaffold had deflected away from the building which risked significant falls 
from height between the inside edge of the scaffold and the face of the building 
Project Detail Building development Case No. 38 
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event The scaffold was a three bay 20metre high loading tower. Two sections of a scaffold loading bay 
tower approximately 20 meters in height collapsed.
Consequence A subcontractor, who was working on the scaffold 12 meters from the ground, fell roughly 5 meters 
into the components of the collapsing tower and was struck by a board and other components, 
suffering severe head lacerations, a broken wrist and a broken rib. The incident happened at 10am at 
a relatively dormant period of activity. There was potential for further multiple injuries and fatalities 
had the incident occurred at a more active period 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The primary factors were failure to appreciate that such a structure would require significant 
temporary work design
• Failure to provide information on the safe loading for this structure
• Failure to control the loading of material onto the structure
• The loading bay tower collapsed as a pallet of building blocks weighing one ton was loaded onto 
it
• The scaffold system was not fit for purpose. The scaffolding tower was not designed and then 
overloaded
• There was insufficient plan bracing and the outer bay was carrying approximately 10 ton of 
concrete block immediately prior to the collapse.  The structure had been severely overloaded 
although a number of factors contributed to the final collapse
Project Detail Major redevelopment of a city centre building Case No. 39 
Categorisation Code CTW2 
Major Hazard Event During an inspection of a refurbishment project to a city centre building, the HSE noticed that the 
scaffolding banner was not properly tied to the scaffold and the building.
Consequence Due to this being a main shopping area and main traffic route there was potential for public fatalities. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• There was no design drawings for the banner or for the scaffold and ties required to support it. 
There was no design for the banner and likewise for the scaffold and ties to support the banner.
• The use of proprietary hand railing components for the banner frame was considered to be unsafe 
and inappropriate for such an application. 
• The worker/s assigned to the specific task should have been conscious of risk 
• The obvious dangers to the public were overlooked 
• Engineers were not meticulous about all aspects of the temporary works 
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Project Detail Gas mains renewal works in a major city centre Case No. 40 
Categorisation Code AST3 
Major Hazard Event A prohibition notice was served
Consequence Potential risks to road users of such poorly shored/supported excavations in the event of a collapse of 
the sides endangering roadway (e.g. a large vehicle entering an excavation).  Multi injury potential. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• No clear design process in place by the contractors 
• Lack of adequate support during excavation works
• Plastic trench sheets were used with only 2 adjustable props with bolts mid span
• Supervisors failed to provide suitable guidance to operators
• Supervisors and site engineers failed to monitor and control the works
• Lack of experienced engineers
• No client or design level checks 
Project Detail Cofferdam method used for the construction of a 665-metre Case No. 41 
culvert during a city centre excavation Categorisation Code AST3 
Major Hazard Event The sand bag bund used to secure the culvert area from flooding collapsed 
Consequence Two workers almost drowned during the incident 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The contractor consciously made the decision to secure one end of the cofferdam with sandbag 
bunds, or barriers, to prevent flooding when the tide came in, which effectively rendered this a 
confined space. 
• Contractor admitted that they had failed to ensure the health and safety of employees who were 
constructing the culvert
• There was insufficient management of hazards
• Workers were not briefed and did not work to method statements (e.g. Emergency Procedures, 
Access/Egress requirements). Operations were inadequately managed and they failed to construct 
a sandbag barrier in accordance with the design set out in the company’s method statement 
• There were management staffing issues, through holidays, sickness and change in staff 
• There was a failure to communicate sufficient method statement and emergency procedures 
Project Detail Design and build contract to construct two tunnels as an Case No. 42 
extension to a transportation system Categorisation Code AST1 
Major Hazard Event A breach occurred in the lining of the tunnel wall due to excess compressed air pressure causing water 
leaking into the tunnel during construction of a cross passage.
Consequence The blowout which occurred created a large crater in the grounds of a local school and showered 
nearby buildings with debris. Incident occurred at night. Had the blow-out occurred just a few hours 
later, then a public disaster may have resulted. Almost undoubtedly there would have been significant 
numbers of seriously injured schoolchildren, with possible loss of life among those closest to the 
location of the blow-out. 
Potential Causative • Calculations carried out for the contractor were inadequate.
Factors • There was not enough overburden to resist internal forces exerted by the compressed air and this 
led to a rapid escape of pressure.
• The risk of blowout due to internal pressure build-up in the tunnel was overlooked.
• Design consultant should have warned the main Contractor about the risk of blow out while 
compressed air was in use in the tunnel.
• Lack of coordination between the design and main contractors.  
• The consequences and range of alternatives construction methods had not been discussed 
between contractors (Design and Construct). 
• Contractors should have checked requirements 
• There was a failure of the contractor to carry out and supply adequate calculations 
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Project Detail Refurbishment of church roof Case No. 43 
Categorisation Code CTW1 
Major Hazard Event The job was called to a halt as there were several improprieties noticed including inadequate 
temporary bracing of the new roof trusses to the church building. 
Consequence Potential collapse risks to workers / public (including children’s nursery / playgroup). Major risks to 
workers and general public. Potential for major disruption and damage to local infrastructure. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Failure to provide temporary bracing to large heavy timber roof trusses to replacement roof to 
church. 
• Inexperience and incompetence of Site Works Engineer
• Engineer failed to recognise the risk to this particular development 
• Failure of contractor to recognise limitations of engineers 
• Clear design instructions should have been passed over to engineer rather than assumptions made 
about experience 
• Interface problems between design and construction 
• Design team could have run on-site checks 
Project Detail Construction of additional steel framed floors to a former 
newspaper press building 
Case No. 44 
Categorisation Code CTW1 
Major Hazard Event A partial collapse occurred during the construction of additional steel framed floors to the former 
newspaper press building. The building was being converted into multi occupancy accommodation, 
which included a section of new build steel frame structures and concrete floor slabs from the upper 
levels of the existing reinforce concrete framed structure. 
Consequence Near to, although not directly accessed by, a populated area.  If further collapse had occurred the 
problem could have been greater 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• No calculations were prepared by the consulting engineer.  Collapse of the two temporary 
steelwork support structures occurred while the concrete was being placed 
• The collapse occurred due to overload of the temporary structure and on-site (ad-hoc) support 
requirement 
• The principal contractor had no temporary works design ability 
• Failure of initial design investigations to identify a service void in the location of the footing of 
the proposed steel frame structure and of temporary works 
• Failure to question the relevance for mortar “buttering up” given the depth of concrete removed 
from the wall heads of a service void. 
• No mortar specifications provided by the site works engineer 
• Construction of the reinforced concrete floor slabs should not have commenced until the steel 
angle supports were secure 
• Principal contractor and site management supervision arrangements were poor 
Project Detail Refurbishment of an existing building Case No. 45 
Categorisation Code SC3 
Major Hazard Event There was a partial collapse of a stone support pier during the refurbishment. There was potential for 
further collapse if work had progressed without temporary shoring having been properly designed. 
Consequence Immediate danger to workers on site although there was the possibility of public injuries and fatalities 
had the collapse significantly compromised the integrity of the whole building 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The work was being undertaken by a relatively small contractor who had not requested any 
proper designs for needling support.
• Poor initial advice given by the falsework representative
• Failure to design appropriate temporary works for forming a new large opening during 
refurbishment 
• Initially there was incorrect information used to work out the loading on new beams for opening 
out on the building
• There was a requirement for a greater density of props than originally detailed in initial drawings 
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Project Detail Construction of a large leisure centre complex Case No. 46 
Categorisation Code SC2 
Major Hazard Event Ceiling collapsed 
Consequence The incident happened only days before the complex were due to open to the public. No one was 
inside and there were no injuries although the theatre had the capacity to hold 500 people 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The designs were unworkable resulting in unauthorised changes 
• There was no evidence of inspection or supervision of installation 
• Lack of communication between principal contractor and client 
• Supporting beam breaking loose due to the extreme weight pressure 
• The false ceiling was not adequately secured leading to a supporting beam breaking loose,
causing 200m² of ceiling which held the lights and the fire preventing sprinkler system to 
collapse in one of the auditoria (theatre 7) 
Project Detail Construction of five blocks of timber framed apartments and Case No. 47 
retail units Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event Fire occurred completely destroying all new block developments and causing significant damage to 
surrounding buildings 
Consequence Caused major gridlock in area, damaged nearby buildings, serious threat to potential residents of 
completed apartments, construction workers and fire service personnel due to dangerous fire fighting 
operational conditions - unsecure access/ retreat and unreliable water supplies 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Lack of compartmentation, completed stairwells and flammability of construction materials 
• The initial work programme changed although there was no additional measures taken in 
response 
• The work program ignored the high fire hazard 
• Lack of appreciation of the vulnerability of the building at that stage of construction and lack of 
control of ignition sources 
• Apparent disjoint between those responsible for site safety and those responsible for the 
construction program 
• Suspected careless disposal by operatives of smoking materials in area of highly flammable 
waste materials 
Project Detail Refurbishment of an important tourist attraction and potential 
commercial centre 
Case No. 48 
Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event Suspicion of Arson 
Consequence Due to dangerous fire fighting operational conditions (unsecure access/ retreat from fire and 
unreliable water supplies) fire fighters were put at risk 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The structure was old and had been abandoned for many years. It was closed to the public and 
not maintained and was boarded up awaiting refurbishment 
• Arson was not detected early, relying on members of the public to alert authorities.  
• Although the site was boarded up, there was no effective access from sea, or land at low tide 
• The structure was not maintained at all, but security was ineffective 
• The site was only accessible by sea, which made the job of fire fighting extremely difficult 
• As a Grade 1 listed building, it is notable that no fire safety or security measures were in place in 
spite of the known fire risk 
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Project Detail Major Refurbishment of an ancient ‘heritage’ timber built Case No. 49 
vessel Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event Failure of industrial vacuum cleaner led to serious fire damage 
Consequence Due to dangerous fire fighting operational conditions (unsecure access/ retreat from fire and and 
unreliable water supplies) put fire fighters at risk. Loss of irreplaceable heritage, and damage of 
reputation to contractors and heritage trustees 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Industrial vacuum cleaner left on over weekend without sufficient checking 
• Failure of industrial vacuum cleaner led to serious fire damage 
• Contractors and conservationists did not review work processes effectively 
• Security team did not understand the significance of their duties, which included constant checks 
and monitoring - not merely prevention of unauthorised access 
• Poor communication
• There was no clear information whether or not flammable gas cylinders were on site, hence fire 
fighters could not enter the structure 
Project Detail Development of a 7 storey high hybrid construction 
development of approx 82 flats: ground floor comprising 
Case No. 50 
reinforced concrete transfer slab over basement car park with a 
6 storey high timber framed building above. 
Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event Fire broke out in the timber frame during construction. Suspected arson. 
Consequence Approx 50 recently completed occupied flats in adjacent properties were evacuated as they were 
potentially within the collapse zone of the tower crane. Local railway line had to be closed and local 
connecting roads were closed for several weeks. The construction site had to be closed leading to 
time scale delays and subsequent economic loses
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Contractor not experienced in coping with circumstances such as this and hence lacked required 
skills. 
• Failure to recognise scenarios, there had been previous well documented incidents in timber 
framed construction sites 
• Commercial considerations were the overriding decision factor which included insufficient site 
security once construction was suspended 
• Unwillingness of contractors to invest in adequate security and safety precautions 
Project Detail Refurbishment of an important commercial development, and Case No. 51 
an existing tourist attraction Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event Arson was the suspected cause of the fire 
Consequence Dangerous fire fighting operational conditions (unsecure access/ retreat from fire and unreliable water 
supplies) put fire fighters at risk 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The client consortium who did not engage competent persons to advise them, nor communicate 
sufficiently with the fire service
• The structure was run-down and ill-maintained, and the majority of it was 100 years old 
• The fire risk had not been adequately assessed 
• No on-site security operating, and it was known that vandalism was occurring on-site, nothing 
was done
• Fire brigade access was difficult and water supplies unreliable due to the nature of the structure 
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Project Detail Construction of an addition of a 2-storey extension to an Case No. 52 
existing, operational 4-storey hospital building Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event It is considered that the most likely cause for this fire was hot works on site, which caused a fire 
which spread through rubber insulation on an external riser into the roof void of the existing building, 
compromising compartmentation 
Consequence Loss of 2 floors of operational health units, loss of entire facility for 10 days, need to evacuate 79 
patients and 200 staff. Also resulted in the loss of 40 years of oncological research data 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The work necessitated hot welding on site, although this was done by competent contractors 
under a hot work permit 
• Flammability of the weatherproofing material was not recognised 
• Other combustible materials were present within the service tower which added to the fuel load. 
• Poor choice of weatherproofing in conjunction with programming of welding 
• Relevant codes and plans for safety were not applied effectively 
• No 'fire watcher' was appointed, so the fire was not extinguished when it was possible to do so 
• Lack of site control with limitations in experienced supervision 
Project Detail Rail tunnel excavation under a sea channel Case No. 53 
Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event Uncontrollable fire broke out on Tunnel Boring Machine during construction ­
Consequence The workers were placed in serious danger. The project was severely delayed and the financial cost 
was high 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Fire was caused by a pin-hole leak in the pressurised system containing highly flammable liquid.  
• Fire risk from pressurised oil which was atomised was understood, however failure to recognise 
importance of maintenance and checking of high pressure delivery pipe work that contained 
flammable liquid. 
• The hazard was not foreseen to be as major as it proved to be. 
Project Detail Construction of 5-storey block development consisting of 34 
flats 
Case No. 54 
Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event Large scale fire. 
Consequence Threat to significant number of nearby residents and also to their properties and fire fighters due to 
due to dangerous fire fighting operational conditions - unsecure access/ retreat from fire and 
unreliable water supplies. Hazard to residents from smoke and hot gases, loss of security and home 
for vulnerable people. Adjacent properties were damaged and some gutted. Nearly 200 evacuated 
and many made homeless. Potential for residents to become trapped. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Lack of knowledge as to recognised hazards from small wood sections and particleboard which 
were easily ignitable 
• Once ignited, timber frames under construction lacked fire separation and the fire developed 
extremely quickly 
• Risk of arson was not addressed properly
• Role of fire advising was not totally clear
• Lack of appreciation of the vulnerability of the building at that stage of construction and lack of 
control of ignition sources 
• Low levels of site control 
• The upgrading of site security had been considered and dismissed on cost grounds 
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Project Detail Major refurbishment during occupation of a high rise building Case No. 55 
Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event Small fire escalated causing the structural collapse of several floors 
Consequence Major fire at night caused huge numbers of people watching and subsequent traffic congestion 
resulting in difficult access for fire service. Loss of major building and power. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Developers did not recognise the increased fire risk of refurbishment whilst maintaining 
occupation 
• A small fire, extinguishable by first aid fire fighting, escalated to a major fire and spread upwards 
and downwards 
• No labels were identified to show which risers supplied the fire floor
• No previous survey by the fire service to ensure they had sufficient information to create an 
effective plan 
• Fire brigade attempted to fight fire with hose reels but did not secure water supply and retreated 
• Numerous errors at all levels of construction and service (including Fire Service, Building 
Managers, Security)
Project Detail Redevelopment of sea front tourist attraction and commercial Case No. 56 
units Categorisation Code F 
Major Hazard Event Fire 
Consequence Due to dangerous fire fighting operational conditions (unsecure access/ retreat from fire and 
unreliable water supplies) put fire fighters at risk. Loss of significant tourist and commercial facility 
for several years, in small coastal town 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Loss of effective water supply led to the fire (which at one point appeared under control) 
breaking out and destroying much of the development 
• Hazards on-site were increased due to requirement of developers to generate funds by continuing 
commercial operations whilst refurbishing  
• Although a Fire Safety Order (FSO) would apply to this site, the property protection aspects were 
not given sufficient priority 
• Lack of hazard overview and effective monitoring due to multiple lease-holders operating in 
close proximity 
Project Detail Construction of pre-stressed precast concrete approach 
viaducts across a river 
Case No. 57 
Categorisation Code CTW1 
Major Hazard Event The girders of a launching gantry collapsed causing a precast segment to fall and penetrate the deck of 
the completed portion  of viaduct 
Consequence There were a significant number of construction personnel in area of collapse. No one was injured in 
the collapse but the recovery of the precast unit, repairs to the viaduct and repairs to the launching 
gantry caused significant cost and delays to the project. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The event involved the operator applying an emergency stop which cut power to the primary 
braking system and applied a static brake – friction from this brake caused overheating, reducing 
the effectiveness of the brake. The 40T hoisting crab and the 200T precast segment ran back on 
the storage section of the gantry that was not designed for this load and thus collapsed. 
• Designers of the launching kit did not consider the emergency stop load condition where the 
dynamic brake would not work (because its power was cut) – the static brake was only envisaged 
to be used once the hoisting crab was stationary. 
• The storage section of the gantry was not designed to carry the weight of the hoisting crab and 
the precast unit as this condition was not envisaged. 
• This was a product failure, but mainly caused by the designers not considering all the potential 
adverse incidents. 
• There was also process and people failure in that the operator had not been advised to only use 
the emergency stop when the crab and its load were stationary. 
• There was a lack of independent review of launching gantry design 
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Project Detail Extension and refurbishment to a hotel Case No. 58 
Categorisation Code C&MPE1 
Major Hazard Event As the crane top was lifted on the climbing frame, the crane top fell backwards, rotated through 180° 
and landed on the roof of the occupied hotel 
Consequence The tower section that had been used as a balance weight was thrown through the roof of the hotel’s 
banqueting suite where a wedding reception has been due to start 30 minutes later.  The operator was 
injured although no injuries were sustained to members of the public using the hotel. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Two tower cranes had been erected on site, one of which was being increased in height by 
climbing
• The erection supervisor was unfamiliar with the climbing frame and had not appreciated the need 
for the climbing frame to be fastened to the base of the slewing section, despite the requirement 
being detailed in the Method Statement. 
• There were time pressures due to unrealistic targets being set for completion of the various tasks
• The erection supervisor did not lead the team effectively and did not carry out effective team 
briefing on tasks that needed to be carried out 
• The bolts connecting the crane top to the top of the tower were removed
• No nuts or washers were used to connect the crane top to the climbing frame 
• The crane top was not secured to the climbing frame and the crane top was not balanced about the 
tower. When the climbing frame was raised, the movement was sufficient to cause the crane top to 
fall backwards. 
• As the crane top was lifted on the climbing frame, the crane top fell backwards, rotated through 
180° and landed on the roof of the occupied hotel 
Project Detail Construction of an office block in a major city centre using Case No. 59 
tower cranes Categorisation Code C&MPE1 
Major Hazard Event Crane collapsed 
Consequence The crane landed in a main city centre area 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Subcontractors were hired who did not have appropriate expertise and there was no in-house 
expertise 
• Regular site inspections by experts was omitted in an attempt to save money 
• The bolted joint between the steel members had not been correctly designed to for tension and 
was not pre-loaded to accommodate fatigue
• The bolts were too short 
• Checks by the contractor were numerical only and there was no review 
• There was a failure to spot the inadequate and unspecified bolt size and lack of pre-stress to resist 
fatigue 
• During operation and cyclical loading and unloading over time the bolts failed due to fatigue and 
the crane to collapse 
Project Detail Major construction development Case No. 60 
Categorisation Code C&MPE1 
Major Hazard Event The front offside outrigger of a tower crane punched through the kerb on which it had been placed and 
a mobile crane used to hoist a tower crane overturned.
Consequence The mobile crane was set up in a public road which ran between the main site and a compound 
containing the site offices and welfare facilities. The road also contained a number of houses, one of 
which was being used by the resident engineers, whilst the others were occupied by residents. Several 
houses were damaged. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The jib of one of the tower cranes was being removed, using a mobile crane, during the 
dismantling of the crane so that the rail bogies on the travelling base could be replaced 
• The front offside outrigger was set up on ground with inadequate bearing capacity 
• There was a lack of effective planning by the appointed person 
• Inadequate planning and inadequate ground assessment 
• Lack of assessment of ground conditions and lack of understanding of ground bearing capacity 
of kerbs and pavements 
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Project Detail Luffing jib tower cranes were being used in the construction 
of a large building.
Case No. 61 
Categorisation Code C&MPE1 
Major Hazard Event A tower section was being climbed in to the tower of one of the cranes. As the section was being 
lowered onto the top of the tower, the climbing fame collapsed with the crane top  
Consequence Three members of the erection team were killed as a result of the 120m fall. Debris from the crane was 
spread over a wide area 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• Cranes were tied to the structure and were being extended, by climbing, as the structure 
increased in height 
• There was a lack of effective planning, including contingency planning.
• There was inadequate training and lack of appropriate personnel on site.  
• Manufacturer’s instructions for balancing the crane and bypassing of slew interlocks were not 
adequately followed
• Lack of anemometer on the crane
• Bypassing of interlocks to prevent inadvertent slewing
• Incorrect balancing of the crane. 
Project Detail A luffing jib tower crane was being erected on site for 
general lifting duties on a city centre construction project 
Case No. 62 
Categorisation Code C&MPE1 
Major Hazard Event The crane top fell onto the partially completed structure, the counterweights became detached and fell 
into the building 
Consequence A joiner working below was killed. The crane operator survived with minor injuries. 
Potential Causative 
Factors 
• The forward moment of the jib was not sufficient to overcome the wind force at maximum in-
service wind speed, allowing the luffing rope to become slack.
• The guarding on the sheave block did not prevent the rope detaching from the sheave 
• A gust of wind was sufficient to blow the jib back, allowing the luffing rope to go slack and the 
rope to jam alongside one of the sheaves
• The operator, in an attempt to lower the jib, paid out a significant amount of luffing rope from 
the winch, which looped down behind the crane. The rope then became free from the sheave 
block and the jib fell, until arrested by the luffing rope
• The crane design was later considered defective 
• There had been a lack of adequate assessment at product design stage 
• Inadequate margins allowed by the manufacturer for jib stability.  
• Possible discrepancies with understanding the relevant European Standards 
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Preventing catastrophic events 

in construction
 
The construction industry recognises the hazardous 
nature of its activities, which can be seen in the high 
toll of accidents its workers suffer compared with 
other industries - ranging from lost time injuries to 
fatalities. There is also a high incidence of ill-health 
among construction workers, including fatal diseases
such as cancer arising from asbestos exposure. 
However, the industry may not be sufficiently aware 
of the potential for it to be associated with more 
major or catastrophic events (those involving multiple
deaths and/or significant damage to property and 
infrastructure). 
Larger construction organisations have been applying
‘holistic’ risk management techniques to manage
project risk. Low probability but high-consequence 
issues have often been included in these 
considerations. Most issues addressed have had 
purely commercial consequences eg sudden loss of 
a major contract or customer. However, some issues 
do have significant health and safety implications. 
This project has examined these ‘low probability but 
high-consequence’ safety hazards by looking at: 
n the types of catastrophic event which have 
occurred or which might occur during 
construction; 
n the reasons for occurrence when there have 
been (or could have been) catastrophic events 
during construction, including an examination 
of the underlying factors; 
n the controls which should contribute to an 
avoidance of a catastrophic event; and 
n where the UK construction industry could 
improve. 
This report and the work it describes were funded by 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Its contents, 
including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, 
are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily 
reflect HSE policy. 
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